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Abstract 
 
This is a theoretical study that appraises the nature and dimensions of sub-Saharan Africa‟s (SSA‟s) 
political economy and the forces that underpin them, using a Coxian framework of analysis. Since 
2000 the nature of SSA‟s political economy has been changing. Emergent trends and shifts in the 
region‟s political economy, including strong economic growth performances and increasing South-
South cooperation, appear in contradiction to a dependent and conflict ridden depiction portrayed 
by most literature on SSA. From a Coxian perspective, it is contended in this study that these 
changes in SSA‟s political economy have arisen because of systemic changes occurring in the 
international system. At the same time, the study acknowledges that SSA‟s political economy is 
infused with dependence that can be identified through exploring the historical context of the 
twentieth century that shaped it. 
 
The majority of scholarly literature written on SSA has focused on humanitarian crises, poverty, 
war, corruption and conflict. In addition, mainstream International Relations (IR) and International 
Political Economy (IPE) theory largely overlook SSA. The majority of those that explore SSA‟s 
place in world politics have failed to contextualise SSA‟s position within the context of structural 
changes occurring in the international system. This has resulted in mainstream IR and IPE 
paradigms being inadequate to provide explanations for emergent trends in SSA‟s political 
economy. 
 
Exploration and analysis of mainstream IR and IPE theories and Africa‟s epistemological and 
ontological requirements directed the study towards selecting a narrowed Coxian Critical Theory 
(CCT) framework to further explore SSA‟s political economy. Using the CCT theoretical tools of 
„historical structures‟ and „hegemony‟ in the international system, the study explores: What have 
been the key trends prevalent in SSA’s political economy from 2000-2011 and how have these been 
shaped by structural changes in the international system? Does the nature of SSA’s political 
economy between 2000 and 2011 give scope for SSA’s conditions of dependence to alter? 
 
A historicised approach in line with CCT allows for exploration of SSA‟s conditions of dependence 
through identifying the key ideas, institutions and material capabilities pertinent to SSA‟s political 
economy in the twentieth century. The main trends of SSA‟s political economy from 2000 to 2011 
include: a resilient economic and political performance in the face of the financial crisis of 2007 to 
2010; increasing engagement with emerging powers resulting in being typified as the „swing 
continent‟; and different ideas and new approaches with regards to development thinking and the 
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role and nature of institutions. These trends have been highly influenced by the structural change in 
relative material capabilities from traditional to emerging powers during this decade. 
 
The specific use of CCT as a framework has provided the means to analyse the fluid interactions 
between the key forces in SSA‟s political economy and the international system, allowing analysis 
of the possibility of SSA‟s conditions of dependency to alter.  However, this is contingent on 
factors such as the desire of African leaders and policymakers to end the conditions of dependence. 
The study identifies the scope and limitations of Coxian analysis for understanding trajectories in 
SSA‟s political economy. 
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Opsomming 
 
Hierdie is ‟n teoretiese studie wat die aard en die omvang van sub-Sahara Afrika (SSA) se politieke 
ekonomie en die kragte wat dit beïnvloed ondersoek, deur gebruik te maak van „n Coxiaanse 
(Coxian) ontledingsraamwerk. Sedert die jaar 2000 het die aard van SSA se politieke ekonomie 
begin verander. Verskuiwings en tendense in die streek se politieke ekonomie, insluitende sterk 
ekonomiese groeisyfers en ‟n toename in Suid-Suid samewerking, strook nie met die beeld van ‟n 
afhanklike en geweld geteisterde gebied wat dikwels in die literatuur oor SSA verskyn nie. Hierdie 
studie voer aan, vanuit „n Coxiaanse oogpunt, dat sulke veranderinge in SSA se politieke ekonomie 
hul oorsprong het in sistemiese verskuiwinge in die internasionale bestel. Terselfdertyd, word dit 
aanvaar dat SSA se politieke ekonomie wel aspekte van afhanklikheid toon, veral wanneer die 20ste 
eeu in oënskou geneem word. 
 
Meeste akademiese literatuur oor SSA plaas die fokus op humanitêre krisisse, armoede, oorlog, 
korrupsie en konflik. Daarbenewens het hoofstroom Internationale Betrekinge (IB) en 
Internasionale Politieke Ekonomie (IPE) hoofsaaklik SSA oor die hoof gesien, terwyl dié wat SSA 
se plek in die internasionale sisteem ondersoek, dikwels daarin faal om SSA se posisie in die 
konteks van strukturele veranderinge in die internasionale stelsel te ontleed. Dit het IB en IPE 
paradigmas tot gevolg wat onvoldoende is om ontluikende tendense in SSA te verklaar. 
 
Daar is dus tekortkominge in hoofstroom IB en IPE teorieë. Terselfdertyd stel ontleding van SSA 
epistemologiese en ontologiese vereistes. Derhalwe gebruik hierdie studie ‟n  nouCoxiaanse 
Kritiese Teoretiese (CKT) raamwerk om SSA se politieke ekonomie dieper te ondersoek. Deur 
gebruik te maak van CKT se teoretiese gereedskap, historiese strukture en hegemonie in die 
internasionale stelsel, ondersoek die studie die volgende vraag: Wat is die belangrikste tendense wat 
voorkom in SSA se politieke ekonomie vanaf 2000-2011 en hoe is hierdie tendense gevorm deur die 
strukturele veranderinge in die internasionale stelsel? Ook, bied die aard van SSA se politieke 
ekonomie tussen 2000 en 2011 ruimte vir SSA se omstandighede van afhanklikheid om te verander?  
 
„n Gehistoriseerde aanslag in lyn met CKT maak voorsiening vir die verkenning van SSA se 
omstandighede van afhanklikheid deur die identifisering van die belangrikste idees, instellings en 
materiële vermoëns wat betrekking het op SSA se politieke ekonomie in die twintigste eeu. Van die 
hoof tendense in SSA se politieke ekonomie tussen 2000 tot 2011 sluit in: sterk ekonomiese en 
politieke prestasie ten spyte van die finansiële krisis van 2007-2010; toenemende betrokkenheid 
deur opkomende magte wat daartoe lei tot Afrika bekend te staan as die „swaai  kontinent;‟ en, 
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nuwe begrippe en idees oorontwikkeling, sowel as oor die rol en aard van instellings. Hierdie 
tendense is sterk beïnvloed deur strukturele veranderinge die afgelope decade in die relatiewe én 
materiële bevoegdhede van tradisionele en ontluikende magte.  
 
Die gebruik van CKT laat ontleding van die wisselwerking tussen sleutelmagte in SSA se politieke 
ekonomie toe, wat gevolglik ook analise van potensiële verandering in SSA se afhanklikheid 
moontlik maak. Of afhanklikheid wel beeindig sal word, hang onder meer af van die bereidheid van 
Afrika-leiers en beleidmakers om daad by die woord te voeg. Die studie bepaal die bydrae en 
beperkinge van Coxiaanse analise vir ‟n begrip van die trajek wat SSA se politieke ekonomie 
inneem.  
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1. Introduction 
 
1.1 Background to the study 
Sub-Saharan Africa1 (SSA) is routinely depicted as „the limbo of the international system, existing 
only at the outer limits of the planet which we inhabit,‟ with the vast majority of academic literature 
reproducing the notion of the region‟s marginalisation from the rest of the world (Bayart 2000, 
p.217). Indeed, the bulk of scholarly work written on SSA appears to have focused on how the 
region is in „crisis‟, or succumbing to war, poverty, militarism, natural catastrophes, famine, 
corruption, conflict, environmental degradation, disease, crisis of governance and criminality 
(Taylor and Williams 2004, pp.1-2). There is minimal focus on SSA‟s political economy within 
International Relations (IR) and International Political Economy (IPE) literature (with exceptions 
including Taylor and Williams 2004; Cornelissen 2009 and 2011) that has resulted in a lack of 
theoretical analysis exploring the nature of SSA‟s political economy. This focus on conflict has 
contributed to an understanding that „Africa does not have meaningful politics only humanitarian 
disasters‟ (Dunn and Shaw 2001, p.1). Consequently, there is a lack of scholarly work analysing 
SSA‟s political economy, with focus instead on SSA‟s developmental discourse largely amounting 
to „saving the continent‟ from „the scourge of human poverty and deprivation‟ (Naidu et al. 2009, 
p.1). 
 
However, emergent trends in SSA‟s political economy appear contrary to this depiction. Since the 
turn of the century, analysts, policy makers and corporations across the world have cast the region 
in a much more positive light (Cornelissen 2011, p.5). This shift has been succinctly portrayed by 
the change in international discourse on Africa. For example, the Economist‟s description of Africa 
changed from „The Hopeless Continent‟ in 2001 to „a more hopeful continent‟ in 2011 (Economist 
2011). This rhetoric swing occurred after identifying SSA as one of the world‟s fastest growing 
regions from 2001 to 2010, due to „the lion kings‟ of Angola, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Chad, Mozambique 
and Rwanda all featuring in the global top ten fastest growing economies (Economist 2011). SSA‟s 
encouraging economic growth and increasingly attractive appearance as a destination of Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI) during this past decade is further highlighted by the World Bank, the 
                                                   
1 For the rest of the thesis, „SSA‟ will be used to denote „Sub-Saharan Africa‟. The countries included in the study‟s 
analysis are: Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, 
Chad, Comoros, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo DRC (Zaire), Cote d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, 
Gabon, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, 
Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Reunion, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, 
Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. South Sudan 
is not included in the study because it is based on events up until March 2011 (as discussed further in the limitations 
section of this chapter) and South Sudan was recognised as a sovereign state after this date. 
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World Economic Forum and the African Development Bank in their jointly commissioned 
publication, The Africa Competitiveness Report 2011. This publication identified Africa‟s 
„economic resurgence‟ by illustrating the region‟s recovery from the global financial crisis, which 
was faster than many other areas of the world (The Africa Competitiveness Report 2011, p.v).  
 
The promising economic growth among a number of developing countries over the past decade has 
resulted in a shift in material capabilities of key players in the international system, due to the rise 
in importance of emerging powers in the international system (Cornelissen 2009; Naidu et al. 2009; 
Scott 2010; Shaw et al. 2009). Despite the fact that many SSA countries are Least Developed 
Countries (LDCs), Africa appears as the „swing continent‟, caught up in „a fluid period of transition 
in the global balance of power and the international state system characterised by traditional and 
emerging powers‟ which has led to the region playing a more prominent role in the international 
arena (Kornegay and Landsberg 2009, p.171). This has presented SSA countries with the 
opportunity to pursue deeper multilateralism with emerging and „Southern‟ powers aimed at the 
reduction of international disparities, whilst traditional and „Northern‟ powers have also pursued 
closer engagement with the continent through means such as international development and aid 
campaigns (Cornelissen 2009, p.6). Hence this shift in the international system has implications for 
SSA‟s political economy in terms of identifying how the region can benefit from alliances and 
representation with either or both groups of powers.  
 
International institutions are also being impacted by this structural shift in the material capabilities 
of key players in the international system, as emerging powers are „giving rise to the reordering of 
actual global relations and highlighting the need to rethink definitions and practices of global 
governance‟ such as allowing a wider group of countries to shape the agenda of international 
institutions (Shaw et al. 2009, p.29). From 2000 to 2011 SSA has become an increasingly 
prominent actor in international politics, and its governments and non-state actors have responded 
to the shift in material capabilities in the international system „with renewed diplomatic and 
political activity on world and regional stages‟ (BISA Africa - African Agency in International 
Politics 2011).  
 
This change in relative material capabilities of the United States of America (US) as the hegemonic 
power and the rise of emerging powers material capabilities was hastened the financial crisis of 
2007 to 2010. This shift in the relative material capabilities of powers in the international system 
had knock on implications for the hegemonic neoliberal notion of market efficiency, which in the 
wake of the financial crisis is „now subject to extensive challenge on both theoretical and empirical 
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grounds‟ (The Turner Review 2009, p.39). Furthermore, this change holds implications for the 
prevalence of neoliberal thinking across the world, as different ideas and new approaches in terms 
of developmental thinking gained prominence. This ideational shift contributed to Africa‟s 
economic resurgence, as countries turned to emerging powers and different developmental models 
as „once the worst of the crisis began to wear off, it became apparent that as a group emerging 
economies [they] had weathered the global recession better than advanced economies,‟ (Kose and 
Prasad 2010, p.7). This raised important questions regarding how different developmental models 
can impact the future growth paths of SSA economies.  
  
As mainstream IR and IPE theory largely overlook SSA, they appear inadequate to provide 
explanations for these emergent trends in SSA‟s political economy. The study maintains that shifts 
in SSA‟s political economy have arisen partly as a manifestation of changes occurring in the 
international system. Consequently, the study asserts that analysis of the nature of the international 
system needs to be undertaken in order to identify key shifts that may have implications for the 
nature of, and forces within, SSA‟s political economy. A number of studies exploring Africa‟s 
place in world politics have failed to position Africa within the context of structural changes 
occurring in the international system, resulting in the majority of studies telling „only part of an 
admittedly complex tale‟ (Taylor and Williams 2004, p.3). Subsequently, the study aims to identify 
and explore the trends that have been prevalent in SSA‟s political economy from 2000 to 2011 and 
how these have been shaped by structural changes in the international system. 
 
1.2 Literature review  
1.2.1 The marginalisation of SSA in IR and IPE theory  
Broadly speaking, IR and IPE theoretical scholarship has reiterated Western „assumption and 
experiences [being] passed off as „normal‟ and [has] enabled definitions and concepts that have 
privileged this narrow segment of the world‟s population to become accepted as the norm‟ within 
theory (Dunn, as cited in Schouten 2008 p.3). Since integral IR and IPE concepts such as 
sovereignty and the state „do not easily apply to African reality‟ as they appear „incomprehensible 
in that context,‟ mainstream IR and IPE theoretical scholarship have systematically marginalised 
Africa and studies of its political economy (Dunn 2001, p.6).  
 
Hence, the close link between questions of state formation in SSA and the region‟s external affairs 
„also relates to the manner in which the predominant tone of post-independence politics on the 
continent has posed some major challenges to a number of treasured principles of the international 
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system‟ and subsequently IR and IPE theory (Cornelissen 2009, p.7). Dunn and Shaw (2001) 
determine the ambiguity of the African „sovereign state‟ leads to the main existing IR theory, and 
consequently its close relative IPE, being inappropriate for the African political context, as it does 
not take the „uniqueness‟ of the African continent into account. 
 
One of the solutions put forward has been to create new IR and IPE theories, specific to the 
particularities of the region of Africa (Dunn 2000). Yet this approach carries the risk of highlighting 
and continuing Africa‟s marginalisation in these disciplines, and could lead to the „dangers inherent 
in emphasising Africa‟s differences to the extent that the continent becomes essentialised‟ (Smith 
2009, p.273). The thesis supports this view and aims to identify a theoretical framework that can 
facilitate exploration of the nature of SSA‟s political economy in the context of structural changes 
taking place in the international system. Despite recognising the difficulties in applying such key 
concepts of IR and IPE in an African context, the problematic issues in IR and IPE theory „do not 
simply appear when one moves one‟s focus to Africa, they are there to begin with‟ (Brown 2006, 
p.119). It is important to take note of the varied nature of the African state, however such concepts 
have been debated and challenged throughout the discourse of IR and IPE, and it is important to 
note that the difficulties associated with their definition are not unique to the application of IR or 
IPE to Africa (Brown, 2006). In order to mitigate this difficulty, the current study shall undertake a 
theoretical overview of mainstream IR and IPE, assessing the use and limitations of these various 
theoretical paradigms and key concepts in furthering understanding on SSA‟s political economy. 
The study shall contextualise the nature of the African state and other key concepts through 
exploration of their nature in the twentieth century in order to present the current study with a 
strong historical grounding. 
 
Examination of the IR and IPE based theoretical discussions of SSA‟s place in the international 
system highlight that studies have largely employed state-centric theoretical frameworks that have 
failed to take into account the integral role played by non-state actors, such as Non-Governmental 
Organisations (NGOs) and international financial institutions (IFIs) (Taylor and Williams 2004, 
p.3). Moreover, studies exploring SSA‟s place in world politics have concentrated on evaluating 
policies adopted by countries in SSA towards the outside world, as opposed to analysing the 
policies external powers have undertaken towards SSA and the subsequent effects this has had on 
the region (such as Harbeson and Rothchild 1995).  
  
Dunn (2000, pp.61-62) puts forward that „the dominant IR theories [are] not adequate in explaining 
what [is] actually happening on the African continent,‟ which in turn has implications for the 
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traditional orthodoxy in IPE. It has been suggested that the broad lack of understanding of the SSA 
experience is a product of the inadequacies of dominant tools of social scientific analysis, which in 
turn renders „much of what happens in Africa invisible to outsiders‟ (Bayart 2000, p.229). The 
thesis assents that William Brown‟s (2006) recommendation that it is important not to generalise 
and claim all theory is irrelevant to Africa is pertinent. Therefore, the current study will aim to fill 
this gap in IR and IPE literature on Africa by identifying a theoretical framework that can facilitate 
exploration of the nature of SSA‟s political economy in the context of structural changes taking 
place in the international system. 
 
1.2.2 The misleading notion of SSA’s marginalisation in the international system 
The theoretical study of SSA‟s political economy and its position within the international system 
has been marginalised, yet this is not the case in practice (Bayart 2000, p.218). This stance does not 
contest that African societies have only entered the capitalist world economy to a limited degree. 
This is consequent of the historical process of plundering resources by colonial powers contributing 
to the fact that there is limited primary accumulation in African societies (Bayart 2000, p.241). 
However, Africa „has never ceased to exchange both ideas and goods with Europe and Asia, and 
later with the Americas‟ via trade down the Atlantic Coast and the commercial and cultural 
highway of the Sahara desert (Bayart 2000, p.218). SSA remains a part of the international system 
through: its export of primary resources and other commodities; importing goods and services; FDI 
invested in the region by external actors and abroad by African actors; its debt (a significant 
proportion of which is owed to foreign countries and companies); remittances; and the private and 
public aid it receives, to name the most prominent means (Bayart 2000, p.238). The region has not 
been „relegated to the fringes‟ of the international system, as the notion of marginalisation 
indicates: it has been involved in various forms of political and economic engagement for centuries 
(Harrison 2010, p.1). 
 
SSA‟s position in the international system is a result of the manner in which the region has been 
inserted into the global system, as described by the formation and nature of African states. As 
opposed to marginalisation, in practice SSA‟s political economy is infused with dependence. In 
contrast with dependency theorists‟ argument that dependence is persistent due to its structural 
premise (as Andre Gunder Frank and Fernando Henrique Cardoso would suggest), the thesis 
consents with Bayart (2000, p.234) that dependence is „a historical process, a matrix of action‟, 
reliant on the historical context that has shaped it. This allows for the possibility of dependence to 
alter, depending on the dynamics and structure making up the nature of SSA‟s political economy in 
the context of structural changes taking place in the international system. 
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1.3 Rationale and research questions  
The rationale for the study is threefold. Firstly, it draws upon Coxian Critical Theory (CCT) in its 
understanding that inherent contradictions in the international system itself eventually lead to 
change; resulting in such shifts being systemic2 in nature (Cox 1987). Analysis of the international 
system from 2000 to 2011 indicates that the rise in emerging powers‟ material capabilities is an 
observable structural shift that has taken place. This shift appears systemic in nature, as it is based 
on a change in material capability related structures that are integral to the formation of the 
international system (Cox 1987). This structural change has had knock on implications for the 
predominant ideas concerning developmental thinking and the previously hegemonic neoliberal 
notion of market efficiency, in addition to highlighting the need to rethink definitions and practices 
of key international institutions. 
 
Secondly, as shown, mainstream IR and IPE literature largely overlooks the African continent, 
resulting in a lack of theoretical analysis exploring the nature of SSA‟s political economy. Thirdly, 
SSA has experienced a number of changes over the past decade, including: strong economic growth 
performances; different ideas and approaches to developmental thinking; experiencing various 
options with regards to multilateralism with the global South and developmental partnerships with 
the global North; and gaining prominence in international institutions and arenas. These shifts in 
SSA‟s political economy have been influenced by the rise in emerging powers‟ material capabilities 
in the international system.  
 
Thus, the purpose of the study is to fill a gap in IR and IPE literature on Africa by identifying a 
theoretical framework that facilitates exploration of the nature of SSA‟s political economy in the 
context of structural changes taking place in the international system. The study is important 
because the twenty-first century „represents the opportunity to redefine African identity in 
international politics‟, and there is the need for „a revision on how Africa should be interpreted in 
the theoretical assumptions of international relations‟ (Naidu et al. 2009, p.1). The study will 
identify and explore the shifts in SSA‟s political economy, taking the implications of the changing 
nature of the international system into account and draw insights from CCT in order to undertake 
contextualised analysis to answer the following main research question: 
 
                                                   
2 The study asserts a systemic change to be one that „refers to the overall governance of the system, the number of great 
powers in it, and the shift in identity of the predominant powers, usually after a systemic was involving challenges to, 
and attempts to maintain, the existing distribution of power‟ (Smith 2005, p.19). It is beyond the scope of the current 
study but for a discussion on systemic shifts in the international system see Cox (1987). 
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What have been the key trends prevalent in SSA’s political economy from 2000 to 2011 and how have these 
been shaped by structural changes in the international system? 
 
With the following supporting research question: 
 
Does the nature of SSA’s political economy between 2000 and 2011 give scope for SSA’s condition of 
dependence to alter? 
 
Within the thesis ‘SSA’ will be conceptualised as „Sub-Saharan Africa‟, as previously noted. 
‘Political economy’ is conceptualised as „the reciprocal and dynamic interaction in international 
relations of the pursuit of wealth and the pursuit of power‟ (Gilpin 1975, p.43). Subsequently, 
„SSA’s political economy’ is taken to mean „the combined pursuit of economic and political power 
of all states in the region of SSA‟. Additionally, specific examples from sub-regions and individual 
countries within SSA may serve to illustrate a specific line of reasoning. The ‘international system’ 
is conceptualised as the „global political economy‟ and is taken to mean „the international arena in 
which the pursuit of economic and political power takes place‟. „Condition of dependence’ refers to 
the dependent nature of SSA on external actors in the twentieth century. 
 
‘Trends’ will be measured through analysing the key forces that make up SSA‟s political economy. 
Thus, the study will draw insights from theorist Robert W. Cox in CCT and place focus on the key 
forces within the systematic themes of „ideas,‟ „institutions‟ and „material capabilities‟ in order to 
analyse the key trends in SSA‟s political economy. ‘Ideas’ refer to „intersubjective meanings,‟ 
referring to the shared perceptions people have of institutions and/or practices, combined with 
„collective images of social order,‟ which can differ and stand in opposition to one another and can 
subsequently give rise to the emergence of „an alternative structure‟ (Cox 1981, p.99). „Material 
capabilities’ are „determined by, and are the result of technology, industry, organisational capacity, 
and wealth,‟ and can be presented in a „destructive‟ form (such as military capacity) and a 
„productive‟ form (Leysens 2008, p.48). Lastly, „institutions’ can take the form of hegemonic or 
non-hegemonic institutions, yet their role is to maintain the prevailing power relations, which are 
often reflected in their intrinsic structure favouring the dominant state and economic classes 
(Leysens 2008, p.49).  
 
In CCT, the framework in which action takes place is identified as the „historical structure.‟ A 
historical structure is made up of the interactions between ideas, material capabilities and 
institutions that determine the parameters within which social forces are able to act in any given 
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historical structure (Leysens 2008, p.48). CCT recognised the fluid nature of historical structures 
presenting „a theory of history in the sense of being concerned not just with the past but a 
continuing process of historical change‟ (Cox 1981, p.89). CCT therefore places importance on 
using historical context as a tool to further understand the processes that go on in the world, as 
opposed to just focusing on history as what has happened in the past. In lieu of SSA‟s dependence 
arising as a result of a historical process, the possibility of its dependence altering is reliant on the 
dynamics and structure making up the nature of SSA‟s political economy in the context of 
structural changes taking place in the international system  (Bayart 2000, p.234). Thus, the study 
will utilise the CCT concept of historical structures as a theoretical tool as a systematic means to 
explore the SSA‟s conditions of dependence prevalent in the twentieth century, through exploring 
the key trends in both the international system and SSA during this period. Furthermore, through 
exploring the key forces making up the nature of SSA‟s political economy between 2000 and 2011, 
it shall assess whether there is scope for SSA‟s conditions of dependence to alter. 
 
Additionally, the key CCT concept of „hegemony‟ in the international system will be utilised in the 
study. In this context, hegemony refers to an arrangement of material power, a widespread image of 
world order, and institutions that are perceived to govern in the broader interest rather than at the 
behest of a dominant state resulting in stability in the international system (Cox 1981, p.103). 
Recognition of the possibility of counter-hegemonic challenges is also integral to the study, as it 
will facilitate understanding of whether changes have taken place, or are likely to occur, in the 
international system. 
 
In order to best provide a contextualisation of SSA‟s political economy, the study contests that both 
structure and agency need to be taken into account. Structure is important because states in SSA are 
acted upon by the international system, yet SSA states also have the agency to (re)constitute SSA‟s 
political economy and that of the international system. Use of these CCT key concepts will 
facilitate analysis of exploration of the nature of SSA‟s political economy in the context of 
structural changes taking place in the international system, highlighting the power relations that 
make up opportunities and constraints for individuals and social groupings. It also offers a 
historicised pluralistic framework that recognises the ontological importance of both structure and 
agency and so will offer beneficial insights for the study. 
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1.4 Research design and methodology  
As has been outlined, mainstream IR and IPE literature present significant shortcomings when 
assisting theoretical analysis of Africa‟s political economy. However, the study assents with Brown 
(2006) that not all theory is irrelevant to Africa and will undertake a qualitative, inductive and 
explorative approach in its analysis. 
 
A qualitative approach will be utilised as it offers a fluid methodology that „emphasises discovering 
novel or unanticipated findings and the possibility of altering research plans in response to such 
serendipitous occurrences‟ (Bryman 1984, p.78). This flexible approach appears more useful for the 
current study than a quantitative approach, which is „underpinned by a distinctive theory of what 
should pass as warrantable knowledge‟ from the onset of analysis (Bryman 1984, p.77). The 
positivist outlook placing key focus on operational definitions, statistics, replicability, causality and 
objectivity in a quantitative study is not integral to the study (Bryman 1984, pp.77-78). Instead, the 
study places emphasis on a contextualised approach using the region of SSA as a case study. This 
will allow for a „detailed examination of an aspect of a historical episode to develop or test 
historical explanations that may be generalizable to other events,‟ which a quantitative approach 
fails to capture (George and Bennett 2005, p.5). 
 
An inductive approach is most pertinent to the study, as the point of departure is from the specific 
observation of identifying structural shifts that have occurred in the international system. From this 
the notion, possible implications of changes in the international system on SSA‟s political economy 
arise, moving towards identifying a narrower version of CCT that can act as a theoretical 
framework to assist identifying the key trends of analysis within the study. This is in contrast to a 
deductive method that would involve initiating from a set theoretical perspective shaping a certain 
hypothesis, before moving to an observation to confirm the proposition. Thus, this inductive 
approach allows for the most pertinent theoretical framework to be identified in Chapter Two as a 
result of the information gained from the data-collection process of exploring the key aspects of 
mainstream IR and IPE theories and their ability to meet Africa‟s ontological and epistemological 
requirements (Babbie and Mouton 2001, p.273).  
 
The study will use a narrower version of CCT to guide the structure of the study, allowing for 
exploration of SSA‟s dependence arising as a historical process. This theoretical perspective will 
help limit the scope of the study through offering a systematic approach to gathering evidence 
within the themes of ideas, institutions and material capabilities. Chapters Three and Four will 
adopt an inductive approach in order to explore the nature of SSA‟s political economy in the 
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context of structural changes occurring in the international system. It will be driven, predominantly, 
by explorative analysis, although explorative-descriptive analysis will also be incorporated in its 
analysis of SSA‟s political economy and the international system in the twentieth century in order 
to contextualise the study. This approach will assist in determining what are the key trends within 
SSA‟s political economy and how they have been shaped by shifts in the international system. 
 
Secondary data will be used, relying on published material in the form of academic literature, 
policy reports and documents, press statements and newspaper articles as textual data sources 
(Babbie and Mouton 2001, p.76). Policy reports and documents will be predominantly accessed 
online from the African Union (AU), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and 
other organisations deemed reliable sources of information. The study will carry out a snowball 
sampling methodological approach, utilising a literature searches in libraries and online databases 
in order to gain relevant and sufficient literature on the topic, stopping once the point of saturation 
has been reached. 
 
1.4.1 Using SSA as a unit of analysis 
At the onset of the thesis it should be noted that despite there being a number of common economic, 
socio-cultural, political and historical features that pertain to SSA, it would be misleading to speak 
of a singular account of African international relations or SSA as a coherent historical social entity 
(Cornelissen 2009, p.7; Harrison 2010, p.15). For example, the homogenising effects of colonialism 
were reduced by the varied templates embarked upon by different colonial powers, such as Britain, 
France, and Portugal, and the pre-existing diversities across the region that persisted in spite of the 
colonial interlude (Bayart 1991).  
 
However, Loxley and Sackey (2008, pp.163-164) assert that although „diverse structures exist 
among African countries, there are sufficient basic features common to the countries in the 
continent to make a macroeconomic study involving all of them.‟ Despite not elaborating on these 
common features, they argue that these commonalities specifically allow analysis of the political 
economy to take place (Loxley and Sackey 2008). Moreover, Mamdani (1995) puts forward that 
Africa appears as a „unity‟ due to its politically constructed nature, which in turn has resulted in the 
discursive deployment of Africa as a category. Thus, to a certain extent, Africa has been 
constructed negatively through processes of „othering‟, as „Africa as an idea, a concept, has 
historically served, and continues to serve, as a polemic argument for the West‟s desperate desire to 
assert its difference from the rest of the world‟ (Mbembe 2001, p.2). Yet, Africa has also been 
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constructed positively through identifying the notion of a politics and culture specific to African 
ideas and sociability (Asante 2007).  
 
Furthermore, SSA is often regarded as having a specific set of developmental issues, and hence 
solutions, which has shaped the discourse on development and assistance in the region (Williams 
2008, p.69). Additionally the United Nations‟ (UN) ministries and departments, the World Bank, 
academics, think-tanks and consultants often rely upon this cognitive geography of SSA (Harrison 
2010, p.17). There is consequently a shared perception of SSA‟s unity which is constructed 
transnationally through „collective images of social order‟ (Cox 1981, p.99). For the purpose of the 
thesis SSA will be used as the unit of analysis with specific examples given from countries and 
localities within the region.  
 
1.5 Limitations and delimitations  
Conducting the study with SSA as the unit of analysis holds limitations since it does not allow for 
the same depth of study as a single country/sub-country case study and could result in a 
generalisation of findings. However, qualitative research „is often dismissed because it is not 
possible to generalise the findings from a study that confines itself to a small number of people or a 
particular setting‟ (Devine 2002, p.207). Through combining SSA countries as a singular unit of 
analysis, the current study aims to overcome this drawback of qualitative research. 
 
Performing a study which deems necessary the exploration of the international system and SSA‟s 
political economy in both the twentieth and twenty-first centuries is an ambitious project. In order 
to cover the scope of this research topic, there is the inherent danger of providing an overview of a 
large number of events at the expense of analytical depth. The thesis will aim to mitigate this 
problematic issue through using a narrowed version of CCT as a theoretical framework that allows 
for analysis of certain themes within the international system and SSA‟s political economy. 
Prominence of analysis will be placed on the forces of ideas, institutions and material capabilities, 
facilitating the exploration of key trends pertinent to SSA‟s political economy and the international 
system. This is further complicated by this area of study being relatively unexplored in current 
theoretical literature.  
 
A further delimitation is achieved through the conceptualisation of the „twenty-first century‟ being 
understood to mean „from January 2000 to March 2011‟. This is due to the constraint of the year of 
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writing and not wishing to predict future events. Thus, information collated and utilised in the thesis 
is based on events up until March 2011 and gathered from sources written before September 2011. 
 
The thesis recognises that CCT is predominantly concerned with „forms of state and how these 
change under pressure from forces from above (world order) and from below (civil society)‟ (Cox 
and Sinclair 1996). Despite Cox always starting his detailed accounts of transformation from the 
bottom, his work asserts that the relationship between these three levels is not unilinear and the 
process can be reversed, „with world orders effecting changes in the forms of state, forcing modes 
of social relations of production to change‟ (Smith 2005, p.17). The current study‟s focus will be 
predominantly based on forces from above (world order). Exploration of other literature utilising 
CCT in an African context showed that this method used to delimit a CCT approach has been used 
in other studies, with Leysens (2006), Sibanda (2010) and Solli (2009) all predominantly focusing 
their work on the social forces acting from below.  
 
Leysens (2006, p.34) explored whether the economically marginalised underclass in southern 
Africa have the potential to act as a force of transformation of their state form, and hence did not 
analyse the international system within his study. Sibanda (2010, p.95) used CCT to conduct a 
comparative study of the politics of land reform in Zimbabwe and South Africa, exploring the 
structural dynamics embedded in these countries‟ politics of land and social construction. Thus, 
CCT was of use in this African case study context through analysing how a state form evolves in 
response to the way in which social forces relate to production, rather than its relation to the 
international system. Solli (2009) undertook a critical theory approach, proposing and utilising a 
synthesis of CCT together and the work of Mahmood Mamdani in order to put forward an 
alternative way to theorise states, using the case study of Angola. The study highlighted CCT‟s 
promising approach to investigate Africa‟s role in the international system and its key limitation of 
applying CCT to an African context being its conceptualisation of the „third world‟ as a singular 
entity, and its subsequent lack of attention to power struggles in periphery countries (Solli 2009, 
p.56).  
 
The small number of studies applying CCT to an African context highlighted the extent to which 
this is an underdeveloped research area. These studies noted the benefits of using CCT as a 
pertinent tool to gain further understanding on African case studies, which the current study also 
advocates. However, these studies predominantly focused on the relationships between social forces 
and states, most likely because the numerous „all-important issues‟ CCT identifies are extremely 
difficult to form into an appropriate methodology (Grugel 2005, p.210). Thus, as a means to 
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mitigate this difficulty the current study will focus predominantly on forces from above (the 
international system). 
 
1.6 Outline of research study  
Chapter One has introduced the research study, providing a background to the study and 
conceptualised key terms. The research questions and aims have been identified, with further 
explanation on the research design and methodology.  
 
Chapter Two expands on mainstream IR and IPE theory outlined in Chapter One, by undertaking a 
theoretical overview of mainstream IR and IPE and looking at the use and limitations of these 
various theoretical paradigms in furthering understanding of SSA‟s political economy. In order to 
facilitate exploration of the nature of SSA‟s political economy in the context of structural changes 
taking place in the international system, a narrowed version of CCT is put forward as a theoretical 
framework. 
 
Chapter Three contextualises the study through assessing the nature of the international system and 
SSA‟s political economy during the twentieth century. It is systematically structured through 
exploring the forces of ideas, institutions and material capabilities in order to identify key trends in 
SSA‟s political economy, and subsequently identifies SSA‟s conditions of dependence. 
 
Chapter Four analyses the more recent time period of 2000 to 2011, exploring the nature of the 
international system and identifies structural changes that have taken place during this period. 
Critical analysis is undertaken, exploring the prevalent trends in SSA‟s political economy from 
2000 to 2011. This chapter addresses the main research question of what have been the key trends 
prevalent in SSA‟s political economy from 2000 to 2011 and how have these been shaped by 
structural changes in the international system? Additionally, the chapter reflects upon the findings 
of its supporting research question of whether the nature of SSA‟s political economy between 2000 
and 2011 gives scope for SSA‟s condition of dependence to alter. 
 
Chapter Five concludes and reflects on the current study‟s key theoretical findings and themes, 
identifying the trends in material capabilities, ideas and institutions in SSA‟s political economy 
from the twentieth century to 2011. The chapter identifies the scope and limitations of Coxian 
analysis for understanding trajectories in SSA‟s political economy. 
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2. Theoretical framework 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter explores the relatively recent emergence of IPE as a discipline in order to establish a 
narrower version of CCT as a theoretical framework to support the empirical analysis of the thesis. 
This chapter initially explores the relationship between IR and IPE, recognising the significance of 
key IR concepts on the IPE field. The key elements and claims making up the mainstream 
paradigms of realism, liberalism and critical theory are explored. Following, this chapter identifies 
the outflow of these traditional streams portrayed in the development of an American and British 
school of thought in IPE.  
 
The chapter reflects on the use and limitations of these mainstream IR and IPE theoretical tools for 
exploring of the nature of SSA‟s political economy in the context of structural changes occurring in 
the international system. It is put forward that a historical pluralistic framework, which recognises 
the ontological importance of both structure and agency, offers beneficial insights for the thesis. 
Subsequently, CCT‟s concepts of „historical structures‟ and „hegemony‟ are explored in more depth 
as well as key critiques of CCT‟s epistemology, ontology and methodology. The emphasis CCT 
places on using historical context as a tool to further understand the processes that go on in the 
world, as opposed to solely what have happened in the past, lend itself to the study‟s analysis of 
whether the nature of SSA‟s political economy between 2000 and 2011 gives scope for SSA‟s 
conditions of dependence to alter. 
 
This is followed by a brief synopsis of scholarly work utilising a CCT framework within an African 
context. The chapter concludes by recognising the ambitious nature of CCT, and presents a 
narrower CCT theoretical framework to facilitate its analysis. This framework primarily makes use 
of the CCT key concepts of historical frameworks and hegemony. These concepts are utilised as 
theoretical tools that guide the structure of the study, allowing for exploration of the nature of 
SSA‟s political economy in the context of structural changes taking place in the international 
system.  
 
2.2 IR and IPE theoretical tools 
The discipline of IPE emerged in the mid-1970s as a branch of IR, yet the last four decades has seen 
the scope, nature and key focus of IPE contested on numerous fronts (O‟Brian and Williams 2004). 
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Questions have been raised concerning the relationship between IPE and IR; certain approaches and 
concepts integral to IR have been incorporated into IPE analysis, yet the discipline also appears to 
have strong linkages with other comparative approaches, such as Comparative Political Economy 
and the Political Economy of Development. Thus, debate has arisen whether IPE is a sub-discipline 
of IR, or a distinct school in its own right. Regardless of this uncertainty, the field appears open, 
dynamic and evolutionary. The chapter will first explore the origins of IPE through its emergence 
as a sub-field of IR. 
 
The traditional orthodoxy in IPE is highly dependent on IR (Blyth 2009). IR is split between three 
main schools of thought as a base from which to conduct analysis in order to render the world less 
complex and more readily understandable: realism, liberalism and Marxism (Frieden and Lake 
1991, p.5). These three ideologies were used by Robert Gilpin (1987) in his textbook of IPE, The 
Political Economy of International Relations). The majority of textbooks written on this field 
continue to use this holy troika approach as a template to study the political economy, yet with the 
Marxism perspective widened to contain critical perspectives. These three approaches within IR 
have mostly followed the trajectory of general IR theory, as shown by the influence of positivist 
debates of the 1970s influencing the methodologies of both IR and IPE (Cohen 2007). The broad 
strands of realism and liberalism are identified within mainstream IPE discourse, with more critical 
approaches being situated on the periphery of IPE (Murphy and Nelson 2001; Underhill 2000; 
Cohen 2007 and 2009). The assumptions upon which these three perspectives are based directs 
individuals to view the political economy of the world in very different ways. As Cox (1981, p.87) 
contends, „theory is always for someone and for some purpose,‟ meaning that the choice of using a 
particular theory is subjective in nature and guided by one‟s own normative assumptions. 
Ultimately, the choice of theory will direct analysis to specific aspects of the international system, 
and the selection of which aspects is shaped by the historical conditions in which a theory is 
propounded (Cox, as cited in Schouten 2010, p.5). 
 
2.2.1 The realist paradigm 
The writing of Greek historian Thucydides, Italian humanist Niccoló Machiavelli and English 
philosopher Thomas Hobbes are considered to be early accounts and demonstrations of the realist 
perspective. This outlook fell in popularity with the rise of liberalism in the nineteenth century, yet 
rose in prominence once again following the Great Depression of the 1930s and the Cold War geo-
political situation concluding in the early 1990s (O‟Brian and Williams 2004, pp.106-107). The link 
between politics and economics is assumed to be innate; politics determines economics through 
nation-states pursuing power and thus shaping the economy via the means of political power. The 
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key aspects of realism in IR and IPE are interlocking in nature: firstly, both perspectives subscribe 
to the notion that nation-states are the most important and dominant actors within an anarchical 
international system, and hence the unit of analysis (Gilpin 2000, p.14). Secondly, realists assume 
that politics is a zero-sum game, as in order for one nation-state to win power, it is at the expense of 
another losing some. Realists suppose anarchy in the international system to be pre-existing, which 
sets parameters for state interaction as power maximisers. Thirdly, nation-states are assumed to be 
rational actors, in the sense that they will analyse the cost-benefits of certain scenarios and then 
embark on that which results in them gaining the greatest amount of power (Frieden and Lake 1991, 
p.10). 
 
With specific regards to the international system, realists contend that political power is prioritised 
and can come at the expense of economic considerations. Looking to the realist presumption that IR 
is conceived as a struggle for power, IPE is understood to be the struggle for power and wealth 
(O‟Brian and Williams 2004, p.16). However, stress must be placed on the fact that realist political 
economy „is primarily concerned with how changes in the distribution of international power affect 
the form and type of international economy,‟ indicating that politics underlies economics (Frieden 
and Lake 1991, p.11).  
 
2.2.2 The liberal paradigm 
The liberal perspectives in IR and IPE both ascribe to the ideals that arose in the Enlightenment 
period. However, the liberal IPE standpoint is drawn primarily from the field of economics in the 
sense that key focus is placed upon the writings of Adam Smith and David Ricardo, as opposed to 
the political aspirations of Woodrow Wilson. Frieden and Lake (1991, p.6) have argued that there 
are three points central to the liberalist approach to IPE. Firstly, liberals assume that since all social 
action can be traced back to individuals, they are thus the key actors within the political economy 
and hence the most appropriate unit of analysis. Secondly, liberals assume that individuals are 
rational, utility maximising actors. This implies that individuals make cost-benefit calculations 
based on an assessment of their possible options, and then continue to select the option which 
provides the highest level of subjective satisficing. Thirdly, liberals assume that individuals 
maximise utility through making trade-offs, thus exchanging goods with one another in order to 
increase their own utility.  
 
When applied to the economy, this IPE perspective implies that there is no foundation for conflict 
in the marketplace „because market exchanges are voluntary, and if there are no impediments to 
trade among individuals... everyone can be made as well off as possible given existing stocks of 
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goods and services‟ (Frieden and Lake 1991, p.6). Subsequently, all participants in the market will 
be acting at their highest possible level of utility. It is for this reason that liberals believe that the 
economic role of a government should be limited, as intervention in the economy ultimately 
restricts the market, creating obstacles to the most rewarding trades taking place. Liberal IPE is also 
heavily concerned with the concepts of multilateralism, transnational cooperation and international 
institutions, with key contributors of this paradigm including Joseph Nye, Stephen Krasner and 
Robert Keohane, amongst others.  
 
2.2.3 The critical paradigm  
In the nineteenth century, Marxism arose as a critical response to the spread of liberalism. Its origin 
can be traced to the writings of political economist Karl Marx who, in contrast to liberals, 
understood the market and capitalism to create extremes of wealth for the elite and increased 
poverty for workers. For Marxists, capitalism appears as a highly contradictory system: it leads to a 
few capitalists expanding their wealth more quickly than other individuals, resulting in a rising 
wealth gap between members of society (Linklater 2005). Looking to the three essential elements of 
the Marxist approach to IPE, firstly, within this theoretical paradigm it is understood that classes are 
the dominant actors in the political economy and thus the necessary unit of analysis. The two 
prominent classes for Marxists can be explained as the capitalists (the owners of the means of 
production), and the workers (as the means of production). Secondly, it is assumed that each class 
acts specifically to maximise the economic benefits for its entire class, in contrast to the individual 
rational actor proposition by liberals. Lastly, Marxists „assume that the basis of the capitalist 
economy is the exploitation of labour by capital‟ which leads to the „antagonistic‟ relationship 
between capitalists and workers (Frieden and Lake 1991, p.8). This is based on the „zero-sum‟ 
notion that any profit made on goods belongs to the capitalist class and at the expense of the 
workers; thus conflict will ultimately arise as an effect of this exploitation.   
 
There are two predominant concerns of Marxists studying IPE in the present age. The first is 
concerned with „the fate of labour in a world of increasingly internationalised capital,‟ in response 
to the rise of the multinational corporations (MNCs) and financial markets becoming increasingly 
globally integrated (Frieden and Lake 1991, p.9). This matter is of key significance as it appears the 
political and economic power of workers has reduced with the rising flexibility and mobility of 
capital; „the centralisation and concentration of capital visible in the form of TNCs [transnational 
corporations] are a key feature of imperialism whereby dominance is expressed in the global 
political economy‟ (O‟Brian and Williams 2004, p.22). Secondly, a Marxist approach to IPE 
focuses on the continued underdevelopment of the third world, linking the „core‟ of the „First 
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World‟ with exploitation of the „periphery‟ of the „Third World‟. The „dependency theory‟ 
advocated by the likes of Andre Gunder Frank and Fernando Henrique Cardoso, for instance, puts 
forward that poor countries are hindered by developed states via economic exploitation resulting in 
the persistent poverty of many poor states (So 1990). 
 
In the 1980s and 1990s, Marxist IPE was critically renovated with renewed interest from scholars 
who drew upon work from Antonio Gramsci. The key focus was shifted somewhat, with emphasis 
being placed upon the role of social forces combined with the function of ideology in liberalising 
and globalising economic relations by scholars such as Cox (1981; 1983; 1987) with his historical 
materialist framework, and Stephen Gill (1991) with his work on the Trilateral Commission NGO, 
highlighting how a historical bloc of liberal ideas, institutions and elites helped promote the 
globalisation of capitalism and reassert the US‟s hegemony in the 1980s. A modified version of 
hegemony was put forward, broadening the definition to include ideological dominance as opposed 
to solely being based on material capabilities (Cox 1987; Gill 1991). 
 
Despite Marxism being the most prominent critical theory, other strands arose in the mid twentieth 
century, such as constructivism. Constructivism is sometimes referred to as critical IR or IPE 
theory, yet key constructivist scholar John Ruggie (1998, pp.879-880) contends that 
„…constructivism is not itself a theory of international relations… but a theoretically informed 
approach to the study of international relations.‟ It is best approached as a critical methodological 
tool because it „does not offer general explanations for things‟ as a theory offers (Onuf 1998, pp.60-
61). The defining feature of constructivism is „a focus on the social construction of social reality, 
specifically the intersubjective aspect of this construction‟ (Smith 2005, p.25). Consequently a 
constructivist lens can offer insight on situations in the international system yet this is mostly after 
change has occurred, resulting in it lacking its own research agenda (Smith 2005, p.26). 
 
Such critical perspectives moved away from focusing on individuals and the states to consider other 
units of analysis and to question the way the world is organised (O‟Brian and Williams 2004, p.21). 
The critical paradigm is ‘not concerned only with understanding and explaining the existing 
realities of world politics, it also intends to criticize in order to transform them. It is an attempt to 
comprehend essential social processes for the purpose of inaugurating change, or at least knowing 
whether change is possible‟ (Devetak 2005, p.145). Thus, critical analysis is „not merely an 
expression for the concrete realities of the historical situation, but also a force for change within 
those conditions‟ (Hoffman 1987, p.233). Critical IPE theory aims to „broaden the scope of inquiry 
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by analysing the forces favouring or opposing changing patterns of behaviour‟ as opposed to 
undertaking analysis focused on maintaining the status quo (Cox, as cited in Schouten 2010, p.6). 
 
2.3 The transatlantic divide 
An outflow of these traditional streams has been the development of both an American and British 
school of thought in IPE, differentiated by the key approaches and issues prioritised in each school. 
This has led to the notion of where you stand determines what you think about IPE, with 
strongholds of each school of thought based on different sides of the Atlantic (Cerny 2009). The 
thesis will now touch upon the key aspects of American IPE and British IPE, highlighting their 
significant differences concerning questions of epistemology and ontology, before reflecting on the 
use of these IPE theoretical tools for analysis of both the international system and SSA‟s political 
economy. 
  
2.3.1 American IPE 
In the late 1960s and early 1970s scholars engaged with both the IR and economics disciplines, and 
the American school of IPE was launched as a branch of IR (Cohen 2009, p.23). The American IPE 
school of thought aims to espouse „a consensus on theories, methods, analytical frameworks, and 
important questions‟ (Frieden and Martin 2003, p.19). American IPE is primarily influenced by 
realism and liberalism, with analysis largely focused on the ontological viewpoint of the state or 
individual as the key unit of analysis (O‟Brian and Williams 2004, pp.15-21). American IPE is 
largely based on a state-centric, reductionist and positivist outlook, with causal explanations 
predominantly accounted for in a quantitative manner (Cohen 2007, pp.201-207).  
 
This approach gained predominance in the 1980s in line with the behaviourialist revolution, as 
American (and some European) social sciences turned to quantitative analysis and model 
stimulation in order to gain the ability to control and duplicate findings, with the aim to make the 
research more „objective‟ and „scientific‟. Thus, American IPE contends that these principles „hold 
that knowledge is best accumulated through an appeal to objective observation and systematic 
testing‟ through mid-level theorising and hard science models (Cohen 2007, p.198). However, this 
move towards the economising of this discipline seems to have led to the „growing inattention to 
the “big questions” in the global political economy‟ as ideational dynamics and structures are left 
out of the debate in favour of empirical data (Phillips 2009, p.91).  
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2.3.2 British IPE 
In contrast to the American school of thought, British IPE tends to view pluralism, intellectual 
diversity and transdisciplinary study as positive aspects, using such multiplicity as a means to study 
and contest the boundaries of IPE (Higgott and Watson, 2008). Moreover, the British approach 
appears post-positive in nature, granting considerable attention to normative issues, such as ideas, 
norms and values (Cohen 2007, pp.207-216). The British approach „does not start from an assumed 
ontology but, rather, from the perspective that ontology is something to be explained and 
questioned,‟ showing how scholars challenge the prevalent dominant (American) orthodoxies of 
epistemology and ontology within the discipline (Cameron and Palan 2009, p.119). 
 
This reflexive and historical approach epitomises the lineage of British IPE being granted status as 
its own field based on contributions across multiple disciplines in the early 1970s. Key emphasis is 
placed upon the relationship between structure and agency in the world system, drawing insights 
from the main IR and IPE theories (Cerny 2009). Ben Clift and Ben Rosamond (2009, pp.101-107) 
have put forward that the historical cast of analysis in British IPE can be linked to the long tradition 
of scholarship concerning the political economy of British imperialism. Theoretical plurality is 
sought, serving the empirical purpose of not limiting analysis with any one set of theoretical lenses, 
but through using a combination in order to critically challenge the core assumptions held by realist 
and liberal perspectives concerning the relationship between individuals, societies, states and 
markets. This heuristic approach allows for numerous levels of analysis, and moves away from the 
dangers inherent in and epitomised by the „Cinderella syndrome‟: the attempts of reductionist 
theorists to squeeze an ugly and oversized world into a beautiful theoretical glass shoe (Reus-Smit, 
in Schouten 2009, p.5).  
 
2.4 Reflection on the use of these IR and IPE theoretical tools for 
Africa 
It is suggested in the current study that American IR and IPE, with its positivist focus on realism 
and liberalism, is limited in its ability to assist further understanding on SSA‟s political economy. 
The epistemological nature of American IR and IPE results in it being focused on searching for 
recurrent themes and identifying universally valid laws. However, the current study asserts that a 
historical approach focused on a set time period needs to be undertaken in order to facilitate 
exploration of the nature of SSA‟s political economy in the context of structural changes occurring 
in the international system. This can be illustrated by recognising that institutional and agency 
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structures have adapted significantly within the region over the past fifty years, with subsequent 
implications for SSA‟s political economy (Harrison 2010, pp.14-15). 
 
Additionally, the ontological nature of American IR and IPE sees key emphasis placed on „great 
powers‟, which results in the analysis of Africa being largely dismissed as inconsequential in the 
international system (Engel and Olsen 2005, p.1). Within American IR and IPE discourse, there is a 
privileged „set of assumptions which emerge from the distinctive political economies and 
experiences of core economies, states and regions, and from their specific context of early 
industrialisation‟ (Phillips, 2005a, p.1). Minimal consideration has been granted to historical events, 
practices, or political theory from developing regions of the world, resulting in the „historical 
monopoly‟ of American IR and IPE theory being predominantly shaped by issues concerning the 
West (La Monica 2007, p.47). The study recognises the importance of taking ideological values 
into consideration in addition to military power, which is the force predominantly emphasised in 
American IR and IPE. This is not unique to the evaluation of SSA‟s political economy, yet as SSA 
contains a wide variety of languages, customs and religions within its 48 states, it is important that 
ideational explanations of African policymakers, leaders and structure are also taken into account 
within the current study‟s theoretical framework (Puchala 1998, p.150).  
 
Taking the state as the key unit of analysis proves problematic because in SSA, as elsewhere, „the 
role of the state as the sole or at least the over-whelming predominant actor in international 
relations has increasingly given way to a much more complex reality in which states and other 
actors interrelate and jostle for influence within a globalised political arena‟ (Clapham 2005, p.33). 
Thus, SSA‟s political economy cannot solely be determined by structural circumstances, as 
presupposed by the realist and neorealist notions of states acting as fixed „units‟, but instead states 
are heavily influenced by the agency of both internal and external state actors (Engel and Olsen 
2005, p.13). Realist focus on the state does not facilitate analysis of the social and political forces 
prevalent in SSA at national and sub-national levels, nor the concurrent global activity. Analysis of 
interactions at and between these levels is necessary in order to gain a comprehensive 
understanding of SSA‟s political economy and its position in the international system.  
 
Moreover, focusing predominantly on the individual as the key unit of analysis, as liberalism does, 
appears limiting in furthering understanding of SSA‟s political economy. This is not a problem 
unique to the application of liberal theory to Africa. However it is highlighted due to the 
prominence of international organisations and institutions, such as NGOs and the IMF, influencing 
the structure of SSA‟s political economy in addition to various state and non-state actors (Harrison 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
    22 
2010). For example, the IMF has played a unique role in SSA, as the fragility of newly independent 
African states and their institutional structures in the 1980s and 1990s created an „unprecedented 
opportunity for external regulatory intervention‟ (Harrison 2010, p.89). In general, it appears there 
is a distinct lack of IR and IPE theoretical studies of Africa (Lavelle 2005). In this sense, 
mainstream IPE theory has subsequently served to reinforce Africa‟s theoretical marginalisation 
from the international system.  
 
Realism places significant focus on the importance of structure to the detriment of agency, whereas 
liberalism places emphasis on the importance of agency to the detriment of structure. In order to 
best provide a contextualisation of SSA‟s political economy, the current study contests that both 
structure and agency need to be taken into account. Structure is important because SSA states are 
acted upon by the international system yet SSA states have the capacity to (re)constitute the 
international system, through means such as utilising their agency to become increasingly assertive 
in international institutions. Additionally, in lieu of Africa‟s dependence arising as a result of „a 
historical process‟, the study recognises the need for a historical approach to be supported by the 
theoretical structure it selects (Bayart 2000, p.234). Thus, in line with the British school of thought, 
it is put forward that a historical pluralistic framework that recognises the ontological importance of 
both structure and agency will offer beneficial insights for the study. 
 
2.5 Assessing the use of CCT to serve the international system’s and 
Africa’s epistemological and ontological concerns 
The study asserts it is worthwhile to narrow focus further to explore the work of Robert W. Cox. 
Falling within the British school of IR and IPE, Cox‟s CCT places importance on using historical 
context as a tool to further understanding of the ongoing processes in the world, as opposed to just 
focusing on history as what has happened in the past. History should not be seen as a linear, finite 
process, moving in a set direction with deterministic economic processes - a viewpoint 
characteristic of the Enlightenment period and, argued by Cox, still prominent in American thought 
today. Francis Fukuyama‟s notion of „the end of history‟ introduced in 1989 epitomised this 
interpretation of history and set precedent for this understanding of power relations within the 
international system (Cox, as cited in Schouten 2010). CCT utilises the concept of historical 
structures, which consists of ideas, material capabilities and institutions, within which social actions 
unfold. The notion of global hegemony, not merely through coercion but also consensus, combined 
with recognition of the possibility of counter-hegemonic challenges, is also integral to this 
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framework. This chapter will now explore these elements of CCT in order to gain inspiration for its 
own critical theoretical framework.3  
 
2.5.1 The historical structure 
In CCT the framework within which „action‟ takes place is the historical structure, made up of „a 
particular configuration of forces‟ that „determine the dynamics within any given historical 
structure‟ (Leysens 2008, p.48). This notion has been shaped from Fernand Braudel‟s (1972) three 
forms of historical narratives: la longue durée; the narrative of the conjuncture; and event-time. 
Braudel‟s (1972) perspective has contributed to Cox‟s (1987) viewpoint that certain structures in 
society have a longer life than others which appear more short-lived. Applying this perspective to 
the international system, it can be seen that dominant structures can appear to be fixed, yet inherent 
contradictions in the system itself eventually will lead to a change as a new historical structure 
arises. This can be illustrated by the domination of the British Empire for almost a century from 
1815, yet its overarching power was eroded significantly in the early twentieth century. Thus, Cox‟s 
(1981, p.89) recognition of the fluid nature of historical structures presents „a theory of history in 
the sense of being concerned not just with the past but a continuing process of historical change.‟ 
 
Analysing an historical structure allows one to analyse the power relations that make up the 
opportunities and constraints for individuals and social groupings. Thus, the way in which ideas, 
material capabilities and institutions mutually influence one another as the key elements of any 
given historical structure needs to be understood in order to view the parameters within which 
social forces are able to act. „No one way determinism need be assumed among these three...‟ as 
their dynamics are intrinsically linked (Cox 1981, p.98). Ideas refer to „intersubjective meanings,‟ 
referring to the shared perceptions people have of institutions and/or practices, combined with 
„collective images of social order‟ which can differ and stand in opposition to one another, 
subsequently giving rise to the emergence of „an alternative structure‟ (Cox 1981, p.99). Thus ideas 
are of key significance to the dynamic nature of the international system as they are integral to 
explaining and demonstrating the failure of rival ideas leading to shifts in the international (Lent 
and Lockwood 2010, p.15). Material capabilities are „determined by, and are the result of 
technology, industry, organisational capacity, and wealth,‟ and can be presented in a „destructive‟ 
form (such as military capacity) and a „productive‟ form (Leysens 2008, p.48). Lastly, institutions 
can take the form of hegemonic or non-hegemonic institutions, yet their role is to maintain the 
                                                   
3 The thesis recognises that these elements of analysis do not reflect the full scope of CCT, yet deem these to be the key 
aspects of CCT necessary to explore for the purpose of the study.  
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
    24 
prevailing power relations, which are often reflected in their intrinsic structure favouring the 
dominant state and economic classes (Leysens 2008, p.49).  
 
These three crucial forces can represent the three points of a triangle, connected with lines showing 
their reciprocal influence on one another, as is shown in Figure 1 and 2 below: 
 
        Ideas 
   
 
 
 
 
 
              Material        Institutions 
     Capabilities 
Figure 1. Historical structure framework, adapted from Cox (1981, pp.98-99). 
 
By breaking down analysis to these dynamic forces, it allows one to recognise the historicity of 
structures in the international system. It also draws attention to the agency of humans. As any given 
historical structure is comprised of the dynamics between the above three forces, it is reflective of 
„collective human activities,‟ and thus there is always scope for them to be changed by human 
action (Cox 1987, p.4). 
 
Despite the above framework representing historical structures, Cox (1981) argues this only 
presents part of the situation, resulting in a need for the contextualisation of a historical situation. 
Moreover, this historical structure framework needs to be applied to three points of entry in order to 
„open up the possibilities of choosing a different valid perspective from which the problematic 
becomes one of creating an alternative world‟ (Cox 1981, pp.87-88). These three points of entry 
concern the relations between social forces (centred on forms of production); the forms of states 
(taking note of the particular state-society complex), and world orders (which is thus made up out 
of, and can be described as, the interactions between states and social forces) (Leysens 2008, pp.50-
53). An alternate structure can arise „under pressure from forces from above (world order) and from 
below (civil society)‟ (Cox and Sinclair 1996). 
 
As with the forces comprising historical structures, these three points of entry can be illustrated 
through three points of a triangle showing mutual interaction and influence, as is shown below: 
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         Social Forces 
 
 
                               
 
             
                            Forms of State    World Order 
 
Figure 2. Levels of analysis, adapted from Cox (1981, pp.100-101). 
 
Cox (1981, pp.100-101) explains how each of these points of entry, which he also refers to as 
„levels‟ of analysis, reflect a specific arrangement of ideas, material capabilities and institutions. 
Analysis of the state „cannot be separated... from the social classes that sustain it,‟ and the nature of 
the form of states impacts the world order, showing how these different levels of analysis are 
intrinsically interlinked (Cox 1987, p.409). The dynamic interaction between these three levels is 
discussed in depth in Cox (1987) with reference to three historical structures – pax britannica, rival 
imperialisms, and pax americana – and the notion of hegemony.  
 
2.5.2 Hegemony 
Cox‟s conceptualisation of hegemony is also influenced by the work of Gramsci: „the exercise of 
power depends on a combination of material aspects and ideas/ideology‟ and thus requires us to 
think of power in terms of material capacity and ideology (Leysens 2008, p.26). However, Cox‟s 
definition becomes distinct when moving to apply the concept of hegemony at the world order 
level, such as when analysing the international system, as this was not Gramsci‟s intention. For 
Cox, the notion of hegemony is intrinsically associated with stability at the world order level. 
Moreover, coercive dominance (through material capabilities) of a state is not enough to equate to 
being a hegemon, as „it also depends on whether there is a “fit” between an arrangement of material 
power, a widespread image of world order, and institutions which are perceived to manage in the 
broader interest rather than at the behest of a dominant state‟ (Leysens 2008, p.52). Thus, 
understanding of whether hegemony is prevalent at world order level can be illustrative of stability 
and a „fit‟ between ideas, material capabilities and institutions: 
Hegemony at the international level is thus not merely an order among states. It is an order 
within a world economy with a dominant mode of production which penetrates into all 
countries and links into other subordinate modes of production. It is also a complex of 
international social relationships which connect the social classes of the different countries. 
World hegemony can be described as a social structure, an economic structure, and a 
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political structure; and it cannot be simply one of these things but it must be all three. 
World hegemony, furthermore, is expressed in universal norms, institutions, and 
mechanisms which lay down general rule of behaviour for states and for those forces of civil 
society that act across national boundaries, rules which support the dominant mode of 
production (Cox 1987, p.137, emphasis author‟s own). 
 
Thus, at world order level, it can be seen that hegemony usually derives from powerful states (yet 
hegemony is not only state-based), whereby a dominant class has succeeded in implementing it at 
the national (state-civil society) level with a broad level of consent from subordinate countries. 
However, this can only occur after the state has experienced significant socio-economic changes 
(Leysens 2008). Therefore, it is through analysing the aforementioned dynamics of forces that 
change and evolution can be explained. From an abstract perspective, hegemony can be envisaged 
to be a facet of power, in addition to a strategy to retain power by dominant groups. With regards to 
the international system, it describes the ability to determine, and thus adapt, commonsensical 
notions of the most prevalent ideas, actions and the nature of institutions in the international system. 
Cox asserts that third world societies are void of exerting hegemony (Solli 2009, p.61). Thus, due to 
the thesis‟ focus on SSA, Cox‟s assertion should be taken to mean that „third world‟ African states 
are shaped by external imposition of commonsensical, hegemonic ideas and actions concerning the 
political economy. Whilst recognised to hold „third world‟ status, African states themselves will not 
hold hegemonic power. This highlights the importance of analysing the external imposition of 
hegemonic ideas concerning how forces at the level of the international system can have 
implications for SSA‟s political economy. However, Cox‟s recognition of the importance of agency 
in shaping ideas, institutions and material capabilities means SSA is no passive actor; African 
agency can be used as a means to help shape and adapt the historical, and thus hegemonic, structure 
(Cox 1987, p.4). 
  
2.5.3 Key critiques of CCT 
CCT has met both praise and criticism from a wide variety of social and political schools of 
thought. Generally, Cox is recognised as a major figure in IR and IPE, even by his critics 
(Schechter 2002). Below is an outline of the key criticisms levelled against CCT in relation to its 
epistemology, ontology and methodology. Despite recognising the following critiques, the thesis 
stresses the substantive focus of these critiques „is wholly unreflective of the commentary in the 
vast literature that refers to Cox‟s published work‟ and that there are many advocates of the CCT 
theoretical framework  (Schechter 2002, p.2). 
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2.5.3.1 Criticisms of CCT’s epistemology 
CCT is criticised for „failing to adhere to one of the cardinal rules of social science, i.e. searching 
for recurrent themes in a quest for identifying general or universally valid laws by doing valid and 
replicable research,‟ which has given rise to the notion that it lacks „the essential ingredients‟ for 
cumulative research in this field (Schechter 2002, p.5). This criticism is directed towards CCT‟s 
knowledge of theory and how it can be gathered, and hence appears epistemological in nature. The 
thesis puts forward that despite CCT not searching for recurrent themes, as epitomised by the 
American school of IPE, this does not make it any less valid but in contrast appears as a strength. 
Due to its historical approach, a quintessential quality of the British school of IPE, CCT provides 
scope for contextualised analysis that can be focused on a region or specific point in time if so 
desired. This presents the opportunity for CCT to provide assistance when analysing SSA as a 
developing region, despite the majority of more orthodox IPE theories being Eurocentric in outlook.  
 
Criticism has also been directed towards CCT as a result of scholars categorising CCT within the 
Marxist, Gramscian and Frankfurt School of thought. From this labelling, criticism has arisen 
because CCT appears to deviate from the key elements that make up these theoretical perspectives. 
For example, there is little doubt that CCT was heavily influenced by work previously undertaken 
by both Marx and Gramsci. However, CCT‟s definition of production and hegemony differ 
somewhat from the equivalent put forward by these two significant scholars, due to CCT drawing 
on aspects from a variety of theories, as opposed to falling neatly into an established theoretical 
category. Despite the fact that „much ink has been spilled on trying to classify Cox‟s work,‟ Cox 
understood and labelled himself to be a historical materialist, recognising that his approach cannot 
not be pigeonholed into a single school of thought previously established (Schechter 2002, p.3). 
Thus, Cox‟s interpretation of production and hegemony, for example, are grounded in this theory of 
knowledge and so are projected from a historical materialist epistemological standpoint. A similar 
epistemological criticism is directed at CCT because some „simply see the world as evolving in 
ways Cox has not anticipated when he wrote or they simply see the world differently than he does‟ 
(Schechter 2002, p.8). 
 
2.5.3.2 Criticisms of CCT’s ontology 
CCT has been critiqued with regards to its ontological key areas of focus within its historical 
materialist framework. In particular, feminists and ecological theorists have criticised CCT for not 
directing attention to integral issues for them, such as environmental degradation and the 
predicament of minorities in the world order. However, in rebuke of this criticism the thesis 
consents with Brown (2006) that in some cases there must be a lower expectation of what theories 
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can do. Steven Lamy (2004, p.221) states the limitations of theories in that „every theory leaves 
something out.  No theories can claim to offer a picture of the world that is complete.‟ The study 
contends the CCT framework provides a structure that gains context and specificity when applied to 
a particular historical and geographical circumstance, as opposed to a methodological straightjacket.  
 
A further criticism of CCT‟s ontology arises out of its treatment of the „Third World‟ as a singular 
entity, highlighting the difference between „core‟ and „periphery‟ countries yet at the expense of 
internal differences between poorer countries in Asia, Latin America and Africa (Samatar and 
Samatar 1987). Despite this criticism, contrasting praise is granted from Jean Grugel (2005, p.209) 
to CCT due to its recognition that „global power is played out very differently in the different 
geographical and productive arenas of the world order.‟ This enables it to be „attuned to realities of 
the developing world as well as to those of advanced capitalist societies,‟ in addition to focus being 
placed on how states can change as a result from pressure from above (the international system) and 
from below (social forces) (Grugel 2005, p.209). 
 
2.5.3.3 Criticisms of CCT’s empirical application  
A key area of CCT‟s epistemological understanding comes from the basis that change can occur in 
the structure of the international system. However, Cox‟s empirical application and approach to this 
possibility of change has met with a significant amount of contradicting critique. For example, CCT 
has been criticised for its perceived pessimism towards agents of change in the contemporary world 
order, especially in its jaundiced view and lack of faith in international institutions (Gareau 1996; 
Nel et al. 2000). However, others have taken from this work an overtly utopian and optimistic 
evaluation of the likelihood for change in the international system, arguing CCT appears a 
misleading generalisation (Waltz 1986; Osler Hampson 1997). Roger D. Spegele (1997, p.224) 
further criticises CCT‟s apparent optimism, focusing on the notion that Cox has stripped structural 
change in the international system of its emancipatory goal and in doing so has lost „all purchase on 
providing a basis for a belief in the movement from a condition of alienation to a condition in which 
things are radically better.‟ 
 
Bob Jessop and Ngai-Ling Sum (2006) have criticised Cox for prioritising the material power-
institution side of the trialectic historical structure at the expense of ideational factors. This can be 
seen as a criticism of Cox‟s own empirical application of historical materialism, as opposed to the 
CCT framework itself. Indeed, Cox has recognised that in his initial work, he placed key emphasis 
on material conditions when analysing global power relations, yet in recent years has stated that 
now he „would put more critical emphasis on the „ideas‟ point of the triangle‟ (Cox 2007, p.517). 
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The fact that this criticism has been met by Cox himself shows its pertinence. Subsequently, the 
current study will aim to place key emphasis on analysing the dynamics of, and between, ideas, 
institutions and material capabilities, as opposed to prioritising a particular force within it.  
 
The thesis recognises the criticism put towards CCT that the state remains the key unit of analysis 
in the broad sense; yet to borrow Cox‟s (2002, pp.32-33) own words, the current study assents „it is 
more complicated than that.‟ One must take into account both sub-state and super-state phenomena, 
in the form of social and international forces, as a CCT theoretical framework advocates. For 
example, one cannot merely open the black box of the state in order to determine whether evolution 
has taken place within the international system, as the prevalence of hegemonic ideas is a notion 
that bypasses the nation state, implicating global institutions and in turn the material capabilities of 
different actors. Thus, even if Cox‟s empirical application can be seen to be flawed in its key focus 
on the state level of analysis, the CCT framework is valuable for the current study „as it permits a 
means of charting that precarious middle course between the twin priorities of, first, developing 
theoretical frameworks that can say something general and broadly significant about the nature of 
contemporary states... and, second, achieving appropriate recognition of specificity and 
contingency‟ (Phillips 2005b, pp.110-111).  
 
2.5.4 Exploring the empirical application of CCT to Africa  
The study will briefly outline the scholarly work undertaken using a CCT framework applied to an 
African context. Despite none of these three works applying CCT to Africa in relation to the 
international system, each presents findings of use to take on board for the current study as detailed 
individually below. 
 
As a scholar who has embarked on using CCT in an African setting, Anthony Leysens (2006) has 
used CCT in order to focus on whether the marginalised act as a source of social instability in seven 
countries in southern Africa (Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Namibia, South Africa, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe). Leysens (2006) has used empirical data from the Afrobarometer (Round 1, 1999-2000) 
as a means to investigate whether Cox‟s macro-theory of change, relating to the marginalised acting 
as a social force that could bring about political economic transformation from below, is 
substantiated when applied to certain southern African states. Thus, Leysens (2006, p.34) utilised 
CCT in order to assess whether the economically marginalised in southern African as the vast 
underclass „have the potential to act as a force for the transformation of state forms, and how do 
they view the state?‟ This research was carried out whilst taking into account Eric Hobsbawm‟s 
(1962, p.249 as cited in Leysens 2006, p.34) observations concerning the poor in England during 
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the industrial revolution: „[i]t is no accident that the least skilled, least educated, least organized and 
therefore the least hopeful of the poor, then as later, were the most apathetic.‟ This undertaking is of 
significance for the current study as Leysens (2006) recognises the applicability of CCT to analyse 
Africa, with Leysen‟s study acting as an empirical case whereby CCT has shaped the hypotheses of 
the study that has focused on a number of countries in southern Africa. However, Leysen‟s findings 
are limited for aiding the current study due to it being based on a limited number of countries in 
southern Africa, with its key focus being placed on the social forces level of analysis as opposed to 
that of the international system. 
 
Nkanyiso Sibanda (2010) used CCT in a comparative study of the politics of land reform in 
Zimbabwe and South Africa, exploring the similarities and differences that exist with regards to 
their respective politics of land reform. Sibanda (2010) recognised the need to explore the structural 
dynamics embedded in these countries‟ politics of land and social construction, and thus utilised the 
critical approach of Cox. The „capacity of social forces to influence people‟s behaviour by shaping 
the environment in which they operate‟ illustrated in CCT was drawn upon as a base from which to 
investigate these two case studies as state-society complexes, which appears a useful means to 
investigate the interlinked nature of the state and society in South Africa and Zimbabwe (Sibanda 
2010, p.13-15). This theoretical approach was deemed to be of use as „a characteristic feature of the 
economies of both countries is the exclusion of the majority of poor people from the processes and 
modes of production‟ and it can be seen to aid the understanding of social change (Sibanda 2010, 
p.95). Thus, CCT was of use in this African context through analysing how a state form evolves in 
response to the way in which social forces relate to production, rather than its relation to the 
international system. 
 
Solli (2009) undertook a critical theory approach, proposing and utilising a synthesis of CCT 
together with the work of Mahmood Mamdani, in order to put forward an alternative way to 
theorise states using the case study of Angola. Solli (2009, p.47) recognised the face value benefits 
of applying CCT to Africa, as the crux of this perspective is „to ask critical questions about the 
system of international order as a way to create a more just and egalitarian world‟ and in lieu of the 
current economic marginalisation of the region in the international system. Solli (2009, p.56) 
identified the main shortcoming of solely using CCT in an African context to be CCT‟s 
conceptualisation of the „third world‟ as a singular entity. This results in CCT not paying sufficient 
attention to power struggles in periphery countries, a concern also addressed in the current study‟s 
evaluation of criticisms levied at CCT. There is consensus between the study and Solli (2009, p.56) 
that at present CCT appears „theoretically sound but empirically weak,‟ in that it „offers a promising 
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approach to investigate African state / society complexes as well as the continent‟s role in the world 
order,‟ yet there is minimal empirical application of CCT to the African setting.  
 
Having provided an overview of the scholars who have applied CCT to assist the analysis of 
African states, it is clear that this is a highly marginalised research area. Despite Cox and CCT 
being widely renowned as offering integral contributions to the development of IR and IPE, there 
are limited scholarly applications of this work in an African context. There is no apparent reason as 
to why this void in the literature has occurred, other than for criticisms and concerns raised with the 
applicability of CCT to Africa as previously discussed.  
 
2.6 Identifying a narrowed version of CCT as a theoretical framework 
Having explored the key characteristics of prominent IR and IPE paradigms, the thesis identifies 
that a critical theoretical framework based upon the CCT concepts of historical structures and 
hegemony would suit the epistemological and ontological requirements for undertaking analysis of 
SSA‟s political economy. This approach recognises that African states are shaped by external 
impositions of commonsensical, hegemonic ideas and actions concerning its political economy, and 
hence highlights the importance of analysing how change in the structure of the international 
system can have implications for SSA‟s political economy. Additionally CCT‟s recognition of the 
importance of agency in shaping ideas, institutions and material capabilities takes into account that 
SSA is no passive actor, and allows scope for the study‟s analysis to take into consideration that 
agency can be used as a means to help shape and adapt the historical (and hegemonic) structure 
(Cox 1987, p.4). 
 
The „prima facie assumption of Cox‟s thought… that global power is played out very differently in 
the different geographical and productive arenas of the world order‟ is evident through the design of 
the CCT analytical framework of historical structures, which allows for the specificities of a 
particular location to be taken into consideration (Grugel 2005, p.209). Thus, the CCT concept of 
historical structures will be used in order to undertake analysis of the international system (the 
world order level) and on the specific region of SSA. This chapter has recognised that the CCT 
agenda is „[a]n extremely ambitious and far reaching programme… [that] requires a sense of the big 
picture combined with sensitivity to very different and changing local realities and the capacity to 
make linkages between the two,‟ and has identified how it will provide a useful theoretical base for 
the current study (Grugel 2005, p.210).   
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CCT is consciously historical in its approach (Cox and Sinclair 1996). This is useful for the current 
study because analysis and exploration of the historical context of SSA‟s political economy will 
provide further understanding of the dependence of SSA on external actors and how it has been 
shaped by shifts in the international system (Callaghy 2008, p.38). This historicised understanding 
of SSA‟s dependence will assist the study‟s analysis of whether the nature of Africa‟s political 
economy from 2000 to 2011 gives scope for SSA‟s conditions of dependence to alter. The CCT 
notion of hegemony will also be drawn upon in order to advance understanding of any shifts in the 
international system and subsequent implications for SSA‟s political economy in the twenty-first 
century.  
 
2.7 Conclusion  
Having assessed the various shortcomings of IPE theoretical tools for Africa, this chapter concludes 
that a historical pluralistic approach offered by a narrowed version of CCT will serve as a useful 
theoretical framework that can enhance understanding of both the international system and SSA‟s 
political economy. The key epistemological, ontological and empirical application criticisms levied 
towards CCT have been explored. The lack of empirical applications of CCT to Africa has been 
highlighted.  
 
This chapter has presented a narrowed version of CCT as a theoretical framework to aid its 
analysis. It primarily makes use of the CCT key concepts of historical frameworks and hegemony. 
These concepts will be utilised as theoretical tools as a means to guide the structure of the study, 
allowing for exploration of SSA‟s dependence arising as a historical process and whether the nature 
of SSA‟s political economy between 2000 and 2011 gives scope for SSA‟s conditions of 
dependence to alter. This theoretical perspective will help limit the scope of the study through 
offering a systematic approach to gathering evidence within the themes of ideas, institutions and 
material capabilities. The pluralistic nature of this approach will aim to highlight the significance of 
both structure and agency, in addition to ensuring numerous units and levels of analysis are being 
taken into consideration when exploring the nature of SSA‟s political economy in the context of 
structural changes taking place in the international system.  
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3. The nature of the international system and SSA’s political 
economy in the twentieth century 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter contextualises the study by assessing the nature of the international system and SSA‟s 
political economy during the twentieth century. It is systematically structured through exploring 
and identifying the key trends through exploring the forces of ideas, institutions and material 
capabilities in line with the study‟s narrower version of CCT as a theoretical framework. 
Exploration of the main trends related to the material capabilities of the international system leads 
to identification of the prominent historical structure(s) of the twentieth century. The chapter then 
proceeds to explore the key trends of the Cold War and the process of decolonisation. During this 
period the prevalent ideas entrenched in the international system included the prominence of the 
nation-state as the significant actor in the international system, the process of capitalism and the 
process of globalisation. The chapter explores the main roles of the UN, IFIs and corporate and civil 
associations (including both for-profit and not-for-profit sectors) that made up the key institutions 
of the international system in the twentieth century. 
  
The chapter then explores the nature of SSA‟s political economy, taking the ramifications of these 
key processes and shifts in international system for SSA‟s political economy into account. The 
impact of colonialism and decolonisation is analysed, in the form of shaping key ideas and 
institutions prevalent in SSA‟s political economy and influencing conditions of dependence. The 
nature of the African state, key ideas and the implications of globalisation for SSA‟s political 
economy are explored. The subsequent impact of these prevalent ideas on development in SSA is 
considered, alongside influence of institutions on SSA‟s political economy over the twentieth 
century contributing to SSA‟s conditions of dependence.  
 
3.2 The nature of the international system in the twentieth century 
3.2.1 Material capabilities 
At the beginning of the twentieth century pax britannica was the historical structure in the 
international system due to its combination of hegemonic material capabilit ies (entrenched through 
industrial, naval, imperial, economic and political power), ideas (liberal norms identifying the 
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separation of politics and economics) and institutions (a liberal trading and financial system helped 
enforce its material capabilities based on the prominent liberal ideas) (Cox 1987, pp.123-147). 
 
3.2.1.1 A shift in historical structure 
The beginning of the twentieth century saw the world experience the First World War (WWI), the 
Second World War (WWII) and inter-war economic collapse. This had a profound impact on the 
material capabilities of pax britannica and various states around the globe, resulting in a change of 
historical structure and hence the nature of the international system. WWI and WWII substantially 
weakened the material capabilities of Western Europe in the international system, resulting in a 
shift away from the hegemonic liberal and imperial policies, and led to the creation of new forms of 
state in Europe and other continents (O‟Brian and Williams 2004, pp.104-105). International trade 
was also affected at the beginning of the twentieth century. WWI and WWII resulted in a change in 
the direction of trade as countries altered their trading partners and European powers largely 
changed their focus from export production to war production in order to meet national demands. 
This had the effect of stimulating other countries to increase their own domestic production, or to 
look towards alternative trading partners, leading to an acceleration of industrialisation in other 
regions of the world (O‟Brian and Williams 2004, p.105).  
 
During the inter-war years, „Britain no longer exercised the same degree of dominance and the 
United States (US) was unwilling to commit itself to system maintenance. While the US had the 
power, it lacked the will‟ to become the global hegemon in this period (O‟Brian and Williams 2004, 
p.112). WWII saw the US establish political and economic supremacy by accounting for more than 
half of the world‟s manufacturing output in addition to acting as the key creditor to the Allied 
powers, resulting in significant growth in its economy (O‟Brian and Williams 2004, p.107). 
However, in the wake of WWII the US „assumed a role as major international power and leader of 
the western bloc‟ leading to the era of pax americana (O‟Brian and Williams 2004, p.113). The US 
increased its active role in the international system in order to maintain stability through 
establishing more robust security arrangements and formulating a global economic system 
facilitated and enforced through international institutions. Thus, following pax britannica’s demise 
as the prominent structure of the world order, pax americana rose as the hegemonic historical 
structure in the mid twentieth century. 
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3.2.1.2 The Cold War 
The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) represented a threat to pax americana throughout 
the Cold War from 1947-1991. The US and its allies engineered a temporary alliance with the 
USSR during the WWII in order to overcome their common enemies of Germany and Japan. 
However, significant tension and rivalry remained in place at the end of the war and their lukewarm 
relationship turned into a cold war (O‟Brian and Williams 2004, p.114).  
 
The Cold War period is often simplified and described as being „composed of three worlds‟ 
(O‟Brian and Williams 2004, p.114). The First World was made up of the US and its allies in 
Western Europe, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and later Japan. The Second World contained the 
USSR and the communist states of Eastern Europe. The Third World was the term used to describe 
the rest of the world‟s states that were occupied with the process of development (O‟Brian and 
Williams 2004, p.114). The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation was created to bolster the material 
capabilities of the First World, with the threat of it having nuclear capability being used to deter 
USSR aggression in Europe. However, the Second World increased the USSR‟s material 
capabilities through also developing nuclear weapons, which led to the period of Mutual Assured 
Destruction. Thus the First World undertook political, economic and military competition against 
the Second World, resulting in periods of relative calm followed by ones of significant tension. 
Despite never engaging in battle on either of their own soils, conflict occurred through the means of 
military coalitions, proxy wars, espionage, nuclear arms races and the extensive use of propaganda, 
with the result of devastation and destruction across parts of the Third World, specifically in 
Southern Africa, Central America and Indo-china (O‟Brian and Williams 2004, p.114-115). 
 
The end of the Cold War had a significant impact on the nature of the international system as the 
demise of the USSR (known at this point as the Soviet Union) saw a shift in material capabilities 
across the globe. The US asserted its position as the global hegemon and the end of this communist 
regime resulted in post-Soviet states experiencing a period of transition, as they were able to 
explore different economic and political systems (O‟Brian and Williams 2004, p.131). Moreover, 
the end of the 1970s had seen China start to open to foreign investment, resulting in a more open 
international system than previously in the century (O‟Brian and Williams 2004, p.115).  
 
This shift in material capabilities also had implications for the nature of the international system in 
terms of conflict and security. The end of the Cold War saw the Soviet Union and the US largely 
withdraw from regions across the world where they had been implicated in supporting opposing 
regimes and proxy wars, resulting in a lack of financing for the continuation of conflict. „Some 
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regional confrontations were moderated by the ending of superpower confrontation and UN 
peacekeeping was bolstered‟ but new conflicts emerged largely within states‟ own borders, as 
ethnic tensions and rivalries remained from previously supported opposing guerrilla groups and 
regimes (O‟Brian and Williams 2004, p.115). 
 
3.2.1.3 The process of decolonisation and financial liberalisation of the international 
system towards the end of the twentieth century  
The collapse of Soviet power resulted in the „disappearance‟ of the categorisation of the Second 
World, which in turn had implications for the ambiguous categorisation of the Third World (Burnell 
and Randall 2008, p.3). The historical process of decolonisation, which was ongoing throughout the 
Cold War period, contributed to the general trend of rephrasing post-colonial states and other 
developing countries as „the developing world‟ (Burnell and Randall 2008, p.3). The majority of 
colonies gained independence during the Cold War as the European empires‟ material capabilities 
were substantially weakened in the wake of the two world wars. The process of decolonisation 
varied by each colonial empire and from state to state, but largely involved activism from local 
populations and a realisation of a lack of capacity, and in some cases will, of colonialists to 
continue to exert control (O‟Brian and Williams 2004, p.119). The US also made use of its 
hegemonic material capabilities to support calls for decolonisation, based on the notion that a 
decolonised world would be in its own interests (Hobden 2008b, p.73). This shift in material 
capabilities of the major powers in the international system resulted in a large number of states 
establishing independence, which had implications for the balance of power in international 
institutions (O‟Brian and Williams 2004, p.120).  
 
The latter half of the twentieth century saw significant increases in the levels of international trade. 
The increasingly popular processes of neoliberal capitalism and globalisation indicated that through 
mutual advantage all countries would benefit from participating in increased levels of trading. 
However, the benefits of this increase appeared skewed, as many countries in the developing world 
did not appeared to reap many benefits; the majority of countries in Africa and Latin America saw 
their proportion of the world‟s exports actually decline during this period (Hobden 2008a, p.62). 
What was particularly distinctive about this period was FDI‟s rapid growth, which resulted from 
increased global competition heightened by the neoliberal notion of free markets gaining 
prominence (Moosa 2002, p.3). FDI become a major component of the international system, with 
the bulk of investment occurring in developed countries but with developing countries receiving an 
increasing proportion as the 1980s and 1990s progressed (Hobden 2008a, p.64). During the late 
1980s and 1990s many countries in the developing world were encouraged to adopt financial 
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liberalisation policies in order to increase the volume of unrestricted capital flows within the 
international system. Many of these countries experienced severe financial disruption during this 
transition and adapted their own political economies to the rapid movement of capital that 
characterised the international system towards the end of the twentieth century (Hobden 2008a, 
pp.66-67). 
 
The 1980s and 1990s saw the rapid industrialisation of emerging markets; specifically in East Asia 
and Latin America, culminating in a shift in the international system as the arena became more 
competitive. This period saw China emerge as the „manufacturing workshop of the world‟ due to its 
ability to produce goods at approximately half the cost of rival producers, often through 
undertaking policies at odds with the hegemonic neoliberal principles (Wade 2008, p.36). This shift 
resulted in significant increases in international financial flows, trade and MNCs across the globe, 
integrating more state economies into the capitalist international system at the end of the twentieth 
century (Gilpin 2000, p.7). 
  
3.2.2 Ideas 
The shift in material capabilities from pax britannica to pax americana in the international system 
was implicated by and had implications for the most prevalent commonsensical notions making up 
the international system. 
 
3.2.2.1 The prominence and varied nature of the modern state 
The modern state arose as a distinctive type of polity in Europe during the sixteenth century, yet 
slowly evolved over the next four centuries to become the political system that is established today 
(Leftwich 2008, pp.212-213). The modern state has emerged as a process of evolution, with key 
characteristics including its sovereignty and hegemony, its public institutions, its monopoly of 
legitimate coercion (violence) and its (theoretically) impartial bureaucracy (Leftwich 2008, p.216). 
This modern state was predominantly „carried outwards by European imperialism and colonialism, 
and imposed on diverse societies or adopted and adapted by them‟ in the twentieth century 
(Leftwich 2008, p.213). This had implications for the international system as many of the 
prominent ideas, borders and key institutions in developing countries were shaped, if not imposed, 
by external colonial actors. Despite the variation between different colonial empires, the purpose 
and nature of colonial rule ensured that state institutions implemented practices that suited the needs 
of colonial powers. Thus, the mentality towards colonies was largely extractive rather than 
developmental, which resulted in the paradox of having strong despotic power alongside weak 
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infrastructural capacities within developing states later in the century (Leftwich 2008, p.221). The 
nature of the modern state became entrenched in the twentieth century as despite all states being 
different, enough common patterns to determine certain structural characteristics were established 
(Leftwich 2008, p.222).  
  
As the twentieth century progressed and the notion of independence rose in prominence, the idea of 
maintaining an empire became less favoured and accepted, resulting in the process of decoonisation 
(O‟Brian and Williams 2004, p.119). However prominent ideas entrenched through colonial ties 
have been a key factor in shaping and influencing the particular form of political economy of many 
post-colonial countries (Leftwich 2008, p.213). The colonial premise of building and maintaining 
patron-client relationships has shaped the post-colonial state as the notion of patronage has 
combined with the formal institutions of the state, resulting in their characterisation as a neo-
patrimonial state with varying levels of corruption (Leftwich 2008, p.222). Moreover, the idea and 
practice of colonial actors imposing territorial boundaries has contributed to the post-colonial 
state‟s struggle in the latter half of the twentieth century to maintain hegemony within its own 
borders, to achieve a monopoly of violence and to protect its sovereignty. This „weakness‟ of post-
colonial states has had the knock on effect of increasing their dependency on international 
institutions, such as the World Bank and the IMF, and sources of private investment, due to it 
limiting their own bargaining capacity. As donors applied increasingly stringent conditions to their 
aid and loans in the 1980s and 1990s, SSA leaders dependent on foreign aid inflows forming a 
significant part of their overall government expenditure found their de facto sovereignty 
substantially reduced (Leftwich 2008, pp.222-224). 
 
3.2.2.2 Organising the political economy of states 
Communism rose in significance during and after WWI as an alternative to the economic liberal 
state, primarily in the USSR. The communist form of organisation was popular among the lower 
working class who had largely been excluded from the benefits derived from capitalist production. 
Communism was based on the notion of a command economy whereby products where produced 
according to specific targets that were government issued (O‟Brian and Williams 2004, p.110). This 
alternative vision for the political economy of society put forward by the Soviet communist model 
was prominent until the end of the Cold War in 1989 (O‟Brian and Williams 2004, p.131). 
 
However, it is the concept of capitalism that has been the prevalent hegemonic idea for how to 
organise domestic political economies in the international system over the past century in two 
distinct ways. Briefly, the popularity of Keynesian demand management, advocating the need for 
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government intervention in struggling economies, rose in Western states in the wake of the 1929 
crisis and the Great Depression (Gilpin 2000). This idea, and subsequently practice, saw 
governments take a larger role in managing their own political economy and providing a form of 
welfare for their citizens when business had lost confidence in the economy (O‟Brian and Williams 
2004, p.111). Thus, focus was placed on individual states „cushioning economic turbulence within 
their borders‟ (O‟Brian and Williams 2004, p.121).  
 
However, in the 1970s Keynesian demand management was perceived to have failed, allowing the 
neoliberal notion of free markets to become increasingly influential in the international system 
(Gilpin 2000). Neoliberal capitalism is based on the assumption that there should be no external 
interference in markets, as they are fundamentally stable and self-correcting, thus offering the most 
efficient allocation of resources (Gilpin 2000). Since the early 1980s, key policies and predominant 
notions emerged in the international system based on ideas of economic liberalism, with the market 
being free from political control (Harrison 2010, p.26). During the latter stages of the Cold War, the 
US and its allies denounced the communist ideology, with British Prime Minister Margaret 
Thatcher coining the slogan „There Is No Alternative‟ to describe the notion that there was no 
alternative to the neoliberal political economy that was rapidly asserted around the globe, bar in 
communist states. The end of the Cold War in 1989 and the subsequent disintegration of the Soviet 
empire saw the power of financial capital „unleashed by the deregulatory moves‟ and the 
„imposition of free trade rules on the rest of the world,‟ as the US and its allies strongly promoted a 
liberal world order and the „benefits of capitalism‟ (Gamble 2009, p.122).  
 
It is the inherent nature of capitalism that the international system is „inevitably driven by major 
upheavals, unpredictable change, and sometimes, rapid swings in fortune‟ (Lent and Lockwood 
2010, p.37). This is because it holds the ability to foster substantial wealth creation and higher 
living standards, yet the implication of winners and losers leads to a tendency towards inequality in 
the system, making it unstable (Lent and Lockwood 2010, p.31). The last decade of the twentieth 
century saw neoliberal capitalism become the most prevalent notion of how to organise the political 
economy, yet with fluctuation over what specifics were the most appropriate in order to stem its 
inherently volatile nature. This can be seen by the end of the century giving rise to liberal Anglo-
American political economic systems, European arrangements that appeared more welfare centred, 
and Asian neoliberal capitalism which focused predominantly on more corporate practices that 
combine business with government and place less emphasis on the role of labour organisations 
(O‟Brian and Williams 2004, p.131). 
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3.2.2.3 Globalisation and the impact on development 
The idea of global production for global markets became more prominent in the US after WWII. 
Thus, the US, as the hegemonic country in pax americana, used its significant material capabilities 
to develop this idea through shaping the prevalent historical structure in the international system to 
suit its own needs (O‟Brian and Williams 2004, p.117). This period saw an increase in technology 
available and technological capabilities, combined with the notion of FDI increasingly implemented 
by state institutions and a rise in MNCs (O‟Brian and Williams 2004, p.113). This resulted in an 
internationalisation of production with a labour oriented focus, enhanced by the US‟s prominent 
state-society relationship that led to the state agreeing to achieve high employment levels and 
introduce a minimum wage. The modern state was further internationalised during this period, 
following the growing prominence of a degree of protectionism within the US. The US was able to 
project these ideas upon the international trade system through key international institutions, 
making use of its hegemonic status and being the only country to hold veto power in the IMF. 
These neoliberal moves towards the internationalisation of production and the state combined with 
the end of the Cold War resulted in the idea and practice of globalisation gaining prominence 
(Leftwich 2008, p.227). The overall definition of the concept and means for how to measure the 
process of globalisation is debated, yet broadly speaking it is „an uneven process, whereby the 
barrier of time and space are reduced, new social relations between distant people are fostered and 
new centres of authority are created‟ (O‟Brian and Williams 2004, p.132). Globalisation is „a 
multifaceted process which affects different countries and different social groups within countries 
differently‟ through the dissemination of knowledge and key ideas (Hobden 2008a, p.55). The 
twentieth century has highlighted how not all states are impacted evenly by globalisation, nor make 
an equal contribution to its momentum. Globalisation entails both costs and benefits for all in the 
globe, yet the nature and extent of which are varied among states and at the sub-state level (Burnell 
2008, p.292). 
 
Globalisation represents an increasingly integrated international system with increased trade, 
investment flows and technology transfer „powered by an almost universal tendency to adopt 
neoliberal economic prescriptions and practices‟ (Burnell 2008, p.294). This notion of there being 
no alternative to neoliberalism has acted as „a differentiated project to maintain a global system of 
core and periphery,‟ acting as an „effective way of intervening and dominating post-colonial and 
post-Communist countries‟ (Harrison 2010, pp.22-23). This critique has arisen from awareness of 
neoliberalism‟s predominantly Western origins, with subsequent arguments suggesting this has 
brought about a globalised double standard of open, free markets in the non-West, whilst more 
protectionist policies are undertaken in the West (Harvey 2007). 
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This has had implications for developmental thinking. As the twentieth century progressed the 
neoliberal developmental model‟s essence was universally agreed upon as a commonsensical notion 
(Hay 2004, p.502). The end of the Cold War had withdrawn the choice of ideology and model of 
development, as the hegemonic status of neoliberal capitalism saw options to default from this 
system reduced (Hobden 2008b, p.77). This had significant repercussions for many developing 
countries, as neoliberal policy and institutional conditions associated with international institutions 
and aid donors‟ assistance become more prominent. The 1980s saw structural adjustment policies 
offered to states experiencing financial crisis, which demanded the liberalising and opening up of 
states‟ economies in order to gain assistance from such sources of finance (O‟Brian and Williams 
2004, p.124). The 1990s saw „good governance‟ considerations being added as a form of 
conditionality for states receiving financial support and developmental aid, such as embodying 
ideas of human rights and democratic reform (Burnell 2008, p.296). 
 
3.2.3 Institutions 
A „striking feature of the international system has been the rise in international organisations in the 
second half of the twentieth century‟ and the increasing importance placed upon such institutions in 
managing the international system (O‟Brian and Williams 2004, p.123). Pax americana has 
maintained its support for renewed and invigorated multilateralism throughout the twentieth century 
despite the ideational shifts in economic policy that have occurred (O‟Brian and Williams 2004, 
p.125). These structural shifts can be illustrated through the changing nature of roles and 
approaches of the UN, IFIs, corporate and civic associations in the international system.  
 
3.2.3.1 The UN 
The UN was created in 1945 as a successor to the League of Nations. Its significance for the 
international system is predominantly channelled through its specialised agencies and its Security 
Council. The UN specialised agencies promote specific issues and cooperation whilst attempting to 
„cope with the casualties of the global political economy,‟ for example through the World Health 
Organisation and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (O‟Brian and Williams 
2004, p.124). However, the Security Council is the chief element of this international institution and 
holds a position of great importance in the international system due to its ability to make binding 
international resolutions to which states are compelled to adhere. It is composed of five permanent 
members (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom (UK) and the US) who hold veto power over 
proposals passing through the Security Council, and ten rotating members, who are each elected in 
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two year terms. The composition of the permanent members of the Security Council is 
representative of the victors of the WWII, and it exerts the most influence over the global security 
structure and economic sanctions against states. Another significant body within the UN is the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), which was established in 1964 
in response to the shift in ideas adjoined to the process of decolonisation. UNCTAD was created to 
promote „the development-friendly integration of developing countries into the world economy‟ in 
lieu of the increasing number of new states and those gaining independence (About UNCTAD 
2002). 
 
3.2.3.2 International Financial Institutions  
From the 1980s onwards a substantial number of IFIs have taken on enlarged roles in the 
international system. The IMF and the World Bank appear the most visible IFIs, with the World 
Trade Organisation, the Group of Eight4 (G8) and the Group of Twenty5 (G20) all rising in 
importance towards the end of the twentieth century alongside regional groupings, such as the Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation and the Southern African Development Community. 
 
The IMF and World Bank served to „give a voice‟ to the universal norms of this hegemonic world 
order, as IFIs were put forward to „serve the whole‟ through „uphold[ing] the rules that underpin the 
idea of a liberal world economy‟ and hence advance the key idea of neoliberal capitalism (Leysens 
2008, p.49). This increase of structural power in global finance has allowed US agency to shape the 
international system, through exerting influence on other states‟ economic practices. This has 
resulted in a high degree of conformity with the liberal US concept and practice of global 
capitalism, with states „adopting a common way of thinking about economic matters‟ at the world 
order level (Cox 2004, p.312-313).  
 
The output of IFIs is displayed through „providing advice on economic policy, demanding policy 
change in return for financing or settling economic disputes between actors‟ (O‟Brian and Williams 
2004, p.124). As these institutions have taken on increasing roles in the international system, their 
significance and relative power has also increased. This can be seen through an increasing number 
of states adopting various structural adjustment policies (SAPs) in return for financial assistance 
from the IMF and World Bank when experiencing a critical financial situation in the 1980s and 
1990s (O‟Brian and Williams 2004, p.124). SAPs can be best understood as a template comprised 
                                                   
4 The G8 is made up of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the UK and the US. 
5 The G20 includes the G8 countries plus the prominent developing countries of Argentina, Australia, Brazil, China, 
India, Indonesia, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Republic of Korea, Turkey and the regional grouping of the EU. 
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of programmes of economic liberalisation, such as: the removal of price controls and public 
marketing institutions; the removal of exchange rate controls (hence preventing devaluation); 
increased rates of interest; further plans to open the economy to FDI; and forms of privatisation, 
which would be attached to a few country specific policies (Harvey 1991, p.121). SAPs were 
introduced following the World Bank‟s Berg Report of 1981, which identified the post-colonial 
state as bloated with rent-seeking institutions that distorted price mechanisms in order to line the 
pockets of political elites, and put forward the solution of, in simplistic terms, less state and more 
market (Harrison 2010, p.89). A critical view is that SAPs effectively served to „buttress the 
political aspirations of dominant groups and reduce inherently political questions of social 
inequality and the role of the state to technical, bureaucratic procedures‟ (Taylor and Williams 
2004, p.5).  
 
The instability and social resistance that arose in response to the implementation of SAPs in 
developing countries led to the need of modification of key programmes. The World Bank (2000, 
p.38) identified that „market driven development could not succeed without a strong social and 
institutional infrastructure, including a strong state‟ and hence from the late 1980s SAPs were 
characterised by significant neoliberal reforms. The Highly Indebted Poor Countries Scheme 
(HIPC) was thus introduced in 1996, and further „enhanced‟ in 1999, aiming „to provide debt 
sustainability that would help to remove a major constraint on investment and growth and to be a 
spur to further adjustment, in part by galvanizing increased private external investment‟ (Callaghy 
2008, p.52). Also in 1999, the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) was introduced to replace 
SAPs and form the prerequisite for HIPC status; the PRSP defines a multitude of programmatic 
reforms and projects to implement a pro-poor development strategy (Harrison 2010, p.45). This 
template put forward had greater emphasis on government ownership, as opposed to World Bank or 
IMF intervention, and on social expenditure, with less attention granted to policy conditionality. 
The introduction of HIPCs and PRSP was significant as it „iterated attempts to recodify the 
neoliberal world-view of market, state and self into different procedures and institutions‟ and 
despite maintaining some forms of policy conditions, it represented a shift in neoliberal policy in 
the international system (Harrison 2010, p.42). 
 
3.2.3.3 Corporate and civil associations  
Corporate and civil associations have become increasingly active in forming and consolidating 
international organisations both for-profit and not-for-profit at the societal level towards the end of 
the twentieth century. The change in material capabilities across the globe at the end of the Cold 
War provided the opportunity for industrialised democratic states to actively promote the spread of 
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political systems similar to their own, triggering a wave of states undertaking democratic transitions 
during the 1990s (Ottaway 2008, p.166). Thus, influential states in the international system „devised 
democracy promotions strategies‟ and „focused much effort on promoting citizen participation and 
activism‟ within developing countries (Ottaway 2008, p.166). A simultaneous process was ongoing 
within established democracies, whereby disenchantment with the performance of state institutions, 
corruption and inefficiency of governments „prompted international development agencies to 
rethink the assumption that development required state intervention‟ and instead sought ways to 
bypass governments, through implementing development projects and programmes through NGOs 
as civil associations (Ottaway 2008, p.167). 
 
NGOs became increasingly prominent as a means for society to lobby governments and 
international organisations, as well as implementing developmental projects and distributing aid 
(Sklias 1999). The formation of transnational advocacy networks by NGOs combined with the 
increased ease (and low cost) of maintaining communication through technology has resulted in 
society having enhanced opportunities to lobby states, IFIs and transnational corporations. This has 
enabled NGOs and other members of society to influence both the ideational and institutional 
structures of the international system through influencing government decisions to develop 
domestic policies, increasingly participating in international political processes and acting as a 
representative for those bound by common values, knowledge, and interests related to a specific 
issue  (O‟Brian and Williams 2004, p.126). 
 
3.3 The nature of SSA’s political economy in the twentieth century 
Having undertaken systematic analysis of the key trends and the forces within the international 
system, this section shall now explore the nature of SSA‟s political economy in the twentieth 
century.  
 
3.3.1 Material capabilities 
SSA‟s political economy in the twentieth century was shaped by internal and external actors‟ 
material capabilities. 
 
3.3.1.1 The impact of colonialism and its lasting legacy 
As a result of European colonial powers effectively slicing up the African region at the Berlin 
Conference in 1884, at the onset of the twentieth century all African states were part of a European 
empire (Rotberg 2003). Different colonialisms „expressed their distinctive experience of statehood,‟ 
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yet „colonial powers also borrowed and learned from each other‟ enhancing the ability to discern 
certain common features across the colonial world (Chiriyankandath 2008, p.41). Colonial rule in 
the first half of the twentieth century had far-reaching consequences for SSA, as this „cultural 
project of control‟ „objectified‟ the colonised, before reconstructing and transforming both 
hegemonic ideas and institutions in the region through the development of a colonial source of 
knowledge that outlived decolonisation (Dirks 2004, p.1). 
 
The historical process of decolonisation was a rapid transformation that saw a number of African 
countries granted independence following the end of WWII. This change for SSA‟s political 
economy arose due to the shift in material capabilities that was occurring in the international system 
with the significant weakening of the European powers following the world wars and the increase 
in tension between the US and the Soviet Union, as both competed to win over anti-colonial 
nationalists to their respective cause (Chiriyankandath 2008, pp.44-45). 
 
Following the process of decolonisation and consolidation in SSA, the 1960s and 1970s were met 
with optimism for the newly independent SSA states. Independence led to „strong proclamations of 
a sense of self, as independent nations mingled with the nascent international ideology of Third 
World solidarity of the time‟ (Cornelissen 2009, p.8). However, SSA states emerged entrenched in 
Western-centred political economy through their key political and economic institutions and 
linkages with previous colonial powers (Clapham 1996). Since the primary notion of anti-colonial 
nationalism was the independence of nation-states, this resulted in African anti-colonialists seeking 
political economic autonomy finding themselves with little option other than to continue to operate 
within this international system based on the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, with the key object 
being the sovereign state (Chiriyankandath 2008, p.47). Thus, the impact of colonialism and 
decolonisation „has been transformative rather than transitory,‟ with lasting implications including 
the dependent nature of SSA‟s political economy on external actors (Chiriyankandath 2008, p.36). 
 
3.3.1.2 The instability of independence and actions of external actors deepen internal 
crises 
The independence of African states from colonial rule presented a formidable challenge. The 
process itself was „marred by the hurried transfer of administrative responsibilities, belated and 
unsustainable political compromises, economic dependence, and largely untested legislatures and 
governments,‟ making for a troubled transition period (Chiriyankandath 2008, p.45). The multi-
ethnic and multi-religious character of most post-colonial states in SSA saw emerging leaders 
struggle to gain acceptance as the legitimate leader by their population. Moreover, as opposed to 
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being the guarantor of the well-being of its citizens, states in SSA have frequently enacted 
significant threats to their populations through means such as military regimes and human rights 
violations. The young partially democratic regimes experienced weak coercive powers and 
instability, enhancing their likelihood of civil conflict as „[p]olitical change deconsolidates political 
institutions and heightens the risk of civil war‟ (Fearon and Laitin 2003, p.34). African states, 
„rather than being the key actor, [have] had to compete with numerous other powerful actors, such 
as warlords, guerrilla groups, and drug cartels, which in some places appear to threaten its very 
existence‟ and heighten insecurity (Hobden 2008b, p.72). Moreover, „the continent‟s domestic 
politics became increasingly settled around incumbents who, having turned out victors in hard-
fought internal battles for power, had established themselves as long-term leaders,‟ which 
weakened SSA‟s economic and political leverage and in some cases led to crises of government 
(Cornelissen 2009, p.8). 
 
Despite having gained independence, SSA‟s political economy was directly impacted by the proxy 
wars taking place during the Cold War period. The 1960s to 1980s was fundamentally suited to the 
needs of the generally small, poor, weak and artificially created African states, as paradoxically the 
level of insecurity generated by the Cold War enabled SSA states to develop and practice ideologies 
within their political economy that corresponded closely with their needs (Clapham 2005, p.20). 
The conflict provided SSA countries with an option „concerning the operation of social and 
economic systems and goals and modalities of development‟ through deciding which superpower to 
align too (Hobden 2008b, p.75). Initially SSA states were able to gain economic and political 
support from aligning with one of the sides as the region rose in geostrategic value, but as the Cold 
War progressed numerous states in SSA were caught up in proxy wars of this major power conflict. 
Thus, external powers supported governments and insurgency movements in SSA in order to 
undermine the opposing capitalist or communist power.  
 
These alliances of convenience resulted in a steady flow of resources for ally SSA countries, 
however „little attention was paid to the ways in which these resources helped fuel corruption, 
patrimonialism and militaristic systems of governance‟ (Taylor and Williams 2004, p.6). The Cold 
War contributed to SSA leaders becoming shrouded in neopatrimonial tendencies, with despotic 
leaders undermining the legitimacy of their state and societal cohesion, resulting in knock-on 
implications for the wider region. Some SSA states rejected this pressure to align with one or the 
other and joined the Non-Aligned Movement, yet the majority accepted economic and political 
incentives that were put forward by both sides in order to increase their own material capabilities at 
the risk of becoming involved in a proxy war (Hobden 2008b, p.74-75). The availability of specific 
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natural resources often influenced the location of the proxy war arena, with weak unstable 
governments propped up by external actors‟ financial resources (O‟Brian and Williams 2004, 
pp.114-115). „[T]he bulk of the continent appeared to sink into general obsolescence‟ as these 
external actors and proxy wars heightened internal crises and conflict in the region (Cornelissen 
2009, p.8). 
 
This combination of the instability of independence and the impact of external actors led to a 
deepening of internal crises across the region. This significant level of insecurity heightened by 
weak material capabilities saw an increasing number of SSA countries turn towards international 
institutions for assistance through SAPs. By the end of the 1980s, 36 African states had undertaken 
243 separate SAPs with the World Bank and IMF due to economic turmoil (Chazan et al. 1999, 
p.337). This rise in prominence of SAPs resulted in external powers (re)gaining increasing power 
over the running of society in SSA, through demanding neoliberal criteria was met in order to 
proffer financial assistance (Hobden 2008b, p.72). The material capability of SSA‟s political 
economy in the 1980s and 1990s was further weakened by the increasing consolidation and 
influence of IFIs that culminated in rising external dependence. This resulted in the various moves 
away from colonial predecessors becoming overshadowed by the overarching external control still 
enforced on SSA states through international trade agreements and development finance programs 
(Harrison 2010, p.12-13). Thus, this period saw the deepening of SSA states‟ internal crises and 
increasing dependence on external actors (Cornelissen 2009, p.8). 
 
3.3.1.3 Implications of end of the Cold War for SSA 
The end of the Cold War brought with it a sense of optimism for the stability of SSA‟s political 
economy that would help bolster its weakened material capabilities. Proxy wars and the ongoing 
jostling between the US and the Soviet Union had enhanced instability in the region, and with its 
end a number of regional conflicts were resolved, such as in Mozambique and Namibia (Hobden 
2008b, p.75). Moreover, a number of corrupt regimes that had been supported by these opposing 
sides were replaced by more democratic regimes.  
 
However, this optimism was short lived as areas within SSA experienced genocide, famine, 
renewed conflict and upheaval (Hobden 2008b, pp.75-76). Some states in the region did experience 
greater levels of stability, yet despite the formal end to proxy wars in the SSA region, the end of the 
Cold War brought with it increased insecurity for many African citizens. Looking specifically to the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), it can be seen that conflict within the country affected 
the nearby region as neighbouring countries intervened on opposing sides. This had a hugely 
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destabilising effect on SSA‟s political economy as numerous countries within the region formed 
alliances against one another and effectively undermined the region‟s material capabilities (Hobden 
2008b, p.76). In the 1990s SSA was „the most conflict ridden region of the world and the only 
region in which the number of armed conflicts [was] on the increase‟ (SIPRI 1999, p.20). Between 
1990 and 1999, SSA witnessed 39.5%6 of the total number of civil war cases that occurred across 
the globe during the 1990s (Fearon and Laitin 2003). Thus, SSA experienced a higher number of 
cases of civil war from 1990 to 1999 than any other region in the world. 
 
The 1990s saw the majority of SSA states experience high levels of political economic vulnerability 
due to a combination of high levels of conflict, external debt, fragile economies, and a material 
dependence on external actors for aid and financial credit (Harrison 2010, p.109). SSA was treated 
as a „salvage operation‟ by IFIs and external actors, as the combination of civil war, human 
insecurity and political arbitrariness in the region was reinforced by infrastructural, administrative 
and economic inefficiency that undermined its overall material capabilities (Callaghy 2008, p.42). 
This approach was reflective of „a new foreign policy rationale by Western industrial democracies‟ 
that took place in the 1990s that resulted in „economic conditionality [being] joined by forms of 
political conditionality, under the assumption that economic and political liberalization must go 
hand in hand‟ (Callaghy 2008, p.42).  
 
SSA‟s geopolitical significance and material capabilities declined at the end of the Cold War, as 
major world powers were no longer driven to provide economic and political support to African 
actors to continue proxy wars based on ideological differences. Additionally, SSA‟s main 
commodities were being more effectively produced by other developing nations, which further 
decreased SSA‟s material capabilities as the region become less important to global investors and 
IFIs (Callaghy 2008, p.40). Combined, this saw SSA‟s significance in the international system 
decline, with interest largely only remaining in investing in the mineral and oil sectors. The extent 
of the weakness of SSA‟s material capabilities during this period is more apparent when compared 
with other developing regions. Looking to South Asia, during this period the region‟s Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) growth rose slowly, whereas SSA‟s dramatically declined. Additionally, 
South Asia‟s population growth rate fell, whereas SSA‟s continued to increase (Callaghy 2008, 
pp.40-41). Looking to the levels of investment, it can be seen that the 1980s saw SSA‟s investment 
as a percentage of GDP decline, in comparison to South Asia‟s increasing. South Asia‟s economic 
policies exceeded SSA‟s in terms of creating an advantageous business environment, through 
                                                   
6 This percentage was calculated from data presented in Fearon and Laitin (2003) and rounded to three significant 
figures.  
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achieving a more favourable politico-administrative and socioeconomic context for investment 
(Callaghy 2008, p.41). Investors perceived SSA to have become „a voracious sinkhole that 
swallowed their money with little or no long-term return‟ due to the high levels of political risks 
resulting in weak states and weak markets (Callaghy 2008, p.41). 
 
Thus, at the end of the twentieth century, SSA was viewed to have weak material capabilities due to 
the combination of conflict, crises of government and lack of financial capabilities that 
characterised the region and culminated in it appearing as a switched off place in the international 
system.  
 
3.3.2 Ideas 
Key ideas in the international system had subsequent implications for the prevalent ideas in SSA‟s 
political economy, as shall now be explored in more depth. 
 
3.3.2.1 The nature of the African state 
The historical context of the state-society relationship from a statist perspective is based on the 
premise of „nation-building‟, describing the movement of political integration from sub-national 
identities, which were based on notions of community and kinship, towards a focus on constructing 
a state (Ferguson 2006, p.94). Success of the state is measured by the construction of a base of 
authority established on nation-state citizenship, yet the African state did not experience such a 
transition. The notion of the modern African state was created for European imperial purposes, 
imposed on the populations of the region by external actors in order to serve colonising empires 
(Clapham 1996). This saw African state boundaries effectively drawn up overnight by European 
colonial powers at the Berlin Conference in 1884, with little consideration granted to the current 
ruling structures, and neither ethnic nor cultural distinctions (Rotberg 2003).  
 
The process of independence in SSA saw little option for anti-colonists other than to maintain the 
sovereign state as the key political and economic unit, as was prevalent and entrenched within the 
international system (Cooper 2003, p.67). Subsequently, decolonisation in the mid twentieth 
century resulted in newly independent SSA states emerging entrenched in a Western-centred 
political economy, without a shared feeling of national unity among its citizens due to the socially 
constructed nature of the African state and the endurance of pre-existing social dynamics (Clapham 
1996). Agency in SSA post-colonial states largely undertook diverse political trajectories away 
from previous colonial templates, resulting in significant differences in terms of political practices, 
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infrastructure and ambitions developing within these „new‟ African states (Young 2004). State 
formation in SSA had a specific effect on SSA‟s position in the international system, as related 
internal processes became interlinked with conditions and developments occurring in the wider 
global arena (Cornelissen 2009, p.7). Additionally, the last couple of decades in the twentieth 
century saw elements of the African state modified, and in some cases significantly revised, by the 
hegemonic notion of neoliberalism that trickled down through the international system (Harrison 
2010, p.97). Thus, the shaping of the African state was highly influenced and contingent upon the 
changing nature of the international political economy throughout the twentieth century (Clapham 
1996; Young 2004). 
 
The nature of the global political economy during this period of African independence combined 
with „the idea of state sovereignty enabled African governments to maximize international support 
for their continued tenure of power‟ despite not meeting the (outdated) Weberian criteria of a state, 
essentially absolving them from many of the demands set originally in the doctrine of sovereignty 
(Clapham 2005, p.20). This has contributed to the „low capacity and/or low political will of state 
institutions to provide all citizens with minimum levels of security and well-being,‟ a key 
determinant of the Weberian classification of the state (Mentan 2004, p.20).  
 
Robert Jackson (1990) typified the African states as „quasi-statehood‟, due to their being treated as 
though they were fully sovereign by other members of the international order despite falling short 
of the Weberian criteria in practice. This consensual acknowledgement of new African states by 
leading states in the world order resulted in a form of protection for SSA states, guaranteeing their 
territorial, external and, in some cases, internal security (Clapham 2005, p.21). However, 
developments that occurred in the international order combined with the internal political and 
economic problems experienced by many African states „stripped away much of the protection with 
which they had previously been provided‟ resulting in them being „dangerously exposed to a new 
world that challenged many of the assumptions on which Africa‟s international relations had 
previously been based‟ (Clapham 2005, p.20). Many African states have struggled with, and in a 
few cases failed to, function as a sovereign nation-state providing security for its citizens (Rotberg 
2003). In the late 1980s and 1990s it appeared that Africa was made up of „despotic and 
overbearing state[s] that monopolizes political and economic space, stifling both democracy and 
economic growth‟ with the state appearing as the chief obstacle to development in the region 
(Ferguson 2006, p.95). The reality is that the majority of African states could be typified as only 
reaching „quasi-statehood‟ during the twentieth century (Jackson 1990). Despite the initial 
optimism that came with the idea of independence and that, in theory, the post-colonial African 
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state has all the outward trappings of international sovereignty, in reality SSA‟s political economy 
was directed from outside due to its dependence on neoliberal ideas prevalent in the international 
system. 
 
3.3.2.2 Key ideas in SSA’s political economy 
Neoliberal reform in SSA states has appeared as a form of „scientific capitalism‟, as externally led 
processes have driven the neoliberal agenda (Ferguson 1995). As capitalism became the hegemonic 
principle in SSA‟s political economy, its generic aspects of combined and uneven development has 
led to „modern forms of economic fragility and spatial differentiation, the disintegrative effects of 
which are mediated through the regulative processes of the state system, albeit one structured by 
massive inequalities of power‟ (Harrison 2010, p.6). Economic fragility in the region is enhanced 
by numerous SSA states relying on a limited number of primary commodities making up the 
majority of their GDP, leaving their economy unstable as the peaks and falls in the price of these 
key exports have a profound effect on SSA countries‟ overall GDP (Gibbon and Ponte 2005). This 
has resulted in the „lumpy‟ nature of investment in SSA, where the extraction of a commodity is the 
driving aim of business, as opposed to embarking on broader engagement with the host market 
(Cooper 2001). Subsequently, resources found in the region such as oil, minerals and agricultural 
crops all offer unstable prices that entrench the continuation of low wages and low technology used 
in agrarian livelihoods across SSA (Harrison 2010, p.7). Moreover, there is a tendency for such key 
commodities to be processed outside of their SSA country of origin, whereby their added value is 
gained and reaped. This has resulted in SSA largely being made up of small and vulnerable 
economies that are heavily affected by changes in the international system whilst exerting minimal 
reciprocal influence (Harrison 2010, pp.7-8). 
 
The independence of SSA countries was highly influenced by the occurrence of the Cold War. This 
is because major powers in WWI and WWII offered foreign resources that could be used by SSA 
leaders as a means to maintain, or gain, control of their state. Thus, rather than seeking legitimacy 
from their citizens through representative democracy, many SSA leaders during this period 
enforced the notion of patrimonialism, extortion and authoritarian rule using this external support, 
further deepening SSA‟s dependence on external actors (Taylor and Williams 2004, p.8). This form 
of control over SSA‟s political economy was at odds with the idea of a neoliberal international 
system that was gaining prominence in the international arena.   
 
The demise of the Cold War saw many of these resources taken away from SSA leaders. Such 
notions of corruption and nepotism were seen to hinder the modernising of the state, and these 
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strategies became more difficult to maintain without looking for alternative sources of external 
support (Ferguson 2006, p.94). As SSA leaders looked for means to gain access to much needed 
resources from the early 1980s to the late 1990s, levels of external debt in SSA rose dramatically 
(Clapham 1996, pp.166-167). The late 1980s and early 1990s saw a wave of democratisation across 
SSA, which can be partially explained by African policymakers and leaders adapting key elements 
within the structure of their political economy in order to gain resources from external actors 
(Taylor and Williams 2004, p.8). This idea of why this process occurred helps to explain why the 
notion of multi-party neoliberal democracy „has failed to incorporate, either economically or 
ideologically, precisely the most alienated segments of many African societies, namely youth, rural 
communities and women‟ (Taylor and Williams 2004). 
 
Thus, structural changes that occurred in the international system combined with the implications of 
the end of the Cold War resulted in SSA appearing „virtually invisible in economic terms but highly 
visible as a region suffering from violent conflict, famine, disease, poverty, environmental 
degradation and corruption‟ (Taylor and Williams 2004, p.9). This prevalent negative perspective 
of SSA‟s political economy developed further with it being identified as „the hopeless continent‟ at 
the end of the twentieth century (Economist 2000). 
 
3.3.2.3 Globalisation and development  
The majority of theoretical and empirical „studies of globalisation often ignore, or provide only 
passing coverage of, Africa‟ (Moore 2001, p.909). Indeed, passing references to SSA deem it to be 
a „switched off‟ place in the international system, yet the region has been implicated in political and 
economic engagement throughout the twentieth century (Harrison 2010, p.1). There has been 
repetitive rhetoric posed by the IMF suggesting that SSA is not fully globalised or that globalisation 
is passing SSA by, yet this is at key odds with the neoliberal integrative processes that have claimed 
to have taken place globally since the late 1980s (Harrison 2010, p.4). SSA represents an arena 
whereby significant and protracted neoliberal engineering has taken place. As a key facet of 
globalisation is the „rolling out‟ of neoliberalism, one can identify that in the twentieth century SSA 
has both experienced and been impacted by globalisation (Peck and Ticknell 2002). However, 
counter to the „liberal notions of convergence, positive-sum outcomes, and the beneficial effects of 
competition,‟ analysis of the nature of SSA‟s political economy in the twentieth century shows that 
the continent „represents and exemplifies the salience of the radically uneven and unequal contours 
of globalisation‟ (Harrison 2010, p.9). 
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The concept of development was frequently used by post-colonial leaders in an attempt to attract 
popular support. The notion of a „developmental state‟ was supported by colonial powers who 
aimed to show a shift from a primary exploitative approach to one of preservation towards African 
states (Chiriyankandath 2008, p.46). Neoliberal macroeconomic thinking was the key driver behind 
these developmental conditionalities of the 1980s that were similar for all states (Campbell and 
Loxley 1989). Not all SAPs were exactly the same, yet they can be best understood to follow a 
specific template. Core programmes of economic liberalisation included: the removal of price 
controls and public marketing institutions; the removal of exchange rate controls (and hence 
preventing devaluation); increased rates of interest; further plans to open the economy to FDI; and 
forms of privatisation, which would be attached to a few country specific policies (Harvey 1991, 
p.121). The prevalence of neoliberalism „virtually abolishe[d] the idea of development as a specific 
concern in favour of a universal set of prescriptions applied to developed and developing economies 
alike‟ (Cammack 2002, p.159). Broadly speaking, this led to IFIs adopting a one-model-fits-all 
approach with regards to development in SSA, regardless of the variety of political and economic 
differences in the post-colonial states. The end of the twentieth century saw the process of 
neoliberal structural adjustment become in effect „the development orthodoxy for the continent‟ 
(Harrison 2010, p.39). 
 
3.3.3 Institutions 
This section will explore key institutions for SSA‟s political economy in the twentieth century, 
highlighting the key implications for states and societies in SSA. 
 
3.3.3.1 The UN, decolonisation and the Cold War  
The UN General Assembly became a key forum for issues that were a priority for the developing 
world and was a significant forum for voicing calls for decolonisation. Resolution 1514 was passed 
in 1960, which officially condemned the continuation of colonialism and in the following decade 33 
African states gained their independence (Hobden 2008b, p.80). Once independent, African states 
took a seat in the General Assembly as a mark of sovereignty and independence. Thus, 
decolonisation of African states also transformed the workings of the UN itself, as the high number 
of independent African states contributed to the significant increase in UN member states from the 
original 51 in 1945 to 188 members in 1999 (UN membership growth 2011). 
 
From 1990 to 1999, approximately 26 member states joined the UN (UN membership growth 
2011). This dramatic increase was largely due to the collapse of the Soviet Union, which saw many 
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former republics apply for membership. Only two of these „new‟ members were African countries 
(Eritrea and Namibia), and these developments affected both the size and the influence of voting 
blocs within the UN systems (Taylor and Williams 2004, p.7). This effectively led to Africa losing 
one-third of the numerical advantage that it had previously enjoyed, and reflected a shift in the 
priorities of major powers in the international system away from Africa and towards Eastern Europe 
and Asia (Taylor and Williams 2004, p.7). 
 
3.3.3.2 The imposing nature of IFIs  
Throughout the 1980s, SSA states were „subject to pervasive compulsion‟ by IFIs (Harrison 2010, 
p.46). As the hegemonic idea, neoliberalism appeared as the global architecture of commonsensical 
ideas and material capabilities, with the IFIs enforcing international regulation (Soederberg 2002). 
SSA states that were experiencing financial crisis, such as those on the brink of insolvency, were 
forced to turn to IFIs in order to gain further credit and organise debt rescheduling. In return, IFIs 
would state a number of economic conditionalities that governments would have to implement in 
order to gain access to these services. This situation was context specific as the fragility of newly 
independent SSA states and their own institutional structures in the 1980s and 1990s created an 
„unprecedented opportunity for external regulatory intervention‟ (Harrison 2010, p.89). Thus, 
neoliberalism was imposed on SSA‟s political economy through IFIs; it was not an indigenously 
conceived project but one advocated by key players in the international system who were driving 
this hegemonic way of thinking (Harrison 2010, p.38). This dominant mode of thought „set the 
parameters within which debates about how the major external powers should interact with Africa 
have been conducted‟ for the later decades of the twentieth century (Taylor and Williams 2004, 
p.4). 
 
It can be seen that „[t]he reform programmes that many African countries initiated in the mid-1980s 
– with the support of the IMF and World Bank and other donors – reflected a new paradigm. The 
reforms attempted to reduce the state‟s role in production and in regulating economic activity… 
they placed more emphasis on maintaining macroeconomic stability and avoiding overvalued 
exchange rates… this new paradigm became known as structural adjustment‟ (World Bank 1994, 
p.34). This form of „scientific capitalism‟ drove the neoliberal agenda forward in SSA, increasing 
the influence of external actors (Ferguson 1995). These neoliberal conditionalities often resulted in 
economic turbulence and recession, which meant that states often had to impose this developmental 
approach against bouts of social protest and rebellion (Harrison 2010, p.46). Only a selective list of 
SSA countries were chosen to be granted HIPC status by the end of the twentieth century, with 
Uganda, Tanzania and Mozambique being the first SSA states to be gain HIPC status. This is 
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because „the key criterion for accession to HIPC is a country‟s previous performance in World 
Bank and Fund [IMF] adjustment policies‟ and  is shaped by the fact that HIPC status can only be 
granted to states that borrow exclusively from the World Bank‟s lending body, the International 
Development Association (IDA), which limited those applicable (Harrison 2010, p.43). 
 
Despite IFIs claiming to focus on pro-poor growth and helping to build lasting democracy in SSA, 
it can be seen that at the end of the twentieth century SSA states had virtually no significant voice 
within their decision making processes. IFIs have consistently ignored calls for structural reform on 
the topic of representation and instead interpreted such complaints to focus on developing more 
sensitive listening skills (Taylor and Williams 2004, p.6). Moreover, due to the nature of IFIs, 
African states have effectively had no say in the design or implementation of SAPs, resulting in 
African states not meaningfully „owning‟ their key national development strategies. This presented 
the opportunity for IFIs to continue to advocate the implementation of neoliberal economic 
principles despite there being overwhelming evidence of their negative social, political and even 
economic consequences in the lead up to the end of the twentieth century (Taylor and Williams 
2004, p.17). Thus, at the end of the twentieth century, IFIs imposed highly centralised and statist 
programmes on SSA „with little consideration as to how reforms might impact upon the complex 
and diverse societies that collectively make up most post-colonial African nations‟ (Harrison 2010, 
p.119). 
 
3.4 Conclusion  
At the onset of the twentieth century territorial boundaries of states in SSA had been imposed by 
external colonial powers, taking little note of diverse ethnic groups or cultures (Rotberg 2003). Key 
institutions and prevalent ideas were shaped by external actors, as patronage, coercion and 
authoritarian practices ensured colonial regimes maintained power (Chiriyankandath 2008). Upon 
independence, newly independent leaders struggled to maintain control over the ethnic and cultural 
diversity (Hobden 2008b, p.72). This made democratic rule difficult, and numerous African 
policymakers and leaders fell back on authoritative practices undertaken during colonial rule in 
order to maintain power, resulting in the impact of colonialism appearing transformative rather than 
transitory for SSA‟s political economy (Taylor and Williams 2004, p.8).  
 
External powers‟ support for conflicting states in SSA during the Cold War period was tied to the 
interest of building and strengthening ideological alliances to support the US or the Soviet Union 
(Hobden 2008b, p.75). This financial and military support was granted to a SSA leader in power or 
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a rebel group against them, and in some cases both, with little or no benefit for the wider 
population. The nature of the African state was effectively enforced and tailored by the material 
capabilities and ideas prominent in the international system (Harrison 2010, p.6). This period saw 
the deepening of SSA states‟ internal crises and increasing dependence on external actors 
(Cornelissen 2009, p.8). The end of the Cold War brought with it a sense of optimism as with its 
end a number of regional conflicts were resolved (Hobden 2008b, p.75). However, this optimism 
was short lived as areas within SSA experienced renewed conflict and upheaval and in the 1990s 
SSA became „the most conflict ridden region of the world‟ (SIPRI 1999, p.20). 
 
Capitalism became the prevalent hegemonic idea for how to organise domestic political economies 
in the international system over the past century, and subsequently neoliberal reforms of Africa‟s 
political economy were mainly imposed and driven through externally led processes from the 1980s 
in the form of scientific capitalism (Ferguson 1995). The twentieth century highlighted the 
inherently volatile nature of capitalism; it provided the terms for substantial wealth creation, yet the 
prospect of winners and losers results in inequality in the system that leads to it being relatively 
unstable (Lent and Lockwood 2010, p.31). Neoliberal capitalism became the hegemonic principle 
in the African political economy, resulting in generic aspects of and approaches to development 
having uneven effects, furthering unbalanced distributions of power (Cammack 2002, p.159). The 
end of the twentieth century saw the process of neoliberal structural adjustment effectively become 
the development orthodoxy for the continent (Harrison 2010, p.39). The extent of SSA‟s 
dependency was apparent through IFIs ability to continue to advocate the implementation of 
neoliberal economic principles in the lead up to the end of the twentieth century, despite there being 
overwhelming evidence of their negative social, political and even economic consequences across 
the region (Taylor and Williams 2004, p.17). 
 
International organisations have significantly risen in importance over the twentieth century, with 
the UN holding the key position of managing the international system (O‟Brian and Williams 2004, 
p.123). The UN General Assembly acted as a significant forum for voicing calls for decolonisation 
and this process also transformed the workings of the UN itself, with the high number of 
independent African states contributing to the significant increase in member states over the century 
(Hobden 2008b, p.80). Renewed and invigorated multilateralism in the second half of the century 
reflected the hegemonic ideas in the international system, and IFIs contributed to impose prevalent 
ideas and practices in the international system onto Africa (Harrison 2010, p.38). 
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Through exploring the key trends and forces prevalent in the international system and SSA‟s 
political economy over the twentieth century, the chapter has identified how SSA‟s conditions of 
dependence on external actors have arisen. At the end of the twentieth century, SSA was dependent 
on IFIs for determining the key ideas and approach with regards to SSA countries‟ development 
models and governance. Additionally SSA countries were dependent on the material capabilities of 
external actors at the end of the twentieth century. The study shall now use this knowledge to 
explore whether there is the scope for these conditions of dependence to alter through exploring the 
key trends formulating the dynamics and structure of SSA‟s political economy in the context of 
structural changes taking place in the international system between 2000 and 2011 in Chapter Four 
(Bayart 2000, p.234).  
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4. Key trends in SSA’s political economy from 2000 to 2011 in 
the context of structural changes occurring in the 
international system 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Over the past decade the nature of SSA‟s political economy has changed (Cornelissen 2011; 
African Development Bank et al. 2011). The region has experienced strong economic growth 
performances, which have contributed to the more positive rhetoric used by analysts, policy makers 
and corporations across the world to describe the region (Cornelissen 2011, p.5; Economist 2011; 
The Africa Competitiveness Report 2011, p.v). In addition, there has been a movement away from 
the previously hegemonic ideational notion of there being no alternative to neoliberalism towards 
exploring different ideas and new approaches to governance and developmental thinking, such as 
supporting greater regionalism, economic integration and FDI (Cargill 2010, p.24; Kose and Prasad 
2010, p.7). SSA‟s political economy from 2000 to 2011 has been characterised by increasing 
cooperation with a variety of partners, mainly in the form of multilateralism with the global South 
and developmental partnerships with the global North (Cargill 2010; Cornelissen 2009, p.6). SSA 
appears as the „swing continent‟ caught up in the transition of material capabilities from traditional 
to emerging powers in the international system (Kornegay and Landsberg 2009, p.171). Moreover, 
the material capabilities and political activity of SSA in international institutions is increasing, 
responding to the shift in material capabilities in the international system and supporting the need to 
rethink the predominant definitions and practices of global governance (BISA Africa - African 
Agency in International Politics 2011; Shaw et al. 2009, p.29). This chapter explores and analyses 
the extent to which the shift of relative material capabilities from traditional to emerging powers in 
the international system has contributed to this change in the nature of SSA‟s political economy.  
 
The chapter first identifies the key trends and forces in the international system from 2000 to 2011. 
Having set this context, the chapter analyses the key trends and forces prevalent in SSA‟s political 
economy during this same period. It explores how have these been shaped by structural changes in 
the international system and subsequently analyses whether this change in the nature of SSA‟s 
political economy provides the scope for SSA‟s conditions of dependence to alter. It is suggested 
that the rise in emerging powers‟ economic and political prowess in the international system from 
2000 to 2011 is the most determining trend for SSA‟s political economy during this period. This 
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process has had implications for the nature of SSA‟s political economy in an ideational, material 
capability and institutional capacity.  
 
4.2 The rise in relative material capabilities of emerging powers in the 
international system from 2000 to 2011 
The global power dynamics in the international system at the beginning of the twentieth-first 
century is „undergoing a cumulative reordering process,‟ whereby emerging powers, such as Brazil, 
China, India and Russia, are occupying increasingly prominent roles in the international system 
(Shaw et al. 2009, p.27). This structural shift in relative material capabilities from traditional to 
emerging powers appears systemic in nature, as it is based on a change in material capability related 
structures that are integral to the formation of the international system (Cox 1987).7 There are six 
key characteristics that typify an emerging power: 1) economic size; 2) the ability to influence 
„contemporary trajectories of the world economy‟; 3) the desire to forge deeper diplomatic linkages 
with smaller nations in the South, in order to enhance the South-South solidarity for political means 
and exploit „economic and trade compatibilities‟; 4) be a geographical location outside of the 
„sphere of North Atlantic industrial capitalism‟; 5) the „consolidation of state strength‟, epitomised 
by the aptitude to create the conditions for economic fortitude and the ideation of cohesion; and 6) 
the way in which their „shifting balance of influence confronts and forces adjustment to the 
established patterns of world hegemony‟ and „the very constitutive character of the international 
system‟ (Cornelissen 2009, pp.12-14). In comparison, an „emerging economy‟ satisfies two criteria: 
firstly, government policies favouring economic liberalisation and the adoption of a free-market 
system, and secondly, one that has a rapid pace of economic development (Hoskisson et al. 2000, 
p.249). The study is focused on the relative rise of emerging powers‟ material capabilities in the 
international system between 2000 and 2011. 
 
This rise of emerging powers‟ political and economic capabilities in the world „has to be read as 
both a shift in the balance of economic forces in the wider international system – a process which is 
underpinned by several interrelated factors – and as a political process, marked by a reorientation 
toward the nature and purpose of power, which is effecting exchanges in the international system in 
some significant ways‟ (Cornelissen 2009, pp.11-12). This shift was hastened by the financial crisis 
of 2007-20108, and has had knock on effects and implications for the predominant ideas concerning 
                                                   
7 CCT can be of use in identifying what has led to this structural shift, which in itself is a contested topic. The study is 
aware that the reasons for this structural shift is an important area of investigation but is beyond the key focus of the 
current study. 
8 The phrase „financial crisis‟ refers to the financial crisis ongoing from 2007 to 2010 for the remainder of the study. 
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developmental thinking and the previously hegemonic neoliberal notion of market efficiency 
(Kirman 2010, p.19; Lent and Lockwood 2010, p.9), in addition to highlighting the need to rethink 
definitions and practices of key international institutions (Cornelissen 2009, p.11; Scott 2010, p.4; 
Shaw et al. 2009, p.29). 
 
4.2.1 The financial crisis of 2007 to 2010 
The financial crisis of 2007 to 2010 arose due to an unbalancing of global finance and global 
production; with finance being understood as „the economic form of power over the (political) 
modes of social relations of production‟ (Leysens 2008, p.55). Cox (1992, pp.180-181) identifies 
global production to make up the „real economy‟ and global finance the „symbolic economy‟, with 
the two concepts being interlinked. „[W]hen credit at the top behaves in unpredictable and unstable 
ways, feeding on itself rather than nourishing the real economy,‟ the symbolic economy delinks 
from the real economy and productive capacity is reduced, with dangerous results (Cox 1992, 
p.181). This was evident in the Asian financial crisis of 1997 and the sub-prime mortgage crisis in 
the US that led to the financial crisis of 2007 to 2010 as shall now be summarised. 
 
The sub-prime mortgage crisis arose due to „excessive debt leverage‟ and „imprudent lending‟ of 
financial houses, the majority of which being in the US, resulting in a „tipping point‟ being reached 
(Wade 2008, p.27). This was reflected in the high default risk on a significant number of financial 
packages, resulting in an increase in anxiety amongst financial institutions. This high level of 
anxiety led to a lack of trust between banks and other financial houses. Consequently, „[w]hat 
started out as an unexpected default by some of the largest financial institutions in the global north 
soon mutated from a banking into a general and widespread malaise, affecting international 
commodity prices, extractive industries, the availability of domestic credit, economic growth 
prospects, labour markets and, ultimately, livelihoods‟ (Cornelissen 2011, p.6). The financial crisis 
of 2007 to 2010 resulted in a highly destabilising force affecting the international system, with 
subsequent impacts differing in timing and substance across varying countries and regions of the 
world (Nesvetailova and Palan 2008, p.167). Broadly speaking, the financial crisis hastened a 
change in the economic tide from West to East (Quah 2010).  
 
4.2.2 Undermining of trust in the neoliberal notion of market efficiency 
The financial crisis of 2007 to 2010 raised the concern that „the whole intellectual framework that 
was being used to understand the economy was flawed‟ as the „current economic predicament 
powerfully suggests that neoliberal economic thinking has run its course‟ (Lent and Lockwood 
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2010, p.9). When the costs of trusting market efficiency theory became too high, states dismissed 
the neoliberal notion that no regulation was necessary to improve the performance of markets and 
intervened in the market, for example through the nationalisation of the Northern Rock bank in 
Britain (Lent and Lockwood 2010, p.11). The instability brought about by this financial crisis 
appeared in sharp contrast with the neoliberal ideal of a „perfectly competitive market with many 
small, independent companies,‟ as the size and interconnected nature of the banks meant each was 
„too big to fail,‟ thus contradicting the supposed efficiency of the market (Lent and Lockwood 
2010, p.11).   
 
States most badly affected by the financial crisis were those whose macroeconomic policy appeared 
in line with neoliberal market efficiency principles (Wade 2008, p.36). As a group, emerging 
powers appeared to weather the contraction of the global economy more effectively than advanced 
economies, and reliance was placed on emerging players to provide capital injections in order to 
stabilise the global economy (Kose and Prasad 2010, p.7). Thus, this financial crisis „has brought 
with it a crisis of ideas and, in particular, a crisis for the neoliberal worldview which holds that 
markets are inherently stable, self correcting, and able to form prices that correctly reflect all 
relevant information about supply, demand and risk‟ (Lent and Lockwood 2010, p.11). When 
speaking of market efficiency in front of US Congress in 2008, Alan Greenspan, the former head of 
the US Federal Reserve, remarked that „the whole intellectual edifice collapsed in the summer of 
last year‟ (as cited in Kirman 2010, p.19). 
 
The financial crisis has raised awareness of the ethics of financial accountability and state 
regulation, and this criticism of neoliberalism has largely been directed towards the management of 
the global economy, as opposed to the purpose of neoliberalism (Cornelissen 2011, p.11). Thus 
despite the „end of neoliberalism‟ rhetoric, in practice a distinct change in terms of governance or 
developmental practice has not occurred; the problem solving approach is focused on maintaining 
the status quo (Cox, as cited in Schouten 2010, p.5). For example, Chakravartty and Schiller (2010, 
p.685) argue that in reality an unreformed IMF and World Bank „continue their emphasis on 
neoliberal austerity, the policy that helped to foster the crisis in the first place,‟ as they appear to 
focus on putting the broken pieces back together. However, the discussion surrounding the best way 
to manage governance and developmental models towards the end of the decade is significant, as it 
means neoliberalism is no longer the hegemonic ideational force in the international system in 
terms of CCT‟s understanding, as it is not widely accepted as a collective image of social order 
(Cox1981, p.99). 
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Civil society has also expressed discontent and lack of trust in the financial system in the wake of 
the financial crisis. The upheaval from 2007 consolidated the growing international civil 
mobilisation demanding the democratisation of international politics. This growing „anti-
globalisation movement‟ expressed its presence through international events and summits, such as 
the vocal opposition and protests staged at the G8 Summit in 2008. Following the „(admittedly 
brief) period of consensus and ideological harmonisation after the end of the Cold War, 
consolidated around a seeming collective orientation towards the politics of neoliberal economics,‟ 
the first decade of the twenty-first century appears to be the return of conflicting ideology in the 
international system (Cornelissen 2009, p.11). 
 
4.2.3 Ramifications for the neoliberal developmental model 
Despite neoliberalism being the hegemonic idea in the international system over the past decade, in 
practice its implementation through governance and developmental models has been wide-ranging 
(Cornelissen 2011, p.8). Neoliberalism has appeared varied in institutional form and its impact in 
different geographical settings around the world. For example, the neoliberal American 
developmental model differs slightly from the more welfare-centred European approach, and more 
substantially from the „Asian corporate practices which integrate business, government and 
subordinate labour organizations‟ (O‟Brian and Williams 2004, p.130). Despite the economic 
prowess of China, few of its beneficiaries around the globe to date are showing inclination to 
explicitly copy the Chinese model (Cox 2010, p.26). Thus, it can be seen that „[i]n its diffusion and 
institutionalism, the principles of neoliberalism have become refracted and are transformed through 
various institutional layers of governance and the preferences and interactions of different economic 
and social interest groups, leading to its variegated character‟ (Cornelissen 2011, p.8). 
 
In the aftermath of the financial crisis significant rhetoric has arisen discussing the decline of 
neoliberalism and its use as a developmental model (Kirman 2010, p.19; Lent and Lockwood 2010, 
p.9). For example, The Turner Review (2009, p.39), a report initiated by the British government on 
the root causes of the crisis, claimed that neoliberal market efficiency‟s main assumptions are „now 
subject to extensive challenge on both theoretical and empirical grounds.‟ Emerging powers 
appeared to weather the global recession better than traditional powers, due to a combination of 
policy choices made by emerging powers and underlying structural changes in their economies. 
These included macroeconomic policies that were successful in bringing inflation under control, 
greater trade and financial linkages among emerging economies (thus increasing their resilience as a 
group), and diversification of production and export patterns (Kose and Prasad 2010, pp.8-9). This 
raised important questions of how different governance and developmental models can impact the 
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future growth paths of economies around the world (Kose and Prasad 2010, p.7). Subsequently, 
recognition of how different effects of the financial crisis could be partially accounted for by a 
state‟s predominant ideological policy has also had the knock-on effect of highlighting different 
ideas and new approaches concerning governance and developmental models.  
 
Exploration of different developmental models and engagement with SSA countries over the past 
decade has shown that framing relations predominantly on developmental issues with a country can 
be counterproductive to developmental goals as it „is implacably clientelist, i.e. it institutionalizes 
an unequal power relationship between donor and recipient‟ which can result in resentment for 
donor countries (Cargill 2010, p.24). There is consensus that the current global aid system „suffers 
from a series of chronic structural problems which have been repeatedly shown to reduce the 
effectiveness of aid‟ and other negative unintended consequences (Barder 2009, p.4). However, 
there are contesting views on whether aid can contribute to improving the lives of individuals and 
societies in developing countries, through means such as accelerating development (such as Collier 
2007; Sachs 2005; Whitfield 2009). The majority of emerging powers attribute their rise in relative 
material capabilities to „processes and factors that do not conform strongly to the patterns of 
industrialisation of the traditional powers‟ which has contributed to them placing less emphasis on 
development issues than traditional powers (Cornelissen 2009, p.14).  
 
4.2.4 Revaluation of the role and nature of IFIs 
In addition to having knock on effects for the predominant ideas concerning developmental 
thinking and the previously hegemonic neoliberal notion of market efficiency, this shift in the 
international system has highlighted the need to rethink the role and nature of IFIs (Subacchi and 
Pickford 2011, p.2). IFIs‟ mandates of dealing with aid, governance structure and responses to the 
financial crisis appeared ineffective in facing up to significant challenges presented from 2000 
(European Parliament Briefing Paper 2009). Since 2000, civil society groups have expressed 
increasing concern with the increase in power of IFIs, questioning the relevance and legitimacy of 
these institutions wielding such significant power (O‟Brian and Williams 2004, p.125; Wade 2008, 
pp.43-44). The need for reform of the governance, mandate and financial structure of key IFIs was 
discussed at the beginning of the twenty-first century as a means to identify how to enhance such 
institutions‟ effectiveness, relevance and legitimacy, yet the debates appeared stagnant by 2007 
(European Parliament Briefing Paper 2009, p.4). The onset of the financial crisis reinvigorated 
discussion on the need to reform IFIs in lieu of the frustration felt towards governments‟ and 
institutions‟ seeming inability to limit the effects of the financial crisis. States, financial groups and 
civil society looked towards IFIs as a means to determine what went wrong, make proposals for the 
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future and reform the representation of the developing world within these arenas (Wade 2008, 
pp.43-44). 
 
A key critique of the IMF is its one-size-fits-all approach when granting assistance to countries. 
However, since the early 2000s the IMF has repeatedly expressed the aspiration to streamline 
conditionality, resulting in more tailored conditions for the specific circumstances of member states. 
Subsequently, the IMF has „pledged to eliminate “hard” structural conditionality, in the first 
instance through the discontinuation of structural performance criteria (including for low-income 
countries) as of May 2009‟ and has demonstrated a clear difference in its treatment of varying 
countries with regards to the financial crisis (European Parliament Briefing Paper 2009, p.10). With 
regards to the World Bank, reforms to increase the influence of developing countries were agreed in 
October 2008 at the World Bank Group‟s Annual Meeting. This first phase of reforms created an 
additional Chair at the World Bank Board for SSA, meaning developing countries now have the 
majority of the seats on the World Bank Board. Moreover this added voice for low income 
countries, bringing the voting power of developing countries to 44 per cent overall (World Bank 
Press Release 2009).  
 
4.2.5 Reappraisal of global governance 
Ideational shifts and the increasing prominence of emerging players in the international system 
between 2000 and 2011 have re-energised discussion surrounding the „self-appointed right‟ of the 
US and G8 to dominate global governance (Wade 2008, p.25). Emerging powers have increased 
their economic relevance and political influence from 2000 through using „a strategy of both 
reinventing South-South political and economic cooperation and using their stronger global position 
to change the conventional practices and procedures‟ of the established institutions of global 
governance (Scott 2010, p.4). This is illustrated by emerging powers increasingly lobbying IFIs for 
increased representation since 2000, culminating in a rise in IMF quota shares for emerging powers 
agreed in November 2010. Although it will only take effect from 2012, the reforms ensured that 
China will receive the third largest amount of votes (6.39 per cent of the quotas), and Brazil (2.31 
per cent), India (2.75 per cent) and Russia (2.70 per cent) will join the IMF‟s top ten shareholders 
(African Development Bank et al. 2011, p.134). Emerging powers are „giving rise to the reordering 
of actual global relations and highlighting the need to rethink definitions and practices of global 
governance‟ such as allowing a wider group of countries to shape the agenda of international 
institutions (Shaw et al. 2009, p.29).  
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Emerging powers have been seeking a larger voice in international institutions not only through 
IFIs but also through membership of the G20 (African Development Bank et al. 2011, p.122). Since 
2000 there has been a shift in prominence from the G8 to the G20. As the G20 steadily gained 
mandate and authority „it became obvious that the old Western economic establishment of the G8 
could no longer claim control or ascendancy over the international system and needed to engage 
more fully with the emerging powers in the G20‟ (Cargill 2010, p.2). Formalised recognition of the 
importance of developing states in the political economy was established in 2007, when the G8 
introduced the roles of „outreach partners‟ for Brazil, China, India, Mexico and South Africa as 
„equal and enduring partnerships‟ (Cornelissen 2009, p.11). Focus was also granted to an expanded 
agenda including peace-building, climate change, the global environment and the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs). This expansion of the G8‟s membership and agenda „represents a 
fundamental altering of one of the most important constituents of the international political 
architecture painstakingly fashioned following the end of the second world war‟ (Cornelissen 2009, 
pp.10-11). However, it has been contested that this „determination on the part of powerful states to 
strengthen multilateral institutions‟ may just be a „last gasp of an old-fashioned concert of great 
powers‟ seeking new compromises with emerging powers (Woods 2010, pp.59-60). 
 
4.2.6 Challenging the hegemon? 
According to CCT, a hegemonic world order ends based on the inherent contradictions that exist 
within it. Thus, the world order „generates global inequalities which eventually lead to feelings of 
frustration, alienation, and opposition‟ that then result in the hegemon losing its legitimacy (Smith 
2005, p.121). This results in the hegemon having to resort to coercive forms of dominance, which 
paradoxically accelerates its decline, and Cox (1996, p.518) identifies four alternative scenarios for 
what could follow. Firstly, the continuation of the key principles of the declining hegemony is 
maintained through cooperation with a group of other powerful states. Secondly, another powerful 
state could found a new hegemony. Thirdly, the declining hegemony could result in a non-
hegemonic order, without effective universal principles of order culminating in the interplay of rival 
powerful states. Lastly, a counter-hegemonic order could arise, made up of a number of collective 
forces, reaching a degree of agreement of universal principles without dominance or dependence 
making up the alternative order (Cox 1996, p.518).  
 
It is contested as to whether there is a counter-hegemonic challenge to pax americana, in the shape 
of individual rising emerging powers or as a group seeking multipolarity in the international system 
(Cornelissen 2009, p.15; Cox 2010, p.26; Ferguson 2010, p.24; Naidu et al. 2009, p.1; Shaw et al. 
2009, p.27; Westad 2010, p.22). Looking to the country with the second largest GDP, it is apparent 
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that China is „determined to use its own economic strength to help it achieve a stronger 
international position, in terms of finance, export markets, and raw materials‟ for its own national 
interests, yet China „does not have a grand strategy for a new world order‟ (Cox 2010; Ferguson 
2010, p.24; Westad 2010, p.22). Michael Cox (2010, p26) argues that for China „it would be nigh 
on catastrophic to make any move to counter-balance the power of the US or to act globally in a 
way that challenged a world order that has underwritten 35 years of domestic stability and record 
economic growth‟ for itself. A counter-hegemonic challenge by China could damage its relations 
with market democratic states in the region, such as Japan and Taiwan, as well as presenting an 
opportunity for the West to unite against China (Cox 2010, p.26).  
 
It has been argued that China is increasing its soft power through its numerous activities abroad 
such as trade, extensive commodity extractions and infrastructure investments significantly in 
frontier markets in Africa and South America, yet it is not part of a counter-hegemonic historical 
structure (Ferguson 2010, p.24). Instead, China, and the region of East Asia at large, is contributing 
to an increasingly multipolar world with their emerging power status (Cox 2010, p.26). However, 
Shaw et al. (2009, p.27) assert that this new power dynamic of the rise of emerging powers marks 
the end of American hegemony, as the rapid and steady intrusion and recognition of emerging 
powers is „challenging the established order, wrenching global relations into a flux.‟  
 
Despite contrasting views on whether emerging powers are challenging the established 
(un)hegemonic international system, it is clear that the growth in relative material capabilities of 
these emerging powers reflects not only the „reconfiguring of power relations between the North-
South but also a level of South-South developmental engagements that are challenging the existing 
orthodoxy of the “Washington Consensus”‟ (Naidu et al. 2009, p.1). From 2000 emerging powers 
have increasing used multilateral forums as a means to change not only the „rules‟, but the essence 
of the „game‟ (Cornelissen 2009, p.15). Scarlett Cornelissen (2009, pp.14-15) furthers this notion, 
identifying that by the sheer size of their recent expansion, since 2000 emerging powers have 
unsettled the world‟s economic epicentre(s) and their experiences are now often considered to offer 
alternative models of development. Additionally, the diplomatic and political activities of emerging 
powers, combined with the motives behind these acts, can have ramifications for the international 
system through „encroach[ing] upon the realms of neo-colonial influence of the North‟ by drawing 
smaller states from the South under their sphere of influence and effecting the „established bonds of 
custodianship between developing countries and their formal imperial powers‟ (Cornelissen 2009, 
p.15). 
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4.2.7 Ramifications of this shift in the international system  
The rise in the relative material capabilities of emerging powers has been the most prominent 
process and driving force in the international system between 2000 and 2011: „emerging powers 
have ramifications for the ways in which central processes in world politics unfold‟ (Cornelissen 
2009, p.15). This structural change in the international system was hastened by the financial crisis. 
Combined, these processes have had ramifications for the reappraisal of key ideas and the nature of 
international institutions that were prominent at the onset of the decade. This can be seen by 
traditional powers relying on emerging players to provide capital injections in order to stabilise the 
global economy (Kose and Prasad 2010, p.7) and the rise in IMF quota shares agreed in 2010 for 
emerging powers in order to better reflect the make-up of the global economy (African 
Development Bank et al. 2011, p.134). The capability of emerging powers to weather the 
repercussions of the financial crisis better than traditional powers raised questions concerning how 
different governance and developmental models can impact the future growth paths of economies 
around the world (Kose and Prasad 2010, p.7). Additionally, discussions on future economic 
cooperation were decided to be led by the G20 rather than the G8 in 2009 in order to best respond 
the challenges brought on by the financial crisis (Cargill 2010, p.12). This rise in prominence in the 
international area has led to emerging powers using their stronger global position to change the 
conventional practices and procedures of the established institutions of global governance (Scott 
2010, p.4). This change in the international system has significant implications for SSA‟s political 
economy, as is now explored in more depth.  
 
4.3 Key trends and forces in SSA’s political economy from 2000 to 
2011 
4.3.1 SSA’s economic performance and its societal implications  
The beginning of the twenty-first century saw a significant increase of FDI into SSA, driven by 
increased international desire of access to oil, minerals and markets in the region (Southall and 
Comninos 2009, p.357). Recognition of SSA‟s status as a relatively under-explored important 
source of natural resources saw a surge in FDI based around natural resource exploration activity; 
for example SSA is believed to hold approximately 30 per cent of the world‟s mineral reserves 
(Prichard 2009, p.240). Moreover, an increase in global mineral and metal prices „spurred 
investment in the resource-rich regions of Africa‟ as investors turned towards more under-explored 
markets, „provoking comparisons with the imperial scramble for Africa at the end of the nineteenth 
century‟ (Hönke 2009, p.274). 
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This discussion surrounding the „scramble‟ for SSA‟s natural resources in the twenty-first century 
„is very much located in a global context of resource scarcity and international competition reaching 
into hitherto marginalised or bypassed areas‟ (Southall 2009:10). Increased global demand for fossil 
fuels, spiked by China and India‟s (amongst other emerging economies‟) fast-growing oil 
consumption levels combined with traditional powers‟ desire to decrease reliance on the Middle 
East (which holds approximately 66 per cent of known oil reserves), has resulted in SSA oil 
producing countries rising in strategic importance in the twenty-first century as traditional and 
emerging powers alike seek to secure access to oil (Southall 2009, p.13). 
 
However, this investment boom at the onset of the twenty-first century has been distinguished by 
the emergence of emerging powers as investors in the region (Prichard 2009, p.254). Since 2000, 
emerging powers have been keen to encourage and consolidate trade and investment linkages with 
SSA (Naidu et al. 2009, p.2). Despite the majority of FDI to the region still coming from traditional 
powers, the speed with which FDI is increasing from emerging powers to the region is significant 
(Kimenyi and Lewis 2011, p.19). Africa is the source of approximately 40 per cent of the raw 
materials, fresh water, energy and agriculture needed in order to sustain global growth and its total 
population makes up one billion potential consumers (Cargill 2010, p.vii). Renewed and 
invigorated interest in SSA by emerging powers is driven by recognition of the opportunities that 
could be gained from investing in the region (Cargill 2010, p.vii). This increased desire for 
international access to natural resources combined with emerging powers‟ increasing engagement 
with the region contributed to SSA‟s strong average annual growth rate standing at approximately 
six per cent between 2002 and 2008 (Okonjo-Iweala 2010, p.37). 
 
However, when the repercussions of the financial crisis of 2007 to 2010 became apparent, there 
were fears that SSA‟s integral economic growth gains that had been established over the previous 
decade would be significantly affected (Cornelissen 2011, p.6). Trade had been one of the major 
drivers of SSA‟s growth surge, the sustainability of which was threatened by the financial crisis as 
African exports faced a contracting market (African Development Bank – Policy Brief 2009, pp.1-
2). Others believed that SSA would be spared the more serious repercussions of the financial crisis 
as SSA banks had little access to US-originated securities and because increasing engagement 
between SSA and emerging economies may have reduced SSA‟s economic reliance on the US and 
Europe (Fosu and Naudé 2009, p.4). A number of SSA countries proved to be surprisingly resilient 
to the financial crisis, supported by a number of African central banks coordinating action to cut 
interest rates and stimulate demand successfully, which helped reassure national citizens and 
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foreign investors alike (Cargill 2010, p.23). This resilience can be demonstrated by 50 per cent of 
countries in the region achieving growth rates of above four per cent in 20109, and approximately 
seven per cent of economies had growth rates below two per cent10 (World dataBank – African 
Development Indicators 2010) 
 
However, in terms of the „real‟ economy, countries in SSA were impacted in different magnitudes 
and temporal dimensions by the financial crisis. Largely speaking, countries that were more closely 
integrated into the global economy were at higher risk of experiencing significant economic shocks 
than those whose economies were not as aligned and were effectively shielded from the worst 
effects of the financial crisis (Cornelissen 2011, p.6). Countries that were less diversified and highly 
dependent on oil and minerals, such as Angola and Equatorial Guinea, were significantly affected 
by the financial crisis (Mutenyo 2011, p.29). SSA countries that were more diversified tended to be 
more resilient during the 2007 to 2010 financial crisis, such as Ghana, Senegal, and Tanzania, or 
recover faster, such as Kenya, Mauritius and South Africa (Mutenyo 2011, p.29). Oil-exporting 
countries in the region were amongst the first to feel the implications of the financial crisis, hit by 
falling commodity prices and the reduced world demand for fuel. Oil-importing countries had to 
navigate volatile fuel prices, capital flight and lowered investor confidence. Additionally, in early 
2009, countries in the region reported large scale cuts to its labour force in the mining, automotive, 
resource extraction and tourism industry sectors (Cornelissen 2011, pp.6-7). The financial crisis 
came „on the heels of already sky-high fuel, food and fertilizer prices that had led to civil unrest in 
several African countries,‟ which contributed to implications for SSA‟s „real‟ economy being 
widely felt (Cargill 2010, p.23). The 2008 food crisis had highlighted what could go wrong if food 
is substituted by biofuels production. Despite SSA having enough resources to feed its population 
as well as meeting global demand for food and agricultural products, this was not managed or 
monitored correctly and between 2003 and 2007 „two-thirds of the global increase in corn output 
went to bio-fuels, mostly to meet demands in the United States‟ (Okonjo-Iweala 2010, p.39). This 
ill-management of corn contributed to the food crisis of 2008, which was acerbated further by the 
financial crisis (World Bank – Africa‟s Pulse 2011, p.7). 
 
In latter half of the decade it was projected that an average annual growth rate of seven per cent was 
needed in SSA in order to meet the MDG of halving the number of people living on less than one 
                                                   
9 Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo DRC (Zaire), Ethiopia, Gabon, The Gambia, 
Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, 
Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
10 Equatorial Guinea, Guinea, Madagascar, Swaziland. It is worth noting that the 2010 GDP growth figures of Djibouti, 
Sao Tome and Principe and Somalia could not be ascertained by the World Bank and hence are not included in this 
calculation. 
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dollar a day (Fosu and Naudé 2009, p.13). This rate was not achieved in the lead up to the financial 
crisis (averaging just below five per cent annual growth between 2000 and 2008) and in 2009 it 
decreased further to 1.7 per cent (World Bank – Africa‟s Pulse 2011, p.3). Markets in SSA have 
recovered better than those in most other parts of the world from the global downturn, with 
projections of economic growth of 4.5 per cent in 2011 (Okonjo-Iweala 2010, p.37). Despite the 
impressive resurgence, this reduction in growth as a result of the financial crisis is likely to include 
„higher unemployment and poverty, increases in infant mortality, and adverse coping with long-
lasting impacts such as higher school dropout rates, reductions in healthcare and environmental 
degradation‟ impacting societies in SSA (Fosu and Naudé 2009, p.13). Thus, the financial crisis 
significantly affected citizens‟ livelihoods, particularly amongst the poorest parts of the region that 
were severely hit by the rise in world food prices in 2008 (Cornelissen 2011, p.8). 
 
The Africa Competitiveness Report 2011 (2011, p.v) illustrated the region‟s recovery from the 
global financial crisis was faster than many other areas of the world. The resurgence of SSA 
economies largely driven by natural resource commodities can be partially explained by traditional 
and emerging powers‟ renewed emphasis on their search for energy security, as has been a key 
driver of FDI increase in SSA since 2000 (Southall 2009, p.13). In line with Africa‟s promising 
economic growth, analysts, policy makers and corporations across the world have typified the 
region in a more positive light as the decade has progressed (Cornelissen 2011, p.5). This shift has 
been succinctly portrayed by the change in international discourse on Africa. For example, the 
Economist‟s description of Africa has changed from „The Hopeless Continent‟ in 2000 to „a more 
hopeful continent‟ in 2011 (Economist 2011). This rhetoric swing occurred after identifying Africa 
as one of the world‟s fastest growing regions from 2001 to 2010, with the „the lion kings‟ of SSA 
(Angola, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Chad, Mozambique and Rwanda) all featuring in the global top ten 
fastest growing economies (Economist, 2011). This rapid growth has arisen due to a combination of 
factors including: low GDP growth rates in prior years (presenting more potential for significant 
levels of catch-up growth); better economic management; significant inflows of FDI; and rising 
incomes fuelling faster growth in domestic demand (Economist, 2011). This strong performance by 
these „lion kings‟ highlight that „[w]hile parts of Africa remain significantly challenged in terms of 
sustaining economic growth and social development and managing conflict, other parts of Africa 
have experienced significant progress‟ with increased economic capabilities since the start of the 
twenty-first century (Shaw et al. 2009, p.32). 
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4.3.2 SSA’s political and societal resilience 
Since 2000, a number of states in SSA have experienced political turbulence, such as South Africa, 
Kenya and Ghana amongst others, yet societies have largely used the political system in place to 
assert their claims (Lewis 2010, p.193). „The prevalence of elected governments, and societies‟ 
broader scope for civil action, have provided outlets for popular grievances and demands‟ and 
despite further hardships occurring due to the food, fuel and financial crisis in the last decade, 
popular reactions to the economic downturn have „not broadly unsettled the region‟s regimes‟ 
(Lewis 2010, p.193). Repercussions of the economic turmoil in the international system for SSA 
have included unemployment, a reduction in remittances income, a return to poverty for several 
millions of people, lower returns on agriculture, reduced returns on goods and commodities, and 
strains on the already weak government services across the region (Lewis 2010, p.194).  
 
UNCTAD has forecasted that there will be 12 to 16 million additional poor people in SSA as a 
result of the financial crisis. Additionally, the World Bank (Averting a Human Crisis 2009, p.2) has 
warned that the poverty created is likely to have a female face, with women making up the majority 
of agricultural and textile employees who are the most likely to face cutbacks. Additionally, there is 
a historical tendency for African families to pull girls out of school as opposed to boys when family 
income falls, which could have significant implications for recent progress made in gender equality 
(World Bank – Averting a Human Crisis 2009, p.2). Linking this with the economic effects of the 
financial crisis, it can be seen that as food prices rose in the region, employment opportunities have 
fallen (Cramer et al. 2010, p.651). Governments „need to expand safety nets and pro-poor spending 
to address rising poverty levels‟ and be aware of how a reduction in aid flows could have further 
implications for society (IMF – Fiscal Policy in SSA 2009, p.5). 
 
This decade of economic growth has benefited from SSA countries involved in conflicts in the 
1990s having moved from economic stagnation and decline towards economic growth, such as 
Angola, Burundi, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Uganda (Suruma 2011, p.6). There is 
considerable evidence that the resolution of conflicts in SSA is a fundamental pre-requisite for 
sustainable economic growth and development, yet between 2000 and 2011 there were still 
countries experiencing severe violence within the region, such as Somalia, those containing 
significant internal conflict, such as the DRC, and those with varied outbursts of violence, such as 
Kenya (Suruma 2011, p.6). The „ultimate resolution of conflicts in Africa requires political 
leadership that skilfully adopts formulas that suit the peculiar conditions of these African states‟, 
highlighting the need for strong African leadership in order to maintain peace and reap the rewards 
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of economic growth (Suruma 2011, p.7). This movement shows how between 2000 and 2011 SSA 
displayed political resilience in addition to economic buoyancy (Lewis 2010, p.193). 
 
4.3.3 Africa as the ‘swing continent’ 
Africa appears as the „swing continent‟, caught up in „a fluid period of transition in the global 
balance of power and the international state system characterised by traditional and emerging 
powers‟ which has led to the region playing a more prominent role in the international arena 
(Kornegay and Landsberg 2009, p.171). This shift in the international system has implications for 
SSA‟s political economy through providing the scope for partnerships with either and/or both 
groups of powers. Subsequently, between 2000 and 2011 traditional and „Northern‟ powers have 
pursued closer engagement with SSA, through means such as international development and aid 
campaigns, while SSA countries have found themselves with the opportunity of pursuing deeper 
multilateralism with emerging and „Southern‟ powers, aiming to reduce international disparities 
(Cornelissen 2009, p.6).  
 
There has been increased engagement between the global North and SSA between 2000 and 2011, 
demonstrated through a number of initiatives, programmes and policies initiated through Northern-
led institutions of finance and power that have placed renewed focus on the questions of poverty, 
development and good governance in SSA (Cargill 2010; Cornelissen 2009, p.15). This focus of 
traditional powers is relatively recent; in 1990, 82 per cent of Official Development Assistance 
(ODA) was allocated to agriculture, economic infrastructure, the financial sector and industry 
(African Development Bank et al. 2011, p.108). However, by 2004 agriculture and industry saw 
their share halved, whilst those allocated for education, health and governance more than doubled in 
the same period (African Development Bank et al. 2011, p.108). This increasing engagement and 
focus on development and good governance since 2000 has been characterised by conditionalities 
set by the North, thus reinforcing the unequal relationship that has been a prerequisite of 
engagement in the past (Cornelissen 2009, p.15). Since 2000, some fresh synergies have been 
observed between aid and official flows from traditional powers to promote developing countries 
access to long-term finance and can be linked to the rise of emerging powers‟ engagement (African 
Development Bank et al. 2011, p.113). As the decade has progressed rural development, agriculture 
and infrastructure are featuring more prominently in traditional powers portfolios with the SSA 
region (African Development Bank et al. 2011, p.113). 
 
From 2000 to 2011 increasing focus has been placed on the intensive pace of emerging powers‟ 
engagement with SSA (Kimenyi and Lewis 2011, p.19). SSA is of key geo-strategic significance to 
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emerging powers that seek to expand and modernise their industrial output and meet their ambitious 
growth objectives due to its relatively underexplored market and natural resources (Naidu et al. 
2009, p.2). Since 2000 emerging powers have increasing „invaded Africa with money, goods, ideas, 
and drilling and mining equipment‟ as opposed to arms (Kimenyi and Lewis 2011, p.19). An Indian 
academic noted that „ “[w]e need Africa not only for the oil but for political power too… But we do 
not have the money of the Chinese or the military might of the Americans. Therefore we have to 
rely on cooperating with African nations… where we have something to give” ‟ (Ajay Dubey, 
quoted in The Guardian 9 April 2008, as cited in Shaw et al. 2009, p.32). The rise in emerging 
powers‟ economic, and increasingly political, prowess between 2000 and 2011 has resulted in their 
increasing ability to offer business and development options to SSA countries, with South-South 
multilateralism being advocated as an alternative agenda to aiming to reduce international 
disparities (Cornelissen 2009, p.6). Emerging powers engagement with SSA during this period has 
placed emphasis on improving infrastructure and removing structural bottlenecks that are integral 
for SSA‟s development, notably the issues less prioritised by traditional powers since 2000 (African 
Development Bank et al. 2011, p.108).  
 
Subsequently, SSA has „never been in such a strong bargaining position‟ than at present with its 
increasing numbers of „suitors‟ (Cargill 2010, p.viii). Thus, when analysing the levels of 
engagement between SSA and the global North and South, it is integral to note that „the 
significance of emerging powers should be measured not in the latter‟s eclipse of the powers of the 
North, but in the political interplay between emerging and established powers and how this 
determines the broad tenor of international relations‟ (Cornelissen 2009, p.15). 
 
4.3.4 SSA’s engagement with emerging powers: friends or foes? 
Despite the fact that many SSA countries fall into the LDCs category within the class system of 
state power in international politics and no state in SSA has been acknowledged as an emerging 
power, this ascent of emerging players nonetheless affects the region‟s present and future in the 
international system (Shaw et al. 2009, p.27). Academic scholarship on the changing nature of 
Africa‟s relationship with emerging powers from 2000 to 2011 appears divided between two 
contrasting schools of thought. Firstly, that emerging powers‟ engagement with African countries is 
purely exploitive, a form of neo-colonialism and destructive. Secondly, that emerging powers‟ 
increasing engagement with Africa is benign and the relationship will not hamper Africa‟s 
developmental objectives. Both of these interpretations of the complex phenomenon appear rigid 
and oversimplified, serving to „mask the nuances inherent in how these actors behave and interact 
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with economies on the African continent and whether they are refuelling Africa‟s development 
prospects‟ (Naidu et al. 2009, p.2).  
 
Firstly, it is important to remember that despite exploring SSA‟s engagement with emerging powers 
as a region, there are „multiple African realities‟ that play a role in shaping emerging powers‟ 
engagement with African countries (Cornelissen 2011, p.11). Similarly, despite the fact that these 
emerging powers are all increasing their political and economic engagement with SSA, the varying 
diplomatic connections and degrees of interaction emerging powers are forging with Africa 
„demonstrate that the make-up of the new global governors is not homogenous and focused on 
necessarily the same interests‟ (Shaw et al. 2009, p.31). Subsequently, the increased presence of 
emerging powers in SSA has brought with it both benefits and potential negatives (Prichard 2009, 
p.254). 
 
The diversity of emerging and traditional partners offers a „tremendous opportunity‟ that increases 
SSA‟s material capabilities as each country brings with it an array of capital goods, developmental 
experience, products and technology as well as new opportunities to trade goods, knowledge and 
models (African Development Bank et al. 2011, p.105). Benefits of increasing engagement between 
SSA and emerging powers since 2000 include creating and connecting markets in addition to 
improvements in regional infrastructure (Kimenyi and Lewis 2011, p.20; Naidu et al. 2009, p.2). 
For example, the lack of existing infrastructure in many SSA countries has meant that both 
companies and SSA host states have been forced to make major investments in order to facilitate 
business, particularly concerning the resource extraction industry (Prichard 2009, p.263). 
Additionally, increasing trade with and investment from emerging powers, in particular China and 
India, is reducing traditional powers‟ political leverage and economic dominance over the region 
(Southall 2009, p.31). It is likely to „increase the negotiating power enjoyed by governments 
seeking to maximise local benefits‟ providing increased leverage for SSA states to improve their 
terms of engagement with investing firms (Prichard 2009, p.254). Shaw et al. (2009, pp.32-33) 
present examples of how South African corporations in more sophisticated sectors undertaking 
business in the region, such as service and retail suppliers, could benefit and gain new opportunities 
through increased Chinese mineral demands.  
 
Despite there being „some evidence of the growth of a new generation of African entrepreneurs 
displaying an awareness of pan-African trading and business opportunities‟, a concern remains that 
on the whole African capitalism is currently too weak and underdeveloped to fully participate and 
benefit from the region‟s resource boom much beyond existing niches in domestically-orientated 
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manufacturing (Southall and Comninos 2009, p.380). Shaw et al. (2009, p.33) also highlight how 
the niche national industry sectors of textiles and shoes in South Africa may be weakened by the 
prominence of Chinese imports. There is also concern surrounding emerging powers‟ commitment 
to upholding environmental and labour standards in addition to the risk of firms becoming involved 
in the financing of investments within conflict areas; these are issues China has been widely 
chastised for in its engagement with SSA (Prichard 2009, p.254). There is further concern that 
increasing access to natural resources could expand the potential for corruption in the allocation of 
exploration and extracting rights (Prichard 2009, p.254). 
 
Looking at the state level of analysis, it can be seen that government leaders in SSA, both from 
authoritarian and more developmental regimes, broadly welcome Chinese investment and 
engagement (Shaw et al. 2009, p.34). For example, President Mugabe of Zimbabwe has been 
proactive about adopting a „Look East‟ policy since 2005 when he signed an aid deal with China, 
who offered a loan yet promised not to interfere in Zimbabwe‟s internal affairs (BBC – Mugabe 
signs aid deal with China 2005). Additionally, in 2008 President Festus Mogae of Botswana 
publically endorsed the increasing engagements between China and Africa, noting that the 
relationship ensured Africans were treated as partners as opposed to subjects, as perceived in the 
European model (The Monitor 25 April 2008, as cited in Shaw et al. 2009, p.34). There is the worry 
that emerging powers‟ seeming lack of concern with SSA policymakers‟ and leaders‟ corruption 
may be contributing to the survival of unaccountable regimes (Kimenyi and Lewis 2011, p.20). 
 
Increasing interactions between SSA and emerging powers since 2000 have highlighted that SSA is 
unquestionably the weaker partner (Shaw et al. 2009, p.32). The notion of emerging powers 
appearing as a dominant neo-colonial power in SSA in academic literature has largely been raised 
in the context of China‟s increasing involvement with the region (Alden et al. 2008). For example, 
the actions of and ventures undertaken by China‟s national oil companies in SSA appear largely 
driven by Chinese strategic interests to gain access to fuel resources in the region (Shaw et al. 2009, 
p.34). Emerging powers‟ focus on securing natural resources from SSA has heightened debate 
concerning how much this increased engagement is based on solely achieving emerging powers‟ 
self interests as opposed to offering developmental benefits (Naidu et al. 2009, p.3). This distinction 
is difficult to unravel because emerging powers‟ developmental assistance appears intrinsically 
linked to their national interest. For example, in 2008 India announced the formal agreement of 131 
projects to Africa estimated to be worth $10 billion, a new $500 million development grant for 
African states and $5 billion in financial credit to the African continent (Shaw et al. 2009, p.35). 
However, these agreements have a „highly resource-supply oriented nature, either directly or 
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through infrastructure development‟ and it is estimated that India imports eleven per cent of its oil 
from Nigeria (Shaw et al. 2009, p.35). This example highlights that recent attention of emerging 
powers towards SSA „is not based on an altruistic goal to improve the economic well-being of 
Africans‟ but instead emerging powers are „trying to maximise their own strategic economic and 
political interests by engaging with African countries‟ (Kimenyi and Lewis 2011, p.20).  
 
4.3.5 Exploring different ideas and new approaches to developmental thinking 
At the beginning of the twenty-first century, Shaw and Nyang‟oro (2000, p.25) asserted that „[a]fter 
a period of unprecedented decline, Africa‟s developmental prospects now appear brighter than at 
any time since the decade of independence.‟ The increasing economic importance of emerging 
powers since 2000 has highlighted different successful forms of economic models, which has 
„found hope among African countries wishing to chart a similar trajectory‟ (Naidu et al. 2009, pp.1-
2). This was reinforced by the fact that as a group, emerging powers weathered the ramifications of 
the financial crisis better than traditional powers, raising important questions regarding how 
different developmental models can impact the future growth paths of SSA economies (Kose and 
Prasad 2010, p.7). 
 
In terms of offering new developmental models, the principles of „Asian values‟, with its origins in 
the „Singapore school‟ and the key works of Kishore Mahbubani, has attracted interest from SSA 
countries (Shaw et al. 2009, p.33). Academic scholarship has offered variations of the „Asian rise‟ 
thesis, with counter-arguments in place advocating the need for open and pragmatic government 
that engages with the global economy (Shaw et al. 2009, p.33). However key interest appears to lie 
in non-aid related tools „such as the encouragement of foreign direct investment and support for 
greater regionalization and economic integration, which are essential for developmental goals 
across Africa [and] can generally be much more easily encouraged and pursued at a diplomatic and 
trade level than through development channels‟ (Cargill 2010, p.24). This has become increasing 
important since 2007, as foreign aid is „being squeezed‟ due to government budget cuts in the wake 
of the financial crisis (Taiwo 2011, p.16). This shift in relative material capabilities in the 
international system has led to emerging powers being able to offer such forms of developmental 
assistance, which may be able to renew the drive for socio-economic development in SSA (Naidu et 
al. 2009, p.2). 
 
Despite much rhetoric from emerging countries citing „South-South solidarity‟ and a „win win‟ 
situation (Cargill 2010, p.vii), it appears unclear as to whether emerging powers are interested in 
furthering SSA‟s developmental priorities or if they are just seeking to exploit the last relatively 
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unexplored region in order to gain natural resources necessary for their own national interests 
(Naidu et al. 2009, p.3). This movement towards looking at different approaches and new ideas 
concerning developmental thinking could lessen SSA‟s dependence on IFIs setting certain 
conditionalities, yet developmental assistance from emerging powers must also „be balanced with 
respect and support for a regulatory and governance framework that ensures such investments 
deliver long-term benefits to all‟ (Cargill 2010, p.vii). There is a concern about the lack of 
transparency between emerging powers and SSA policymakers and leaders in the signing of FDI 
and developmental contracts, especially to do with environmental standards and working conditions 
(Kimenyi and Lewis 2011, p.20). This is where the importance of agency arises, as SSA 
policymakers and leaders need to invest more time and money into the contracting process in order 
to establish it is more transparent (Kimenyi and Lewis 2011, p.20). 
 
Between 2000 and 2011 the discoveries of oil and gas deposits in some SSA countries, including 
Ethiopia, Ghana, São Tomé and Príncipe and Uganda, have presented new opportunities to chart a 
development path that facilitates poverty reduction (Aryeetey and Ashmah 2011, p.22). Despite 
these findings differing in size, there „are growing expectations among the citizens of these new oil 
economies of the immediate upswings in their livelihoods and improvements in quality of life‟ as is 
expected that the economic benefits will be used to deliver significant economic, infrastructure and 
social improvements in these SSA countries (Aryeetey and Ashmah 2011, p.22). However, many of 
these countries have „failed to leverage their natural resource wealth to build strong and stable 
states‟ as the findings have instead been associated with high poverty rates, corruption and weak 
institutions (Aryeetey and Ashmah 2011, p.23). According to Transparency International‟s 2010 
Corruption Perceptions Index, Africa is the most corrupt region of the world, and the prevalence of 
corruption is one of the region‟s most difficult obstacles for development (Transparency 
International – Corruption Perceptions Index 2010). From 2000 to 2011 it has become more widely 
recognised that the quality of a country‟s governance institution is a crucial determinant of a 
country‟s development and economic growth (Kimenyi and Mbaku 2011, p.30). There have been 
significant improvements in governance over the past decade, yet the prevalence of corruption still 
remains a key challenge to development (Kimenyi and Mbaku 2011, p.30). Corruption is 
problematic because it deprives society of access to public goods and services that could assist their 
ability to rise out of poverty (Kimenyi and Mbaku 2011, p.30). Although most SSA countries „have 
set up elaborate anticorruption units, these bodies are largely ineffective and some have even been 
compromised by the appointing authorities‟ (Kimenyi and Mbaku 2011, p.31). There is increasing 
recognition of the practices that need to be put into place in order to avoid the „resource curse‟, with 
Botswana being an example SSA country that has managed its natural resources in order to advance 
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development, yet on the whole the region still suffers from a high level of corruption (Aryeetey and 
Ashmah 2011, p.23). 
 
4.3.6 SSA’s increasing use of diplomacy and political activity in institutions  
Since 2000, SSA countries have played a more strategic role in international affairs, which has been 
assisted through their increasing use of diplomacy and political activity in a number of international 
institutions and with emerging powers (Cargill 2010, p.vii). Invigorated diplomacy has been 
initiated by emerging powers towards SSA over this past decade (Shaw et al. 2009, p.29). Looking 
specifically to the increasing interaction of SSA with China, India and Brazil as examples of 
emerging powers, it can be seen that a number of summits, institutions and bilateral agreements 
have been set up in order to foster a strong relationship between them and SSA.  
 
China initiated the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in 2000. FOCAC has gained 
increasing recognition of its diplomatic importance, with 43 African heads of state or government 
leaders attending the third FOCAC summit in 2006 (Shaw et al. 2009, p.29). The Declaration of 
Sharm el-Sheikh and the Sharm el-Sheik Action Plan (2010-2012) were adopted by an assembly of 
African and Chinese leaders at the fourth FOCAC summit in 2009. The Declaration reflects the 
views of China and Africa on key global and regional issues and provides guiding principles for 
broadening and strengthening China-Africa cooperation. The Action Plan (2010-2012) highlights 
the priority areas for China-Africa cooperation, such as promoting regional peace and co-ordination 
in addressing global trade and financial issues, setting out guidelines and plans in order to help meet 
these objectives (FOCAC 2009).  
 
India followed suit and initiated the India-Africa Forum Summit in 2008, whereby 14 African 
leaders selected by the AU met with prominent Indian leaders (Shaw et al. 2009, p.30). The second 
India-Africa Forum Summit was held in 2011 and discussed the Africa-India Framework for 
Enhanced Cooperation and the scope for future partnership (AU 2nd Africa-India Forum Summit 
2011). To date India-Africa cooperation has predominantly come in the form of technical training 
and private sector investment (African Development Bank et al. 2011, p.130).  
 
Brazil‟s President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva has been one of the most vocal supporters of Africa‟s 
advancement on the international stage from 2000 to 2011, developing numerous bi-lateral 
relationships and undertaking visits to the SSA region (African Development Bank et al. 2011, 
p.130). In July 2010, Brazil and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) held 
a special Summit of Heads of State in Sal, Cape Verde, which further consolidated Brazil‟s 
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commitment to the region. The prominence granted to these frameworks, summits and action plans 
can be seen as institutional affirmation of the growing relationship between SSA and emerging 
powers. 
 
Since 2000 the IMF has been discussing reform of its voting structure in order to „better reflect the 
make-up of the global economy rather than the world as it was when the IMF was set up‟ at the end 
of WWII (Elliot 2006). Thus the IMF proposed that emerging powers would be granted increasing 
weighting in IMF voting structure. SSA countries „reacted furiously‟ to such proposals on the basis 
that it would give priority to emerging countries „while delaying action to give the world‟s poorest 
countries greater influence over the body that often dictates their economic policies‟ leaving them 
in an even weaker and more dependent position (Elliot 2006). Since the proposal of emerging 
powers to increase their IMF quota share was passed in 2010 and will be implemented from 2012, 
the implications of this shift for SSA has yet to be seen (African Development Bank et al. 2011, 
p.134). Looking to the World Bank and the other key IFIs, in October 2008 at the World Bank 
Group‟s Annual Meeting reforms were agreed that created an additional Chair at the World Bank 
Board for SSA (World Bank Press Release 2009). This was seen to be a highly positive move for 
SSA countries, yet in April 2010 the World Bank issued further reforms which saw 18 of SSA‟s (at 
the time) 47 countries lose quota share, with 60 per cent staying the same and only one (Sudan) 
gaining (World Bank 2010). Despite this loss of quota shares, as a region SSA has become 
„increasingly assertive in international forums and aware of its influence‟ as a region making up 
nearly 25 per cent of the world‟s countries, and subsequently as a large bloc in international 
institutions (Cargill 2010, p.43). Thus, as emerging and traditional powers are both keen to gain 
support and secure votes from the region, SSA‟s material capabilities in international institutions 
have increased with the region‟s increasing use of diplomacy and political activity. 
 
Emerging powers‟ desire to invoke a reordering of global relations and a rethink of key definitions 
and practices of global governance has been supported by SSA, which has focused on gaining more 
representation for the region in both IFIs and global governance institutions (BISA Africa - African 
Agency in International Politics 2011; World Bank Press Release 2009). However, there appears to 
be ambiguity about who speaks for SSA in these international forums and to what extent it is 
possible and desirable to present a common African position (Cargill 2010, p.43). The AU appears 
„the most constitutionally sound articulation of continent wide positions, yet its capacity is limited‟ 
(Cargill 2010, p.43). The AU does not have a coherent strategy for managing the continent‟s multi-
bilateral relationships. The continent is marked by „fragile institutions that struggle to advance 
continental and regional governance against traditional notions of state sovereignty; notions that 
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reinforce Africa‟s colonial inherited fragmentation and, as a result, vulnerability to more powerful 
external state and regional actors‟ (Kornegay and Landsberg 2009, p.189). The AU faces the 
challenge of increasing its ability to manage the inter-African system in a way that maximises the 
continent‟s interests in the wake of emerging powers‟ rising interests, in order to lessen its current 
weakness benefitting „the parochial vested interests of predatory elite impunity under the guise of 
state sovereignty‟ and instead help gain tangible benefits for the region as a whole (Kornegay and 
Landsberg 2009, p.189).  
 
Presidents Thabo Mbeki of South Africa, Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria, Abdelaziz Bouteflika of 
Algeria and Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal skilfully lobbied the G8 leaders in 2000 and 2001 to 
commit to appointing an African Personal Representative to work out an African Action Plan, 
which was launched in 2002 (Cargill 2010, pp.3-4). The G8 African Action Plan was drawn up 
based on the key aims and commitments set out in the New Partnership for Africa‟s Development 
(NEPAD) (Cargill 2010, p.6). NEPAD was adopted by the Organisation of African Unity (the 
predecessor to the AU) in July 2001, with the aims to eradicate poverty; halt the marginalisation of 
Africa in the globalisation process; enhance Africa‟s full and beneficial integration into the global 
economy; accelerate the empowerment of women; change the systemic defects in Africa‟s political 
systems; and place African countries on a path of sustainable growth and development (Cargill 
2010, pp.4-5; Cornelissen 2011, p.10). NEPAD represented the „determination of Africans to 
extricate themselves and the continent from the malaise of underdevelopment and exclusion in a 
globalising world‟ (NEPAD 2001, p.1). NEPAD „set the stage for a new era of aid relations 
between Africa and the North, which, on the one hand, involved changes in the modalities and 
goals of Northern assistance to the continent and, on the other hand, the establishment of new, 
multilateral institutions of “partnership” ‟ (Cornelissen 2011, p.10). Subsequently, the key 
implication of NEPAD is that it represented collective acceptance by Africa‟s leadership of the 
notion of „good governance‟ and encouraged the move for relationships with the North to be based 
on partnership, as opposed to conditionalities and dependence (Cornelissen 2011, p.10). Thus, the 
G8 „has played a valuable role in clarifying and anchoring a more strategic, coordinated and 
consultative approach to Africa‟s development needs among most Western countries,‟ yet the latter 
years of this decade of analysis saw the G8‟s progress on Africa slow (Cargill 2010, p.vii).  
 
In 2005, NEPAD began to „unravel‟ as the „African side of the push for international reform had 
run its course‟ (Cargill 2010, p.10). Since 2005, Africa has remained on the G8 agenda, yet the 
focus placed on aid at the detriment of business and private-sector linkages has resulted in the G8 
diminishing in importance for SSA, echoing the shift in relative material capabilities that occurred 
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in the international system between 2000 and 2011 (Cargill 2010, pp.vii-viii). Criticism has been 
levied towards the G8‟s commitment to its African engagement, with G8 processes appearing little 
more than symbolic gestures in the light of a very small proportion of the pledged assistance 
actually being paid out (Cornelissen 2009, p.17). 
 
The movement in the prominence of global governance from the G8 to the G20 has implications for 
SSA. The fact that many of the G20 countries are developing countries appears to strengthen its 
broad commitments to improve „fuel, food and finance to the world‟s poor‟ through measures 
targeting issues such as food security, microfinance access and reducing the impact of climate 
change on the poor, which is highly beneficial for SSA countries (G20 - Pittsburgh Summit 2009). 
Moreover, prominence being placed on the G20 has increased the presence of emerging and 
developing powers at discussions of global governance, granting scope for more rounded 
discussions on development ideas and models within this forum (Cargill 2010, p.13). However, 
South Africa is the only SSA country represented in the G20, despite calls for inclusion by other 
SSA states, and it is limited in its ability to focus the G20 on issues the most pertinent to SSA 
(Cargill 2010, p.14). Subsequently, other SSA states, such as Angola, Nigeria, Ghana and Uganda, 
are focusing efforts on the G77 and other forums as a means to push African issues onto the agenda 
in the international system (Cargill 2010, p.14). 
 
4.4 Conclusion 
Having explored the key trends in Africa‟s political economy between 2000 and 2011, it can be 
seen that the nature of SSA‟s political economy has changed in this last decade from the conditions 
of dependence identified in the twentieth century (Cornelissen 2011; African Development Bank et 
al. 2011). The main trends of SSA‟s political economy from 2000 to 2011 include a resilient 
economic and political performance in the face of the financial crisis of 2007 to 2010, increasing 
engagement with emerging powers resulting in being typified as the „swing continent,‟ and different 
ideas and new approaches with regards to developmental thinking and the role and nature of 
institutions. Through exploring the key trends and forces prevalent in SSA‟s political economy in 
the context of structural changes ongoing in the international system, it has become apparent that 
the nature of SSA‟s political economy has been highly influenced by the shift in relative 
capabilities from traditional powers to emerging powers in the international system that occurred 
during this decade (Cargill 2010; Cornelissen 2009; Kornegay and Landsberg 2009). 
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The financial crisis of 2007 to 2010 had significant repercussions in the international system as it 
hastened the shift in material capabilities from traditional to emerging powers. The rise in IMF 
quota shares agreed in 2010 for emerging powers and the reliance on emerging players to provide 
capital injections in order to stabilise the global economy depicts this (African Development Bank 
et al. 2011, p.134; Kose and Prasad 2010, p.7). The move from the G8 to the G20 in 2009 as the 
key international institution to discuss future economic cooperation was decided to be the best 
means to best respond to the challenges brought on by the financial crisis (Cargill 2010:12). It was 
the capability of emerging powers to weather the repercussions of the financial crisis better than 
traditional powers that raised questions concerning how different governance and developmental 
models can impact the future growth paths of economies around the world (Kose and Prasad 2010, 
p.7). As the decade progressed, emerging powers used their stronger global position to try and 
change the conventional ideas, practices and procedures of the established institutions of global 
governance (Scott 2010, p.4).  
 
At the end of the twentieth century, SSA was dependent on IFIs determining key ideas and 
approaches to SSA countries‟ development models and governance. However, emerging powers‟ 
rise in material capabilities through different factors and processes to traditional powers‟ own 
patterns of industrialisation gave rise to the notion that there are alternative models of development 
to neoliberalism (Cornelissen 2009, p.14). This shift in relative material capabilities in the 
international system during the first decade of the twenty-first century has resulted in emerging 
powers increasingly being able to offer different forms of developmental assistance based on non-
aid-related tools to SSA, with the scope to help renew the drive for socio-economic development in 
the region (Naidu et al. 2009, p.2). The option of different approaches and new ideas concerning 
developmental thinking, such as supporting greater regionalism, economic integration and 
encouraging FDI, could lessen SSA‟s dependence on IFIs setting certain conditionalities (Cargill 
2010, p.vii). However, concern has been raised regarding emerging powers‟ lack of developmental 
contracts dealing with environmental standards and working conditions (Kimenyi and Lewis 2011, 
p.20). This raises the need for SSA policymakers and leaders to invest more time and money into 
the contracting process in order to make it more transparent and not hinder development in the 
region (Kimenyi and Lewis 2011, p.20). As Africa was ranked the most corrupt region of the world 
in 2010 (Transparency International – Corruption Perceptions Index 2010), there is the worry that 
emerging powers‟ seeming lack of concern with SSA policymakers‟ and leaders‟ corruption that it 
may even be contributing to the survival of unaccountable regimes (Kimenyi and Lewis 2011, 
p.20). Developmental assistance from emerging powers must also „be balanced with respect and 
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support for a regulatory and governance framework that ensures such investments deliver long-term 
benefits to all‟ (Cargill 2010, p.vii). 
 
SSA countries were dependent on the material capabilities of external actors for managing the key 
policies and elements of their political economy at the end of the twentieth century. However, when 
looking at the financial crisis of 2007 to 2010 as one of the key trends in both the international 
system and SSA‟s political economy between 2000 and 2011, it can be seen that SSA weathered the 
crisis, albeit with ongoing effects. SSA countries that were more diversified tended to be more 
resilient than those that were highly dependent on a few commodities (Mutenyo 2011, p.29). 
Despite SSA economies fronting an impressive resurgence in their „symbolic‟ economy, the impact 
on the „real‟ economy was heightened by the overlap with the 2008 food crisis (Cargill 2010, p.23). 
SSA citizens‟ livelihoods are likely to be impacted in years to come through higher levels of 
unemployment, poverty and child mortality rates, with reduced rates on goods and commodities 
resulting in strains on the already weak government services across the region because of the 
financial crisis (Fosu and Naudé 2009, p.13; Lewis 2010, p.194). SSA countries have also displayed 
political resilience, as popular grievances and demands from civil society in the wake of the food, 
fuel and financial crises have not predominantly unsettled the regimes. The increased number of 
democratic governments has allowed scope for civil dissatisfaction without challenging the regimes 
in place (Lewis 2010, p.193).  
 
Additionally, since 2000 SSA states have embarked on invigorated diplomacy with emerging 
powers, utilising the rhetoric of partnership and solidarity between the global South (Shaw et al. 
2009, p.29). This rise in emerging powers‟ engagement with SSA has had the positive influence of 
highlighting the need for traditional powers to fund and promote access to rural development, 
agriculture, long-term finance and infrastructure projects for developing countries (African 
Development Bank et al. 2011, p.113). In contrast, exploration of the key trends in SSA‟s political 
economy has shown that traditional powers have placed renewed focus on the issues of poverty, 
development and good governance, with the engagement often characterised by set conditionalities 
that appear in continuation of an unequal relationship (Cornelissen 2009, p.15).  
 
The emphasis placed by emerging powers on improving infrastructure and other structural 
bottlenecks since 2000 has been beneficial for SSA, as these were issues less prioritised by 
traditional powers at the turn of the century and are integral to SSA‟s development (African 
Development Bank et al. 2011, p.108). The diversity of emerging and traditional partners wanting 
to increase their engagement with SSA countries offers a „tremendous opportunity,‟ as the array of 
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developmental experience, products and technology as well as new opportunities to trade goods, 
knowledge and models presents SSA with opportunities and lessens the likelihood of future 
conditions of dependence (African Development Bank et al. 2011, p.105).  
 
The significant increase in and nature of engagement between SSA and emerging powers has led to 
discussions of whether emerging powers‟ increasing engagement with SSA countries is purely 
exploitive or benign are rigid and oversimplified stances that do not suffice to help understand the 
complex phenomenon (Naidu et al. 2009, p.2). The concern of developing countries maintaining 
very low standards of corporate social responsibility has been raised, alongside the worry that 
increasing competition for access to mineral rights will result in increased corruption and 
politicisation of access, which could be detrimental to citizens and the democratic governance of 
SSA states (Prichard 2009, p.254). It is important to raise the question of whether emerging powers 
are trying to forge a relationship with SSA that could ultimately lead to conditions of dependence. It 
would be naïve to assume that emerging powers‟ increasing engagement with SSA is based on an 
altruistic goal to improve the economic well-being in SSA. It is important to remember that 
emerging powers have increased this engagement in order to achieve their own strategic economic 
and political goals (Kimenyi and Lewis 2011, p.20). Exploration of the nature of the increasing 
interactions between SSA and emerging powers between 2000 and 2011 indicates that at present 
SSA is the weaker partner (Shaw et al. 2009, p.32). 
 
Thus, this chapter has carried out an exploration of the key trends in SSA‟s political economy from 
2000 to 2011. It has shown how the structural shift in relative material capabilities in the 
international arena from traditional to emerging powers has highly shaped the nature of SSA‟s 
political economy during this period. There has been a heightened desire of traditional and 
emerging powers to engage with SSA, coupled with the increased capability of emerging powers to 
do so. Combined with increased diplomatic opportunities for the region, these trends show there is 
an opportunity for SSA to enhance its independence. To fully exploit the opportunity, SSA leaders 
must work cohesively, improve governance and issues of corruption, and resist moves by emerging 
powers to encourage conditions of dependence. 
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5. Conclusion 
 
5.1 Introduction  
The study has aimed to increase understanding of the nature of SSA‟s political economy. The 
majority of scholarly literature written on SSA has focused on humanitarian crises, poverty, war, 
corruption and conflict (Dunn and Shaw 2001; Taylor and Williams 2004). The study suggests that 
mainstream IR and IPE theory largely overlook SSA, and consequently mainstream IR and IPE 
literature is inadequate to provide explanations for emergent trends in SSA‟s political economy. 
Academic scholarship on SSA‟s place in world politics largely focuses on evaluating policies 
adopted by African states towards the outside world, as opposed to analysing the policies external 
powers have undertaken towards SSA and the subsequent effects this has had on the region (such as 
Harbeson and Rothchild 1995). For the above reasons, a number of studies exploring SSA‟s place 
in world politics have failed to evaluate SSA‟s position within the context of structural changes 
occurring in the international system (Taylor and Williams 2004, p.3). 
 
SSA‟s political economy is infused with dependence that can be identified through exploring the 
historical context of the twentieth century that shaped it. Since dependence is „a historical process, a 
matrix of action,‟ this allows for the possibility of dependence to alter as a result of a change in the 
dynamics and structure making up the international system and the key trends within SSA‟s 
political economy (Bayart 2000, p.234). Emergent trends and shifts in SSA‟s political economy, 
including strong economic growth performances and increasing South-South cooperation, appear to 
contradict a dependent and conflict ridden depiction (Cornelissen 2011, p.5). The thesis identifies 
that these changes in SSA‟s political economy have arisen because of systemic changes occurring 
in the international system.  
 
These points have formed the rationale of the study, shaping the main and supporting research 
questions: What have been the key trends prevalent in SSA’s political economy from 2000-2011 and 
how have these been shaped by structural changes in the international system? Does the nature of 
SSA’s political economy between 2000 and 2011 give scope for SSA’s conditions of dependence to 
alter? This chapter shall now explore the main theoretical and empirical themes in order to answer 
and reflect on the research questions, before discussing the scope for future research.  
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5.2 Theoretical framing 
The study has recognised that there is a need for „a revision on how Africa should be interpreted in 
the theoretical assumptions of international relations‟ (Naidu et al. 2009, p.1). The study has 
systematically explored the key attributes of mainstream IR and IPE theories, highlighting their 
shortcomings in furthering understanding of the nature of SSA‟s political economy. Subsequently, 
the study highlighted key epistemological and ontological aspects that should be taken into 
consideration when exploring the nature of SSA‟s political economy. The importance of history, the 
need for various units and levels of analysis, the influence of internal and external agency, and the 
importance of identifying ideational and institutional strength in addition to military power, led to 
the identification of the need for a historicised pluralist framework that recognised the importance 
of both structure and agency. 
 
This exploration and analysis of the mainstream IR and IPE theories and Africa‟s epistemological 
and ontological requirements directed the study towards selecting CCT as a critical framework to 
facilitate exploration of SSA‟s political economy. Through identifying CCT‟s concept of hegemony 
in the international system and the historical structure, the heuristic approach of studying the 
prevalent forces concerning material capabilities, ideas and institutions at different levels of 
analysis appeared a useful lens of analysis. The ambitious nature of both CCT and the study 
combined with practical constraints, such as time and word limitations, ensured that predominant 
focus was placed on „forces from above‟ using the framework of analysis. 
 
The key criticisms levelled towards CCT‟s epistemology, ontology and empirical application were 
explored, with counter arguments presented when founded. Criticisms ranged from CCT not 
searching for recurrent themes (Schechter 2002, p.5) to its treatment of the „Third World‟ as a 
singular entity, highlighting the difference between „core‟ and „periphery‟ countries yet overlooking 
the differences between countries categorised as periphery (Samatar and Samatar 1987). 
Exploration of CCT has highlighted the limited number of scholarly applications of this theoretical 
approach in an African context. The criticisms and concerns highlighted have undoubtedly 
influenced this scholarly distancing of applying CCT to analysis of SSA.  
 
Recognition of these various weaknesses has influenced the study‟s decision to narrow focus to the 
CCT concepts of hegemony in the international system and historical structures. It has highlighted 
the key benefits of this lens of analysis through its applicability and use when applied to exploring 
both the international system and SSA‟s political economy. The study has used this historicised 
critical approach in order to „broaden the scope of inquiry by analysing forces favouring or 
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opposing changing patterns of behaviour,‟ thus allowing for the systematic exploration of shifts and 
key trends in SSA‟s political economy within the context of structural changes occurring in the 
international system (Cox, as cited in Schouten 2010, p.6). 
 
5.3 Major themes  
Exploration of the key trends prevalent in SSA‟s political economy in the context of the nature of 
the international system highlighted how SSA‟s political economy was infused with dependence in 
the twentieth century. The key ideas and institutions prevalent in SSA‟s political economy in the 
twentieth century were heavily influenced by the respective significant ideas and institutions in the 
international system. This historical context shows that even since independence, SSA countries 
have been dependent upon external requirements and resources as a result of both external and 
internal actors‟ actions. However, since 2000 the nature of SSA‟s political economy has changed. 
The key trends prevalent in SSA‟s political economy continue to be highly shaped by the nature of 
the international system, with the structural shift in relative material capabilities from traditional to 
emerging powers in the international system having significant implications for SSA‟s political 
economy. The main trends of SSA‟s political economy from 2000 to 2011 include increasing 
engagement with emerging powers; different ideas and new approaches with regards to 
development thinking and the role and nature of international institutions; and a resilient economic 
and political performance in the face of the financial crisis of 2007 to 2010. This historicised 
approach has enabled the study to explore whether the nature of SSA‟s political economy from 
2000 to 2011 provides scope for SSA‟s conditions of dependence to alter. 
 
These trends have been made up of the interactions between the key forces of ideas, institutions and 
material capabilities. The chapter now highlights the dynamics of these key forces in SSA‟s 
political economy in both the twentieth and early twenty-first century.  
 
5.3.1 Material capabilities 
The twentieth century saw a shift in historical structure from pax britannica to pax americana and 
the US remained the hegemon at the end of the century. SSA was highly shaped by pax britannica, 
with a number of SSA states having been colonised by the UK. The 1960s and 1970s were met with 
optimism by and for the newly independent SSA states following the relatively smooth processes of 
decolonisation and consolidation (Cornelissen 2009, p.8). However, SSA states emerged entrenched 
in Western-centred political economy, due to their key political and economic institutions forming 
strong linkages with previous colonial powers (Clapham 1996). Subsequently, decolonisation 
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further facilitated SSA‟s condition of dependence on the same external actors that had been utilised 
in colonialism (Chiriyankandath 2008, p.36). SSA leaders and policymakers found their capabilities 
weakened by the number of powerful actors with whom they had to compete in order to maintain 
control of the state (Hobden 2008b, p.72). 
 
SSA‟s political economy was further impacted by external actors throughout the Cold War, as 
proxy wars and actions of external actors deepened internal crises across the region (Cornelissen 
2009, p.8; Hobden 2008b, pp.74-75). In order to gain economic resources and political support, a 
number of SSA leaders embarked on alliances of convenience with the either the US or the USSR 
and their respective allies in the Cold War, resulting in neopatrimonial tendencies becoming 
prevalent and undermining the legitimacy of states and societal cohesion in the region (Hobden 
2008b, p.75). Instability in SSA was increased by proxy wars in states or their neighbouring 
countries. This heightened political instability and weak economic capabilities led states to 
increasingly turn to IFIs for financial support (Chazan et al. 1999, p.337). Neoliberal ideational 
criteria had to be met by SSA states in order to gain financial assistance, which resulted in IFIs 
gaining external control of SSA states‟ political economies through means such as SAPs (Harrison 
2010, pp.12-13). The end of the Cold War brought with it renewed insecurities for a number of SSA 
countries, as conflict within states had implications for neighbouring countries (Hobden 2008b, 
p.76). SSA‟s main commodities were being more effectively produced by other developing nations, 
which further decreased SSA‟s material capabilities as the region become less important to global 
investors and IFIs (Callaghy 2008, p.40). 
 
However, the structural shift in the international system that has occurred since 2000 has seen a 
move in relative material capabilities from traditional powers to emerging powers (Shaw et al. 
2009, p.27). This structural shift has resulted in Africa becoming the „swing continent‟ caught up in 
the global transition of power, which has increased its material capabilities (Kornegay and 
Landsberg 2009, p.171). Countries from both the global North and South have pursued closer 
engagement with SSA since the beginning of 2000. However the nature of the partnerships offered 
contrast, with Northern powers focusing on aid and development and the emerging Southern 
powers focusing on reducing international disparities and FDI (Cornelissen 2009, p.6). As the 
decade progressed, emerging powers used their stronger global position to try to change the 
conventional ideas, practices and procedures of the established institutions of global governance, 
which benefited the African agenda of seeking more representation in global governance and IFIs 
(Scott 2010, p.4). SSA weathered the effects of the financial crisis of 2007 to 2010 better than most 
regions, with its „symbolic‟ economy gathering impressive growth rates in its wake (Cargill 2010, 
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p.23). The implications for the „real‟ economy were heightened by the 2008 food crisis, and there is 
the ongoing danger of citizens‟ livelihoods experiencing higher levels of unemployment, poverty 
and child mortality rates as a result of the financial crisis (Fosu and Naudé 2009, p.13). SSA 
demonstrated significant political capabilities, as despite the disruptions caused by the food, fuel 
and financial crisis, civil dissatisfaction has been expressed by societies without largely challenging 
the governing regimes in place (Lewis 2010, p.193). 
 
5.3.2. Ideas 
The key ideas concerning SSA‟s political economy in the twentieth century were effectively 
enforced by external actors and infused conditions of dependence on SSA countries. The process of 
independence in SSA presented anti-colonists with little option other than to maintain the sovereign 
state as the key political and economic unit, as was prevalent and entrenched within the 
international system during this period (Cooper 2003, p.67). Subsequently, newly independent SSA 
states emerged entrenched in a Western-centred political economy, without a shared feeling of 
national unity among its citizens, due to the socially constructed nature of the African state and the 
endurance of pre-existing social dynamics following independence (Clapham 1996). Additionally, 
the notion of capitalism was the key idea for how to organise both domestic and international 
political economies, albeit in different forms as the century progressed (Gilpin 2000). Neoliberal 
capitalism rose in prevalence and became the hegemonic idea in the international system in the 
1980s (Gilpin 2000). This had knock on implications for SSA, as neoliberal reforms of SSA‟s 
political economy were imposed and largely driven through externally led processes as a form of 
„scientific capitalism‟ (Ferguson 1995). This resulted in the process of neoliberal structural 
adjustment effectively becoming the developmental orthodoxy for the continent (Harrison 2010, 
p.39). 
 
This rise in emerging powers‟ economic, and increasingly political, prowess has resulted in their 
increasing ability to offer business and developmental options to SSA countries between 2000 and 
2011 (Naidu et al. 2009, pp.1-2). Additionally, the ability of emerging powers to weather the 
financial crisis more effectively than traditional powers has seen SSA countries express more 
interest in emerging powers‟ developmental models. The option of different approaches and new 
ideas concerning developmental thinking could lessen SSA‟s dependence on IFIs setting certain 
conditionalities (Cargill 2010, p.vii). African countries looking towards different ideas and new 
approaches to governance and developmental models represent an ideological shift away from a 
collective orientation towards the politics of neoliberal economics towards more contrasting 
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ideology in terms of developmental thinking and global markets in the international system 
(Cornelissen 2009, p.11). 
.  
5.3.3 Institutions 
International organisations rose in strategic importance over the twentieth century, with the UN 
holding the key position of managing the international system (O‟Brian and Williams 2004, p.123). 
The nature of SSA‟s political economy was impacted by the UN General Assembly‟s advocating 
the process of decolonisation and the high number of independent African states contributed to the 
significant increase in member states of the UN over the century (Hobden 2008b, p.80). Renewed 
and invigorated institutional multilateralism in the second half of the century reflected the 
hegemonic ideas in the international system, and IFIs imposed prevalent ideas and practices in the 
international system onto SSA (Harrison 2010, p.38).  
 
Between 2000 and 2011, emerging powers have highlighted the need for the reordering of global 
relations and advocated rethinking definitions and practices of global governance, such as allowing 
a wider group of countries to shape the agenda of international institutions (Shaw et al. 2009, p.29). 
This shift has been favourable for SSA‟s political economy, which has historically been 
underrepresented in IFIs and global governance institutions despite being highly influenced by 
decisions generated by such institutions. Since 2000 African counties have increased their use of 
diplomacy and political activity in IFIs, resulting in the region playing a more strategic role in 
international affairs as the decade progressed (Cargill 2010, p.vii). Emerging powers have placed 
increased prominence on frameworks, summits and action plans with African as a region, such as 
FOCAC and the Africa-India Framework for Enhanced Cooperation. These appear as an 
institutional affirmation of the growing relationship between SSA and emerging powers. Reforms 
of the IMF and World Bank can be seen as favourable to SSA because they represent a move away 
from traditional powers‟ monopoly of the institutions to a weighting that more closely represents 
the make-up of the global economy (World Bank 2010). However, in reality these reforms grant 
little improvement to SSA‟s marginal influence in these IFIs. 
 
In the twentieth century SSA was predominantly acted upon by international governance and 
financial institutions, with conditionalities being set for SSA‟s own national institutions. However, 
the start of the twenty-first century shows the region has become increasingly assertive in 
international forums and aware of its influence, making up nearly 25 per cent of the world‟s 
countries and a substantial bloc in international institutions (Cargill 2010, p.43). From 2000, the G8 
has played a significant role in „clarifying and anchoring a more strategic, coordinated and 
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consultative approach to Africa‟s development needs among most Western countries,‟ yet the latter 
years of this decade of analysis saw the G8‟s progress on Africa slow (Cargill 2010, p.vii). 
Criticism has been directed towards the G8 for its processes appearing little more than symbolic 
gestures, as a very small proportion of the pledged assistance has actually being paid out 
(Cornelissen 2009, p.17). The movement in prominence from the G8 to the G20 in the international 
system presents the opportunity for issues more pertinent to developing countries to be discussed in 
this arena, yet as South Africa is the only SSA country represented in the G20 it is limited in its 
ability to focus the G20 on issues most pertinent to SSA and effectively represent the region 
(Cargill 2010, p.14).  
 
5.4 Reflections on SSA’s conditions of dependence 
Through undertaking analysis of the nature of the international system and SSA‟s political economy 
in the twentieth century, the nature of SSA‟s conditions of dependence on external powers and 
institutions has been identified. Exploration of the key trends prevalent in SSA‟s political economy 
from 2000 to 2011 has shown a shift in relative material capabilities from traditional powers to 
emerging powers to be the key trend and process during this period. The study consents with 
Bayart‟s (2000, p.234) understanding of dependence being a historical process and hence reliant on 
the dynamics and structure making up the international system. Additionally, the study 
acknowledges Cox‟s (1981) determination that an alternative structure in the international system 
can arise under pressure from forces from above as well as those from below. Thus, since the period 
of 2000 to 2011 has seen a structural change occur in the international system, does this give rise to 
different dynamics between the key ideas, institutions and material capabilities in the international 
system and SSA‟s political economy that could alleviate this dependence?  
 
Exploration of the ramifications of this rise in emerging powers‟ material capabilities indicated that 
there were both benefits and downfalls for SSA and its political economy. Despite much rhetoric 
from emerging countries citing „South-South solidarity‟ and a „win win‟ situation (Cargill 2010, 
p.vii), it appears unclear as to whether emerging powers are interested in furthering SSA‟s 
developmental priorities or if they are just seeking to exploit the last relatively unexplored region in 
order to gain natural resources necessary for their own national interests (Naidu et al. 2009, p.3). 
However, emerging powers‟ increase in economic capabilities has enabled them to offer new forms 
of developmental assistance to countries in SSA which offers a different path to that imposed by 
IFIs, to whom the majority of SSA countries are already in significant debt (Naidu et al. 2009, pp.1-
2). This movement towards looking at different approaches and new ideas concerning 
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developmental thinking could lessen SSA‟s dependence on IFIs that set certain conditionalities, yet 
developmental assistance from emerging powers must also „be balanced with respect and support 
for a regulatory and governance framework that ensures such investments deliver long-term 
benefits to all‟ (Cargill 2010, p.vii). 
 
The increased engagement of emerging powers with SSA should not be measured as the demise of 
traditional power‟s engagement (Cornelissen 2009, p.15). Since 2000, traditional powers have also 
pursued closer engagement with the African continent, yet through means such as international 
development and aid campaigns as opposed to emerging powers‟ focus on pursuing deeper 
multilateralism and FDI (Cornelissen 2009, p.6). SSA‟s material capabilities have increased as both 
emerging and traditional powers are keen to gain support from SSA in international institutions. 
SSA has „never been in such a strong bargaining position‟ than at present with its increasing 
numbers of „suitors‟, yet African leadership appears „insufficient and the activism and vision that 
characterized the first few years of the twenty-first century are less in evidence now‟ (Cargill 2010, 
p.viii).  
 
In order for SSA countries to gain the benefits of working with a myriad of traditional and 
emerging powers, the region‟s leaders are best placed to mitigate the possible problematic issues 
that may arise (Cargill 2010, p.viii). African policymakers and leaders must consider to what extent 
these economic powerhouses can represent the global South‟s and Africa-specific issues in 
international forums. Moreover, what SSA wants to gain and stands to gain from South-South and 
Southern-driven multilateral alliances must be identified (Cornelissen 2009, p.6). At present it is not 
clear whether SSA is effectively managing these partnerships. SSA needs to strengthen the AU and 
its other inter-African bodies in order to ensure that neither the global North or South „carve out 
relationships with the AU (or indeed, bypass it) that will facilitate external national interest agendas 
that are as much self interested as in Africa‟s interest and not necessarily entirely on African terms‟ 
(Kornegay and Landsberg 2009, p.188). 
 
The level of agency attributed to African leaders and policymakers themselves is a highly 
underexplored aspect of SSA‟s political economy and international relations (Naidu et al. 2009, 
p.3), yet one that needs to be further explored in order to ascertain whether the emerging dynamics 
in the international system and SSA‟s political economy could alleviate SSA‟s dependence on 
external powers and institutions. Numerous challenges will continue to arise for SSA in effectively 
guiding increasing engagements with emerging powers, yet „how Africa comes to grips with the 
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challenges will, in many respects, determine and define the opportunities‟ of alleviating its 
historical dependence (Kornegay and Landsberg 2009, p.172). 
 
5.5 Scope for future research  
The study was an ambitious yet illuminating project. Using SSA as the unit of analysis was 
challenging, as it resulted in a macro study of key forces within the region falling under the themes 
of ideas, institutions and material capabilities. However the rationale for this unit of analysis is 
strong, as there is a shared perception of Africa‟s unity that is constructed transnationally through 
collective images of social order. Also, this is a key unit of analysis used in both academic and 
policy literature which has not been explored from this theoretical framework before. The lack of 
scholarly literature exploring SSA‟s political economy means that the current study and future 
studies utilising CCT in this manner will contribute to further understanding on the nature of SSA‟s 
political economy.  
 
The study has contributed to both IR and IPE literature through identifying how a narrowed version 
of CCT can facilitate analysis of SSA‟s political economy in the context of structural changes 
taking place in the international system. This highlights to IR and IPE scholars that if one broadens 
the scope of explorative tools beyond the main paradigms, CCT provides a useful theoretical 
framework to analyse African issues. Moreover, because of CCT‟s flexibility in proving a useful 
lens of analysis to also facilitate the exploration of the international system, as shown in the study, 
advocating the application of CCT to Africa does not run the risk of continuing Africa‟s 
marginalisation in IR and IPE or „essentialise‟ the continent (Smith 2009, p.273).   
 
The study puts forward that CCT would be a useful tool when undertaking analysis of the political 
economy of other developing regions that have struggled to be explained using the more traditional 
IR and IPE paradigms. Moreover, analysis of a sub-region of Africa, such as the Great Lakes or a 
regional economic community, would be interesting for further study. A study utilising a narrowed 
version of CCT to explore a smaller unit of analysis would provide scope for more focus to be 
placed on the dynamics of state-society complex as agents of change. 
 
Despite CCT offering scope for the analysis of both structure and agency, through exploring the 
dynamics between the key forces prevalent in the historical structure of the international system and 
SSA‟s political economy this study has predominantly been grounded in structural analysis. This 
limited the study‟s exploration of agency in SSA‟s political economy, which was further 
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complicated by the level of agency attributed to African leaders and policymakers being a highly 
underexplored area (Naidu et al. 2009, p.3). Further analysis of the level of agency attributed to 
African leaders and policymakers would help ascertain whether there is the desire amongst political 
leadership to alleviate Africa‟s dependence on external powers and institutions. 
 
5.6 Conclusion of Study 
The study has appraised the nature and dimensions of SSA‟s political economy and the forces that 
underpin them, using a narrowed CCT framework of analysis. The study has aimed to fill a gap in 
the current literature on SSA‟s political economy through identifying a framework that would assist 
the exploration of key forces and trends ongoing between 2000 and 2011. It has highlighted the 
need to position studies of SSA within the context of structural changes occurring in the 
international system, as shifts in SSA‟s political economy have arisen partly as a manifestation of 
changes occurring in the international system. Through utilising a narrowed version of CCT, it has 
explored Africa‟s dependence on external actors as a result of a historical process. The study has 
identified how key ideas, institutions and material capabilities in the international system highly 
influenced the key trends within SSA‟s political economy in the twentieth century and from 2000 to 
2011. The specific use of CCT as a framework has provided the means to analyse the fluid 
interactions between the key forces in SSA‟s political economy and the international system, 
allowing analysis of the possibility of SSA‟s conditions of dependence to alter. The study has 
shown how the shift in relative material capabilities from traditional to emerging powers has had 
the most significant ramifications for the nature of SSA‟s political economy, giving scope for 
SSA‟s dependence on external actors and institutions to alter if African leaders and policymakers 
desire it to. 
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